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In re: W.L., 335 Ga.App. 561, 782 S.E.2d 464 (February 2, 2016). Following couldn’t directly appeal order adjudicating him “delinquent of various offenses, ordering him to pay restitution, and transferring the case to the Juvenile Court of Peach County for final disposition. “Georgia courts have repeatedly held that transfer orders are not appealable orders under OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(1) because a case transferred from one trial court to another trial court is still ‘pending in the court below.’” Juvenile should have sought discretionary interlocutory appeal instead. In re: C.M.B., 335 Ga.App. 456, 781 S.E.2d 570 (January 11, 2016). In delinquency proceeding, juvenile court properly denied motion to dismiss; delinquency petition was timely filed within “the 72–hour period under OCGA § 15–11–521(a) … following a detention hearing.” Juvenile contended that the 72-hour period included the intervening weekend, but “under OCGA § 15–11–5(c), ‘[w]hen the period of time prescribed is less than seven days, intermediate weekends and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.’” Further, under OCGA § 15-11-5(a), “‘[w]hen a period of time measured in days, weeks, months, years, or other measurements of time is prescribed for the exercise of any privilege or the discharge of any duty, the first day shall not be counted but the last day shall be counted; and, if the last day falls on a weekend, the party having such privilege or duty shall have through the following business day to exercise such privilege or discharge such duty.’ (Emphasis supplied.)” Notes that the original version of 5(a) excluded time periods measured in hours, but that language was deleted in 2014. In re: J.M.S., 334 Ga.App. 142, 778 S.E.2d 391 (October 8, 2015). Transfer of delinquency petitions to superior court affirmed. 1. Evidence supported “finding that he was not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation.” “Indeed, J.M.S. had been non-compliant with a juvenile-treatment program in the past, and despite his history in the juvenile- court system, he continues to engage in criminal activity that has escalated in severity. [fn] In this respect, we have held that, ‘[e]ven if there is evidence that the child may be amenable to treatment, the juvenile court may still transfer the case if it finds that the amenability factor is outweighed by the interest of the community in treating the child as an adult.’ In re: D. M., 299 Ga.App. 586, 591(2), 683 S.E.2d 130 (2009) (punctuation omitted); accord In re: D. C., 303 Ga.App. 395, 398(1)(b), 693 S.E.2d 596 (2010); see also State v. M. M., 259 Ga. 637, 640(3), 386 S.E.2d 35 (1989) (holding that the State was not required to prove that the child was not amenable to treatment when the community’s interest in treating the child as an adult outweighed the child’s interest in remaining in the juvenile system due to the heinous nature of the charged offenses involved). Indeed, under former OCGA § 15–11–562, a child’s amenability to treatment is only one of ten factors to be considered by the court in determining whether the community’s interest in treating the child as an adult outweighs the child’s interest in treatment in the juvenile system. See M. M., 259 Ga. at 639–40(2), 386 S.E.2d 35(a), (c) (explaining that ‘a child’s amenability or non-amenability to treatment is but one factor to consider in determining the child’s and the community’s interests,’ and that a court must balance the child’s interest in treatment in the juvenile system, including but not limited to his amenability to treatment, against the community’s interest in treating the child as an adult).” Notes that new version of OCGA § 15-11-562, effective July 1, 2015, is substantially the same except that it “ includes one additional factor for the juvenile court’s consideration -- ‘[t]he impact of the alleged offense on the alleged victim, including the permanence of any physical or emotional injury sustained, health care expenses incurred, and lost earnings suffered.’ See OCGA § 15–11–562(a)(5) (2015).” 2. Evidence supported “juvenile court’s determination that the community’s interest in transferring his case to superior court outweighed J.M.S.’s interest in remaining in the juvenile system. … Specifically, J.M.S.’s criminal conduct escalated from a history of minor offenses, such as trespass and curfew violations, to three commercial burglaries that occurred within the span of a few days.[fn] And during the last of these burglaries, J.M.S. stole sixteen firearms, aimed an AR–15 rifle at a police officer, and engaged in aggressive behavior toward the officer until he was finally subdued by a taser.[fn] There was also evidence that the last burglary ‘was very sophisticated and well thought out.’[fn] Additionally, an expert in gang activity believed that the burglaries were gang-related based in part on J.M.S.’s own admission to being a gang member and his prior association with well-known gang members. The expert also testified in detail about the serious danger that criminal street gangs pose to the community and noted that there had been an increase in gang-related criminal violations in Glynn County since 2012.[fn] Further, he testified that the potential danger to the community if J.M.S. had successfully stolen such a large number of firearms was ‘very alarming.’” Accord, In re: T.S., A15A1803, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1126474 (March 23, 2016) (under 2014 Code, juvenile court properly considered the transfer factors and balanced the interests of the juvenile and the community). State v. Baxter, 333 Ga.App. 849, 777 S.E.2d 696 (September 22, 2015). In prosecution for aggravated sexual battery, superior court properly granted juvenile’s motion to transfer to juvenile court; where juvenile wasn’t indicted within time limits of OCGA § 17-7-50.1, superior court lost jurisdiction and transfer was mandated. Juvenile’s attempted waiver of timely indictment was ineffective, as timely indictment is jurisdictional requirement, and parties can’t confer jurisdiction upon the court by consent.