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transferred prosecution to superior court. “Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-30.2, a juvenile court may transfer a case to an appropriate court if, in its discretion, it determines that ‘there are reasonable grounds to believe that ... [t]he child committed the delinquent act alleged; ... [t]he child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill; ... [t]he interests of the child and the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint and the transfer be made; and ... [t]he child ... was at least 15 years of age at the time of the alleged delinquent conduct....’ OCGA § 15-11-30.2(a)(3)(A)-(C), (4)(A).” Juvenile court could make its determinations based in part on hearsay. Transfer could be made despite evidence that the juvenile is amenable to psychological treatment. “‘[A] juvenile court may transfer to the superior court a juvenile who is amenable to treatment if the juvenile court finds that the amenability factor is outweighed by the interests of the community in treating the child as an adult.’ In re: B.J.W., 247 Ga.App. 437, 440(2) (543 S.E.2d 811) (2000). ‘In such cases, the State is not required to prove non-amenability to treatment, and the transfer order need not reflect why the child is not amenable. Instead, the order must balance the child's interest in treatment in the juvenile system, including but not limited to his amenability to treatment, against the community's interest in treating the child as an adult.’ (Punctuation omitted.) In re: S.K.K., [280 Ga.App. 877, 879(2) (635 S.E.2d 263) (2006)]. See In re: J.B., 234 Ga.App. 775, 776-777(2) (507 S.E.2d 874) (1998).” Pascarella v. State, 294 Ga.App. 414, 669 S.E.2d 216 (November 6, 2008). Superior court properly declined to transfer juvenile defendant’s case to juvenile court. Indicted for murder, 15-year old was convicted in superior court only of armed robbery. “Before sentencing, Pascarella moved the superior court to transfer her case to juvenile court or, alternatively, to enter a disposition consistent with an adjudication of juvenile delinquency. The court denied the motion and sentenced Pascarella to ten years confinement.” “OCGA § 15-11-28 establishes the jurisdiction of juvenile and superior courts over matters involving juveniles. This Code section gave the superior court exclusive jurisdiction over Pascarella's trial for murder. OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(i). And because the conspiracy charge arose from the same criminal transaction as the murder charges, the superior court also had jurisdiction over Pascarella's trial for that offense. See Houston v. State, 237 Ga.App. 878, 879-880(4), 517 S.E.2d 357 (1999). In Carrindine v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d 627 (1976), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that ‘an adjudication of guilt of a juvenile in superior court is a criminal adjudication,’ not an adjudication of delinquency. Id. at 285-286, 223 S.E.2d 627. Under this rule, the superior court was authorized to treat Pascarella's adjudication of guilt for a charge over which it did not have exclusive jurisdiction as a criminal adjudication, rather than an adjudication of juvenile delinquency, and to sentence her accordingly.” Accord, Keating v. State , 309 Ga.App. 804, 711 S.E.2d 327 (May 17, 2011) (co-defendant with Pascarella). Styles v. State, 291 Ga.App. 255, 661 S.E.2d 641 (April 23, 2008). Superior court had jurisdiction over minor defendant’s charges of armed robbery and aggravated assault; where prosecution was commenced in superior court, no transfer order from juvenile court was necessary. State v. Henderson, 281 Ga. 623, 641 S.E.2d 515 (January 22, 2007). Superior court erred by ordering the transfer of defendants’ armed robbery prosecution to juvenile court over the objection of the DA. “Once the State elected to invoke the superior court’s jurisdiction by pursuing the cases against [defendants] in superior court, the court, acting on its own volition, did not have the authority to transfer the cases to juvenile court prior to indictment. The legislature has made clear that the district attorney, and not the court, makes the election regarding whether to pursue a case against a juvenile in superior court or juvenile court. See OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(c) (‘Before indictment, the district attorney may, after investigation and for extraordinary cause, decline prosecution in the superior court of a child 13 to 17 years of age alleged to have committed [one of the seven serious offense specified in OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) ]’) (emphasis supplied); OCGA § 15-18-6(4) (It is the district attorney’s duty ‘[t]o draw up all indictments or presentments ... and to prosecute all indictable offenses’). Where courts ‘have concurrent jurisdiction, the first court taking jurisdiction will retain it’ and a transfer may only be made as provided by law. J.G.B. v. State, 136 Ga.App. 75, 77(2) (220 S.E.2d 79) (1975), citing Hardeman & Sparks v. Battersby, 53 Ga. 36, 38(2) (1874). Thus, as here, where the district attorney properly invokes the superior court’s jurisdiction by pursuing a case against a juvenile in superior court, the court is obligated to retain jurisdiction over the case and is not authorized, sua sponte, to transfer it prior to indictment .” OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(1) does not violate due process, equal protection, and separation of powers, citing Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592, 385 S.E.2d 661 (1989) and Bishop v. State, 265 Ga. 821, 462 S.E.2d 716 (1995). In re: R.T. 278 Ga.App. 225, 628 S.E.2d 662 (March 15, 2006). Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it transferred case to superior court. Defendant allegedly raped his younger cousin days before defendant’s seventeenth birthday; victim didn’t report crime until nine years later. Twenty-eight year-old defendant sought remand to juvenile court. “ Under our law, transfer of a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court to the superior court is authorized when in the discretion of the juvenile court the child committed the delinquent act, the child is not