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reasonable doubt. Id. Because possession of an alcoholic beverage by a person under 21 years of age is generally prohibited, OCGA § 3-3-23(a)(2), the exception to that general prohibition created by OCGA § 3-3-23(c), which allows the conduct under specified circumstances, is an affirmative defense. Because Burchett never produced evidence that his parent or guardian gave him the beer and that his possession of it was in the home and presence of his parent or guardian, the State did not have to disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See May v. State, 179 Ga.App. at 737(2). Burchett’s sufficiency argument fails.” In re: A.A., 265 Ga.App. 369, 593 S.E.2d 891 (January 30, 2004). “[Defendants] … claim that the State failed to prove venue for the offenses of minor in possession of alcohol. [Defendants] argue that no evidence was introduced as to where they actually possessed the alcohol. They claim that once the beer was in their stomachs, it ceased to be an alcoholic beverage…. [Defendants] provide no authority for this statement and indeed, well-settled case law is to the contrary. See, e.g., Krebsbach v. State, 209 Ga.App. 474, 433 S.E.2d 649 (1993); Lee v. State, 201 Ga.App. 827, 828, 412 S.E.2d 563 (1991); Hadaway v. State, 190 Ga.App. 5, 6, 378 S.E.2d 127 (1989). The officer testified that his encounter with [defendants] and their subsequent arrest occurred in Fayette County. This was sufficient to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hanson v. State, 275 Ga. 470, 569 S.E.2d 513 (September 16, 2002). “Evidence that [Defendant] had the odor of alcohol on his person, appeared to be in an intoxicated state, and admitted that he had consumed an alcoholic beverage, was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of alcohol by a person under 21 years of age [OCGA § 3-3-23].” B. ATTORNEYS 1. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW Sawhill v. State, 292 Ga.App. 438, 665 S.E.2d 353 (June 18, 2008). “OCGA § 15-19-51 establishes that the practice of law without a licence is forbidden. That code section provides, in pertinent part, that it shall be unlawful for any person other than a duly licensed attorney at law (a) to hold himself out to the public or otherwise to any person as being entitled to practice law, or (b) to render or furnish legal services or advice. [Cit.] In the instant case, there is sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Sawhill engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by holding himself out to Broome and Broome’s probation officer as being entitled to practice law and by furnishing legal services and advice to Broome. See, e.g., Marks v. State, 280 Ga. 70, 73(1)(b) (623 S.E.2d 504) (2005); Gaines v. State, 177 Ga.App. 795, 801(3) (341 S.E.2d 252) (1986).” C. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES (TITLE 16, CHAPTER 13) 1. ABANDONING IN A PUBLIC PLACE Woods v. State, 275 Ga.App. 471, 620 S.E.2d 660 (September 9, 2005). “Woods … contends that the evidence did not support his conviction for abandonment of a controlled substance, because, he argues, he did not abandon the cocaine in a public place. OCGA § 16-13-3 provides: ‘Any person who shall abandon, in a public place, any dangerous drug, poison, or controlled substance as defined by Article 2 or Article 3 of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.’ For purposes of Title 16, the term ‘public place’ is defined at OCGA § 16-1-3(15): ‘any place where the conduct involved may reasonably be expected to be viewed by people other than members of the actor’s family or household.’ See Ridley v. State, 176 Ga.App. 669, 670-671 (337 S.E.2d 382) (1985) (reviewing cases in this area and holding that the defendant’s yard was a ‘public place’ for purposes of public drunkenness statute since acts in yard could be and were viewed by police at the scene). Here, there was evidence that the trash barrel where Woods abandoned the cocaine was in an empty lot that could be and was viewed by persons other than the members of Woods’s family or household, e.g., the agents as they drove along the street. No evidence indicated that the trash barrel or empty lot was separated or hidden from the street in any way. We find sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict as to abandonment of a controlled substance in a public place.” 2. ATTEMPT/CONSPIRACY King v. State, 295 Ga.App. 865, 673 S.E.2d 329 (February 9, 2009). Defendant was properly convicted of conspiracy as a lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, based on wording of indictment; distinguishing Rowe v. State , 166 Ga.App. 836, 838(1) (305 S.E.2d 624) (1983), where “conspiracy was not included in the indictment, as no reference is made therein to one or more persons conspiring or agreeing to commit an offense, nor does the indictment refer to the doing of any overt act to effect the object of a conspiracy”). “Here, the indictment specifically accused King and his co-defendant of ‘acting together as parties to the crime, [to commit] ... the offense of possession of