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cocaine with intent to distribute.’” Overruled “ to the extent that [it] adopts [ Hill v. State, 295 Ga.App. 360, 671 S.E.2d 853 (2008)] 's proposition that a defendant may be convicted of a lesser offense if the facts alleged throughout the indictment and the evidence presented at trial establish the elements necessary to convict on the lesser offense.” Davis v. State, 281 Ga.App. 855, 637 S.E.2d 431 (September 15, 2006). 1. Indictment charging defendant with ‘criminal attempt to traffick in cocaine’ was not required to allege the purity of the substance , which defendant was negotiating to purchase from a confidential police informant and which never actually existed. “This case … does not involve a mixture of cocaine. The indictment clearly charged that Davis attempted to purchase three kilograms of cocaine, not that he completed the crime. [fn] There is no requirement that the State specifically place the adjective ‘pure’ before the word cocaine in the indictment, particularly given that the operative statute [OCGA § 16-13-31(a)(1)] does not use such wording. [Cits.] Indeed, there was no actual cocaine involved, and we fail to see why the State should be required to allege the purity of nonexistent cocaine. The indictment tracks the applicable statutes in a manner that is easily understood, and it apprised Davis of both the crime and the manner in which it was alleged to have been committed. Moreover, if Davis admitted the allegations precisely as set forth in the indictment, he would be guilty of criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine. [Cit.] Thus, the indictment is not defective, and the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss it.” 2. Likewise, proof of attempted trafficking does not require proof of the purity of the substance. “Indeed, it would eviscerate the purpose of delineating attempt as an offense if the State were required to prove all elements of the underlying crime.” Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28, 608 S.E.2d 631 (February 7, 2005). Convicted of criminal attempt to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, defendant challenged the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-13-33, which provides that attempt or conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act carries the same penalty as the underlying provision. OCGA § 16-4-6, by contrast, provides that criminal attempt generally carries a maximum sentence of one-half the underlying offense. Defendant contends that the rule of lenity requires that he be sentenced under the lesser of the two: “‘Where any uncertainty develops as to which penal clause is applicable, the accused is entitled to have the lesser of the two penalties administered. [Cit.] This principle is frequently referred to as the rule of lenity, [cit.] which the United States Supreme Court has described as a junior version of the vagueness doctrine -- the doctrine that bars enforcement of criminal statutes that are too vague for people of common intelligence to understand.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 276 Ga. 606, 608(2) (581 S.E.2d 35) (2003).” Held, trial court correctly rejected this argument; the more specific 16-13-33 controls, and there is no ambiguity. Accord, Sosebee v. State , 282 Ga.App. 905, 640 S.E.2d 379 (December 14, 2006). 3. KEEPING BUILDING/VEHICLE USED BY DRUG VIOLATORS Scott v. State, 326 Ga.App. 115, 756 S.E.2d 220 (March 12, 2014). Evidence didn’t support Scott’s conviction for keeping a dwelling for the purpose of using controlled substances. “[A]lthough the evidence described above shows that the house at 307 East Jenkins was used mainly for the distribution of drugs, there is no evidence that Scott knowingly kept or maintained the house. While Scott told officers that he did yard work at the property, by its plain language, OCGA § 16–13–42(a)(5) proscribes only the keeping or maintaining of a structure, not grounds-keeping. Moreover, the trial evidence does not show that Scott was inside the residence prior to the execution of the search warrant or that he had ever been inside the house at all.” Chua v. State, 289 Ga. 220, 710 S.E.2d 540 (May 31, 2011). Felony murder and VGCSA convictions affirmed, but conviction for “knowingly keeping a dwelling for the purpose of using controlled substances” not supported by evidence. “In discussing this Code section, this Court has stated: ‘[f]irst, we hold that in order to support a conviction under [OCGA] § 16–13–42(a)(5) for maintaining a residence or other structure or place used for keeping controlled substances, the evidence must show that one of the purposes for maintaining the structure was the keeping of the controlled substance; thus, the mere possession of limited quantities of a controlled substance within the residence or structure is insufficient to support a conviction under § 16–13–42(a)(5). Second, we hold that in order to support a conviction under this statute for maintaining a residence or other structure or place used for selling controlled substances, the evidence must be sufficient to support a finding of something more than a single, isolated instance of the proscribed activity. [Cit.] Thirdly, we hold that in determining the sufficiency of the evidence in these regards, each case must be adjudged according to its own unique facts and circumstances, and there is no inflexible rule that evidence found only on a single occasion cannot be sufficient to show a crime of a continuing nature.’ Barnes v. State, 255 Ga. 396, 402(5), 339 S.E.2d 229 (1986) (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.). The only evidence was that the building in question was Chua's home; there was no evidence that one of the purposes for maintaining the home was to provide [victim] Carter a place to use and keep controlled substances. While the jury could infer that controlled substances had been kept and used there on more than one occasion by Carter, without a showing that a purpose of Chua's maintaining the house was for such use by Carter, a guilty verdict was not authorized. Greeson [ v. State, 287 Ga. 764, 765, 700 S.E.2d 344