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transfer orders entered pursuant to § 17–7–50.1(b).” Contrary to State’s argument, a transfer under 17-7-50.1(b) does not amount to “‘an order ... setting aside or dismissing an[ ] indictment,’ which the State may appeal under § 5–7–1(a)(1).” State v. Armendariz, 316 Ga.App. 394, 729 S.E.2d 538 (June 26, 2012). In prosecution on drug and weapon charges (not specified in opinion), trial court properly granted plea in bar based on statute of limitation. Defendant, age 15, was originally charged as a juvenile, then transferred to superior court. A 15-count indictment was returned, whereupon defendant’s bond was revoked, but 12 of the charges were quashed because they weren’t first presented in juvenile court. A new juvenile court petition and transfer order were obtained on nine charges, followed by a new indictment on those charges. “Because the second indictment was returned … more than 250 days after Armendariz's detention, the trial court found that the second indictment was not timely returned and granted the plea in bar-statute of limitations.” 1. Contrary to State’s argument, OCGA § 17–7–50.1's 180–day time requirement applied to all charges upon which defendant was originally detained, including those later quashed. “Armendariz was detained prior to any challenge to the validity of the charges, indicating that he was detained for violating bond related to all charges. Nothing in the statute indicates that the clock stopped running when some charges against him were deemed invalid, an event that preceded the expiration of the 180–day period.” 2. OCGA § 17–7–50.1's 180–day time requirement not affected by six-month extension of statute of limitation for quashed indictments found in OCGA § 17-3-3. “OCGA § 17–3–3 provides that ‘[i]f an indictment is found within the time provided for in Code Section 17–3–1 or 17–3–2, or other applicable statute, and is quashed ... the limitation shall be extended six months from the time the first indictment is quashed.’ [fn] The State clings to the phrase ‘or other applicable statute,’ but presents no case law showing that OCGA § 17–7–50.1 qualifies as an ‘applicable statute,’ nor do we find any case law construing these statutes together. Further, OCGA § 17–3–3's six-month extension is in direct conflict with OCGA § 17–7–50.1(a), which allows an extension ‘not to exceed 90 additional days.’ Additionally, OCGA § 17–7–50.1 deals specifically with juvenile dispositions; OCGA § 17–3–3 does not. We have held that ‘a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent, to resolve any inconsistency between them.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Singletary v. State, 310 Ga.App. 570, 571 n. 9, 713 S.E.2d 698 (2011), citing Berry v. City of East Point, 277 Ga.App. 649, 654(6)(c), 627 S.E.2d 391 (2006). The State's argument fails.” In re: R.W., 315 Ga.App. 227, 726 S.E.2d 708 (March 27, 2012). Evidence supported juvenile court’s remand of defendant to restrictive custody following delinquency adjudication based on burglary. 1. “‘[T]he court must consider five factors in determining whether to order restrictive custody, including the needs and best interest of the juvenile; his record and background; the nature and circumstances of the offense; the need for community protection; and the age and physical condition of the victim.’ In re: J.W., 306 Ga.App. 339, 341(3) (702 S.E.2d 649) (2010). See OCGA § 15–11–63(c). The weight of each factor, and the ultimate decision about whether restrictive custody is warranted, is within the discretion of the juvenile court. In re: Q.S., [310 Ga.App. 70, 77(2) (712 S.E.2d 99) (2011)].” 2. Judge’s speculation on the record that juvenile’s gun theft may have led to recent shooting was “not replicated in the juvenile court's written order, which sets forth, at length, the court's basis for committing R.W. to restrictive custody. ‘While a judge's oral statements on the record may provide insight into the intent of [his] subsequent written judgment, any discrepancies between the two must be resolved in favor of the written judgment.’ In re: S.S., 276 Ga.App. 666, 667 (624 S.E.2d 251) (2005) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the oral statements made by the judge during the hearing show that the juvenile court abused its discretion in placing R.W. in restrictive custody.” 3. Order properly addressed juvenile’s “needs and best interests. The commitment order shows that, under the heading of ‘The Needs and Best Interests of the Juvenile,’ the juvenile court found R.W. to be ‘in need of secure confinement and rehabilitation before he is allowed to return to the community.’ This is sufficient to show that the court considered R.W.'s needs and best interests. In re: J.A.C., 291 Ga.App. 728, 731(3) (662 S.E.2d 811) (2008).” In re: T.F., 314 Ga.App. 606, 724 S.E.2d 892 (March 6, 2012). Juvenile probation revocation reversed; juvenile probation couldn’t be revoked as to 17-year old based on petition that alleged probation violation, but didn’t specifically request revocation. Petition here alleged a curfew violation while in restrictive custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice. “T.F. argues that when the probation violation occurred he was no longer a ‘child’ as that term is defined in OCGA § 15–11–2(2)(A) and that pursuant to OCGA § 15–11–28(d), the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over any new action that was initiated against him after he reached the age of 17 years. The State argues that jurisdiction was proper in this case because OCGA § 15–11–2(2)(B) specifically provides that a ‘child’ includes a person under the age of 21 years ‘who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 17 years, and who has been placed under the supervision of the court or on probation to the court;....’ But, as T.F. points out, this jurisdiction is limited by OCGA § 15– 11–28(a)(1)(F), which provides that ‘such jurisdiction shall be for the sole purpose of completing, effectuating, and enforcing such supervision on a probation begun prior to the child's seventeenth birthday;....’ Construing these