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committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill, and the interests of the child and the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint and the transfer be made. OCGA § 15-11- 30.2(a)(3). ‘A juvenile court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether reasonable grounds exist for transferring a delinquency petition to the appropriate court for prosecution of a crime or public offense. [Cit.]’ In re: K.L.L., 204 Ga.App. 320, 321(2), 419 S.E.2d 312 (1992). Further, ‘[t]reatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right, but one granted by the General Assembly; therefore, the General Assembly may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit.’ Lane v. Jones, 244 Ga. 17, 19(3), 257 S.E.2d 525 (1979). A transfer under this section ‘does not violate substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.’ In re: J.J.S., 246 Ga. 617, 618(1), 272 S.E.2d 294 (1980). We find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by transferring this case to the superior court for disposition. As a 28-year-old adult, R.T. would no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system as soon as he was adjudicated. Thus, because of OCGA § 15-11-70(d) [fn] the juvenile court could not be assured that R.T. could be required to receive appropriate treatment for the necessary length of time in the juvenile system. Further, adopting the proposal R.T. suggests would require establishing a special system just for him which would require the assistance and cooperation of other agencies beyond the control of the juvenile justice system. ‘Therefore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering transfer.’ In re: J.N.B., 263 Ga. 600, 601(1), 436 S.E.2d 202 (1993) (transfer warranted because juvenile court concluded appropriate treatment in secure facility not available). [fn]” Seabolt v. State, 279 Ga. 518, 616 S.E.2d 448 (June 30, 2005). “‘“[T]he concurrent jurisdiction of the superior court over capital felonies committed by juveniles must necessarily extend to related lesser crimes which are part of the same criminal transaction. To rule otherwise would be to bisect criminal conduct artificially and require the state to follow two procedures with no substantive meaning other than to satisfy procedural requirements, with the end result that the case involving the lesser crime would be instituted in juvenile court and transferred to the superior court, OCGA § [15-11- 30.2], and the juvenile would still be tried for the lesser crime along with the crime giving the superior court concurrent jurisdiction. There is no loss of substantive protection of the juvenile, and the public’s rights should not be impeded by meaningless procedural steps which delay the judicial process and conceivably could lead to the frustration of justice under the rigorous requirements of the double jeopardy clause.”’ Reynolds v. State, 266 Ga. 235, 236(1) (466 S.E.2d 218) (1996), quoting Worthy v. State, 253 Ga. 661, 662(1) (324 S.E.2d 431) (1985).” In re: A.B.S., 242 Ga.App. 277, 529 S.E.2d 415 (February 8, 2000). Transfer of juvenile’s prosecution for aggravated assault and related offenses (based on Rockdale County school shootings) affirmed; juvenile court could find that juvenile “is not committable to an institution for the mentally ill.” “‘In order to transfer a delinquency case for criminal prosecution, the juvenile court must determine that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that: ... (B) The child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill[.] ...” OCGA § 15-11-39(a)(3),’” quoting L.K.F. v. State, 173 Ga.App. 770(2), 771, 328 S.E.2d 394 (1985). “Under OCGA § 37-3-1(9.1)(A) and (B), a person is committable to a psychiatric hospital if he is mentally ill and ‘presents a substantial risk of imminent harm to [himself] or others, as manifested by either recent overt acts or recent expressed threats of violence which present a probability of physical injury to [himself] or other persons....’ Ample evidence supported the juvenile court's determination that as of the date of the hearing, A.B.S. did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment,” including testimony of two psychiatrists who testified that A.B.S. had a serious mental illness (“major depression, recurrent, severe with psychotic features”), but that it was controllable by medication. In re: J.T.D., 242 Ga.App. 243, 529 S.E.2d 377 (February 3, 2000). Delinquency adjudication based on criminal damage to property affirmed; juvenile court didn’t lose jurisdiction when juvenile turned 17 during pendency of case. “J.T.D.'s age at the time of his adjudicatory hearing is not determinative of the juvenile court's jurisdiction over him. Rather, his age at the time of the offense controls. ‘“Under (OCGA §§ 15-11-5 and 15-11-2), the juvenile court has jurisdiction if the accused is under the age of seventeen at the time the offense is committed.” Edmonds v. State, 154 Ga.App. 650, 269 S.E.2d 512 (1980).’ In re: D.L., [228 Ga.App. 503, 504-505(1)(a), 492 S.E.2d 273 (1997)]. Inasmuch as it is undisputed that J.T.D. was under the age of 17 at the time he committed the act of delinquency in the case sub judice, the juvenile court properly exercised exclusive original jurisdiction over his case. See id.; OCGA § 15-11-5. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in denying J.T.D.'s motion to dismiss.” Bearden v. State, 241 Ga.App. 842, 528 S.E.2d 275 (January 18, 2000). Defendants’ convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed. “The trial court did not err in refusing to transfer the cases to juvenile court. At the time of the armed robbery, Bearden was 16 years old and Jablonowski was 15 years old. The superior court has exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of any person 13 to 17 years of age who is alleged to have committed armed robbery with a firearm. OCGA § 15-11-5(b)(2)(A)(vii); State v. Watson, 239 Ga.App. 482, 483, n. 1, 520 S.E.2d 911 (1999). Because