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provisions,[fn] this Court has previously held that when a violation of probation occurs after the juvenile's seventeenth birthday ‘[t]he juvenile court's jurisdiction ... extends only to revoking the juvenile's probation for his previous adjudication of delinquency,’ In re: B.S.L., 200 Ga.App. 170, 171 (407 S.E.2d 123) (1991), and a delinquency petition alleging a probation violation is not sufficient to invoke that jurisdiction. Further, this Court has recognized that ‘ before a juvenile court may revoke an order granting probation, a petition must be filed requesting such relief.’ In re: B.C., 169 Ga.App. 200, 201–202 (311 S.E.2d 857) (1983).” Crawford v. State, 314 Ga.App. 796, 726 S.E.2d 58 (February 17, 2012). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; defendant waived appellate review of order transferring case from juvenile court to superior court by failing to directly appeal it. “Such a transfer order is a final order that is directly appealable. In re: D.M., 299 Ga.App. 586, n. 1 (683 S.E.2d 130) (2009). However, Crawford did not file an appeal within 30 days of that final order, and instead first challenged it nearly two years later in an amended motion for new trial. ‘Because [Crawford] failed to appeal the transfer to superior court within 30 days, he waived appellate review of this issue. [Cit.]’ Cox v. State, 242 Ga.App. 334, 335(2) (528 S.E.2d 871) (2000).” In re: C.B., 313 Ga.App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (January 27, 2012). Delinquency petition based on aggravated child molestation and related offenses. Where juvenile wasn’t indicted within 180 days of detention; and time for indictment wasn’t extended as provided by law; and superior court thus transferred the case to juvenile court pursuant to OCGA § 17–7–50.1; juvenile court erred by transferring the case back to superior court pursuant to OCGA § 15–11–30.2. “It is clear to us that the legislature intended to set time limitations for the State to act in those situations in which the juvenile is detained and the superior court is exercising jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to either OCGA § 15–11–28(b) or OCGA § 15–11–30.2, and those time limitations would be eviscerated if the juvenile court's transfer order in this case is allowed to stand. Thus, the juvenile court's transfer order must be reversed and the case transferred back to the juvenile court.” “[A] transfer back to the superior court under those circumstances is pointless since an indictment returned by the grand jury would be void,” citing Nunnally (September 1, 2011), below. In re: I.M.W., 313 Ga.App. 624, 722 S.E.2d 586 (January 20, 2012). Trial court properly denied motion to dismiss delinquency petition despite failure to timely schedule adjudicatory hearing. “OCGA § 15–11–39(a) … establishes the applicable timing; for children who are not in detention, like I.M.W., the statute provides that ‘the court shall set a hearing thereon which shall be not later than 60 days from the date of the filing of the petition.’ OCGA § 15–11–39(a).” Hearing was instead set 69 days after filing of petition. “‘The language of OCGA § 15–11–39(a) is mandatory and the adjudicatory hearing must be set for a time not later than that prescribed by the statute.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted). In re: A.S., 293 Ga.App. 710, 711(1) (667 S.E.2d 701) (2008). Nevertheless, the requirements of OCGA § 15– 11–39(a) ‘can be waived, or continued for the securing of legal representation, OCGA § 15–11–30(b), or for reasons within the discretion of the juvenile court.’ (Citations omitted). In re: R.D.F., 266 Ga. 294, 295(1) (466 S.E.2d 572) (1996).” Counsel here waived objection by failing to make it when notified of the hearing date within the 60-day period. “This Court has held that under similar procedural facts, the juvenile court did not err in denying the appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to comply with OCGA § 15–11–39(a). In re: A.T., 302 Ga.App. 713, 714(1) (691 S.E.2d 642) (2010) (at arraignment, appellant did not object to hearing date set beyond required time and did not object within the same time frame).” In re: A.W., 312 Ga.App. 513, 718 S.E.2d 865 (November 14, 2011). Juvenile court properly transferred delinquency petition to superior court “so that he could be treated as an adult offender as provided by OCGA § 15–11–30.2(a).” Evidence supported finding that juvenile “could not be committed to an institution for the mentally retarded.” “Before transferring jurisdiction from juvenile to superior court, the juvenile court must find that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child committed the delinquent act alleged; the child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill; the interests of the child and the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint and the transfer be made; and the child was at least 15 years of age at the time of the alleged delinquent conduct.” Evidence here included contact with juvenile probation officer, less than a year prior to trial, and psychological evaluation conducted 16 months prior to trial. Distinguishing In re: K.J.T., 246 Ga.App. 660, 542 S.E.2d 514 (2000) (testimony of probation officers with no contact with juvenile in almost two years was insufficient to support transfer motion, especially as “the psychological evaluation in K.J.T. specifically indicated that the child's current mental state could not be properly determined without inpatient observation and evaluation for psychotropic medication treatment.”). Nunnally v. State, 311 Ga.App. 558, 716 S.E.2d 608 (September 1, 2011). In prosecution for armed robbery with firearm and other offenses, superior court erred by failing to transfer prosecution to juvenile court where defendant wasn’t