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In re: L.T., 325 Ga.App. 590, 754 S.E.2d 380 (January 23, 2014). Following Alford plea to aggravated child molestation, juvenile court properly denied juvenile’s repeated motions to seal the record. OCGA § 15-11-79.2(b) provides for sealing of the record after “[t]wo years have elapsed since the final discharge of the person,” if other conditions are met. Trial court properly determined that “final discharge” here meant completion of the sentence and release from probation, not, as argued by L.T., “the date of adjudication.” Juvenile court thus correctly held that the motions were premature, as L.T. was still on probation. Edwards v. State, 323 Ga.App. 864, 748 S.E.2d 501 (September 13, 2013). In juvenile’s prosecution for kidnapping and related offenses, superior court erred in denying transfer to juvenile court pursuant to OCGA § 17–7–50.1(a). Code section requires transfer where juvenile isn’t indicted within 180 days; superior court wrongly held that the code section was tolled because the juvenile was released on bond. “[N]othing in the statute mandates that the defendant continue to be detained for the entire 180–day period. To the contrary, section 17–7–50.1(a) refers to the child ‘who is detained,’ and the use of the present tense supports that the date of detention is a specific point in time, rather than an ongoing condition necessary for the running of the 180–day time limitation. Moreover, this construction is consistent with the apparent intent of the statute, which is to provide a date certain for a detained child charged with specific felonies to expect an indictment.” In re: J.R.L., 319 Ga.App. 666, 738 S.E.2d 144 (February 5, 2013). No abuse of discretion where juvenile court transferred sixteen-year old’s first degree vehicular homicide prosecution to superior court. “‘Before transferring jurisdiction from juvenile to superior court [pursuant to OCGA § 15–11–30.2(a)], the juvenile court must find that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child committed the delinquent act alleged; the child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill; the interests of the child and the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint and the transfer be made; and the child was at least 15 years of age at the time of the alleged delinquent conduct.’ (Citation omitted.) In re: D.M., 299 Ga.App. 586, 683 S.E.2d 130 (2009).” Issue here is balance between juvenile’s amenability to treatment in juvenile system vs. community’s interest in transfer. 1. Amenability to treatment in juvenile system. “The court first found that J.R.L. was amenable to treatment in the juvenile system, and that the State had not contested that issue. The court concluded that J.R.L.'s amenability to treatment in the juvenile system, his lack of criminal history, his good grades, and his aspiration to attend college weighed in favor of keeping the case in juvenile court.” 2. Community’s interest in prosecution. “The juvenile court, however, went on to detail four factors in the community's interest that weighed in favor of transfer to superior court. The first factor was the seriousness of J.R.L.'s offenses and the severity of the injuries he caused, including the death of one child and the permanent paralysis of another. The second factor was the fact that J.R.L. was the instigator of the misconduct: he made the decision to huff, he taught his passenger how to huff, and he was driving to a location to drink beer and continue huffing when the fatal collision occurred. The third factor was the limited options for detention and supervision available to the juvenile court in dealing with J.R.L., as outlined by the Department of Juvenile Justice supervisor who testified at the hearing. In this regard, the court concluded that an order committing J.R.L. to the department would be insufficient ‘to do justice for the harm [he] caused to the community,’ and would be inadequate because J.R.L. would not be placed in a secure youth detention center preventing him from committing this kind of offense again. Finally, the fourth factor considered by the juvenile court was that the community had a strong interest in having a full public trial, as would be available in superior court, when ‘felonious conduct causes death and debilitation on its highways.’” “Georgia precedent makes clear that all of these factors can be considered by a juvenile court in determining the weight given to the community's interest. See, e.g., State v. M.M., 259 Ga. 637, 640(3), 386 S.E.2d 35 (1989) (‘heinous nature of the offenses’ weighed in favor of community's interest in having case transferred); In re: D.C., [303 Ga.App. 395, 398(1)(b), 693 S.E.2d 596 (2010)] (severity of the offenses and fact that juvenile was an instigator and coordinator of the crimes weighed in favor of community's interest in having case transferred); In re: S.K.K., 280 Ga.App. 877, 879(2), 635 S.E.2d 263 (2006) (fact that ‘there would be insufficient time for the juvenile system to provide adequate treatment in a secure facility’ weighed in favor of community's interest in having case transferred); In re: W.N.J., 268 Ga.App. 637, 641(2), 602 S.E.2d 173 (2004) (severity of the offense and fact that juvenile was the instigator of the offense were factors weighing in favor of community's interest in having case transferred); In re: R.J., [191 Ga.App. 712, 715(3), 382 S.E.2d 671 (1989)] (‘public's right to know the events and the outcome’ of the case weighed in favor of community's interest in having case transferred).” State v. Johnson, 292 Ga. 409, 738 S.E.2d 86 (February 4, 2013). State couldn’t appeal superior court’s transfer of 15- year old’s murder prosecution to juvenile court, based upon failure to indict within 180 days, pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-50.1(b). Types of orders appealable by State are enumerated in OCGA § 5-7-1(a). “When the General Assembly enacted § 17–7–50.1 in 2006, … it did not amend or reference § 5–7–1 to specifically authorize the State to appeal