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State v. Hoover, 253 Ga.App. 98, 558 S.E.2d 71 (December 19, 2001). Cobb County Police Officer noted tag light out and began pursuing Defendant. Officer then observed Defendant cross in and out of her lane of traffic. Officer activated his car camera as the pursuit approached the Cobb County/Fulton County line. After entering Fulton County, the officer activated his blue lights. Defendant failed to stop. Viewing the chase, an Atlanta police officer joined in the pursuit. Defendant finally pulled over. She was charged by accusation with DUI, invalid license, no tag, weaving on roadway, and a tag light violation. Held, the officer had the authority to arrest Defendant for a traffic offense committed in his presence, regardless of territorial limitations. Citing Poss v. State , 167 Ga.App. 86, 87, 305 S.E.2d 884 (1983), the Court concluded that the fact than an officer does not engage in a high speed chase in pursuit of a driver does not necessarily mandate a finding that the stop and arrest beyond the officer’s territorial limits were unauthorized under the “hot pursuit” doctrine. Nor is there any requirement that the officer activate emergency lights or a siren before leaving his jurisdictional territory. The critical elements characterizing “hot pursuit” are the continuity and immediacy of the pursuit, rather than merely the rate of speed at which pursuit is made. H. JUVENILES In re: T.S., A15A1803, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1126474 (March 23, 2016). In delinquency proceeding based on burglary and other gang-related activity, trial court properly transferred the matter to superior court under 2014 Code. The Court properly heard evidence and argument on each factor set out in OCGA § 15-11-5629(a). Contrary to T.S.’s argument, transfer wasn’t “based solely on the nature of the alleged offenses,” nor did the court “disregard[ ] his amenability to rehabilitation in juvenile court.” Rather, the record shows that the court considered whether other programs or services in the juvenile justice system might be available to help T.S. … [T]he order demonstrates the court’s express consideration of T.S.’s delinquency history with the juvenile court and his behavior and noncompliance with the terms of prior probated sentences, aside from the nature of the offenses T.S. is alleged to have committed.” Evidence authorized juvenile court’s findings here. “In this case, the juvenile court did not find that T.S. was not amenable to rehabilitation; instead, the court ‘doubted’ that he was—a finding the court was authorized to make, given the evidence. See In re: J.M.S., [334 Ga.App. 142, 144–146(1), 778 S.E.2d 391 (2015)]. T.S. had been non-compliant by failing to abide by conditions of his probations, and despite his history in the juvenile court system and various measures having been taken to help him, he continued to engage in criminal activity that escalated in severity. The juvenile petition alleged that T.S. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted burglary and multiple counts of criminal trespass, theft by taking, and participation in gang activity. There was evidence that T.S. kept the company of gang members; one of the perpetrators in the underlying case was an adult gang member; and T.S. possibly carried a firearm during the commission of the underlying alleged acts, which he instigated. “And here, even assuming [T.S.] was amenable to treatment, the juvenile court’s determination that the community’s interest in transferring his case to superior court outweighed [T.S.’s] interest in remaining in the juvenile system was supported by the evidence.” Id. at 146, 778 S.E.2d 391; see In re D.C., [303 Ga.App. 395, 397-398(1), 693 S.E.2d 596 (2010)].” In re: J.H., 335 Ga.App. 848, 783 S.E.2d 367 (February 26, 2016). Juvenile court erred by “permit[ing] the prosecuting attorney to orally amend the petition to prosecute one of the charges-Criminal Gang Activity—as a Designated Felony.” OCGA § 15-11-523 provides as follows: “(a) A prosecuting attorney may amend a petition alleging delinquency at any time prior to the commencement of the adjudication hearing. However, if an amendment is made, a child may request a continuance of his or her adjudication hearing. A continuance may be granted by the court for such period as required in the interest of justice. … (c) After jeopardy attaches, a petition alleging delinquency shall not be amended to include new charges of delinquency.” “Whether a juvenile is adjudicated for committing a Designated Felony or simply a delinquent act significantly alters the length of the commitment available. The maximum length of commitment for a delinquent act is 24 months, with the possibility of a 24–month extension. OCGA § 15–11–607(a). In contrast, an adjudication of delinquency for a Class A Designated Felony may result in restrictive custody with the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for as long as 60 months, and for a Class B Felony, in DJJ custody for 36 months, with a maximum of 18 months in restrictive custody. See OCGA §§ 15–11–602(a)(2), (c)(1), (d)(1).” “OCGA § 15–11– 480(b) specifically provides that jeopardy attaches when the juvenile court accepts a child’s admission to a petition alleging delinquency, and the State concedes that jeopardy had attached in this case before the juvenile court granted the oral motion to amend the petition.” “Construing OCGA § 15–11–522(5), which requires a delinquency petition to state whether any charges are designated felonies, with § 15–11–523(b), which requires that a material amendment to the petition be served to the child and certain designated persons at least 72 hours before the hearing, we conclude that the legislature intended to prohibit the State from materially amending a delinquency petition after the hearing had commenced and after jeopardy attached. Accordingly, because the State sought to make a material amendment to the petition absent proper notice and service, the trial court erred in allowing the amendment.”