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indicted within 180 days of detention; trial court couldn’t grant extension of time for indictment nunc pro tunc. “[T]he wording of [OCGA § 17–7–50.1(b)] makes it clear that the extension cannot be granted after the time limit established in the code section has expired.” Accord, In re: C.B. (January 30, 2012), above; Armendariz (June 26, 2012), above. Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 710 S.E.2d 667 (May 6, 2011). Vacating defendant’s guilty plea to aggravated assault. “In this case of first impression, we are called upon to interpret the provisions of OCGA § 17–7–50.1(a), establishing a time limit for the presentment of a juvenile's case to a grand jury in superior court. Because the State failed to meet the time limit for presenting the case to the grand jury, the case should have been returned to the juvenile court. The superior court as a result lacked jurisdiction to entertain a guilty plea, and we therefore vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for transfer to the juvenile court.” “The plain language of the statute provides that a child within superior court jurisdiction ‘ shall within 180 days of the date of detention be entitled to have the charge against him or her presented to the grand jury.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The statute further provides that the case ‘ shall be transferred to the juvenile court’ if an indictment is not obtained within the specified time. (Emphasis supplied.)” Issue was not waived by defendant’s guilty plea: “As recognized in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628) (1974), an unconditional guilty plea does not preclude appeal of a claim of error grounded upon the right not to be haled into court at all, that is, jurisdictional and generally double jeopardy-type errors. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hooten v. State, 212 Ga.App. 770–771(1) (442 S.E.2d 836) (1994). Because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter its judgment on Hill's guilty plea, his claim under OCGA § 17–7–50.1 was not waived and the judgment of conviction on his plea should be vacated. Cf. State v. Sullivan, 237 Ga.App. 677 (516 S.E.2d 539) (1999) (indictment properly quashed when jurisdiction not in superior court due to delayed entry of transfer order.)” Contrary to State’s argument, “the statute plainly adopts the date of detention, not the date of transfer [of the case to superior court], as the point from which the time is calculated, and it explicitly applies whether the child is initially subject to the jurisdiction of the superior court through committing an enumerated offense, OCGA § 15–11–28, or via a transfer to superior court after a petition and hearing, 15–11–30.2. OCGA § 17–7–50.1(a).” Accord, Walker (March 3, 2015), above (guilty plea didn’t waive issue of proper transfer, which is jurisdictional). See also Nunnally (September 1, 2011), above. Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695, 707 S.E.2d 359 (February 7, 2011). Child molestation and aggravated child molestation convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to transfer case to juvenile court, as aggravated child molestation is non-transferable under OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A). Defendant rightly points out that the offense theoretically could have been committed “prior to July 1, 2006, when that offense was not yet punishable by life imprisonment and instead was to ‘be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 30 years.’ Ga. L.1997, pp. 1578, 1579, § 1 (former OCGA § 16-6-4(d)(1)). Indeed, aggravated child molestation clearly was a transferable offense under OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) prior to the 2006 amendment of OCGA § 16-6-4(d)(1). State v. Ware, 258 Ga.App. 564, 565 (574 S.E.2d 632) (2002). However, we have held that ‘the superior court is not divested of jurisdiction merely because some, but not all, evidence of criminal acts is beyond the scope of the superior court's jurisdiction, so long as that evidence stems from the same criminal transaction which vests the superior court with jurisdiction. [Cit.]’ Reynolds v. State, 266 Ga. 235, 237(2) (466 S.E.2d 218) (1996). … Because the indictment alleged and the evidence at trial authorized a finding that Adams committed aggravated child molestation on some date after July 1, 2006, we hold that the trial court could not be divested of jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 15-11- 28(b)(2)(B). See McGruder v. State, 279 Ga.App. 851, 852(1) (632 S.E.2d 730) (2006). Therefore, the trial court correctly denied the motion to transfer the case to juvenile court.” Cuvas v. State, 306 Ga.App. 679, 703 S.E.2d 116 (November 1, 2010). Not cruel and unusual punishment where 13-year old defendant was sentenced to twenty years, ten to serve, for armed robbery. “Cuvas was properly tried as an adult in superior court as she was alleged to have committed armed robbery with a firearm. [fn] Although she was only 13 years old at the time of the robbery, she had no inherent right to be treated as a juvenile. Bishop v. State, 265 Ga. 821, 823(3) (462 S.E.2d 716) (1995). The legislature's determination that the superior court has jurisdiction over minors 13 to 17 years of age who are alleged to have committed certain serious offenses is founded on a rational basis, including ‘the need for secure placement of certain violent juvenile offenders [and] the safety of students and citizens of Georgia.’ Id. See OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A).” Gutierrez v. State, 306 Ga.App. 371, 702 S.E.2d 642 (September 23, 2010), affirmed on other grounds, 290 Ga. 643, 723 S.E.2d 658 (February 6, 2012). Superior court properly refused to transfer 16-year old’s armed robbery prosecution to juvenile court; where defendant challenged superior court’s jurisdiction, superior court, and not juvenile court, properly conducted hearing on the matter. Defendant’s argument that juvenile court should have conducted hearing “is directly contravened by OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B), which provides that ‘[a]fter indictment, the superior court may after