☢ test - Í

offered by the state other than spatial proximity is the testimony of Nobles. Nobles testified that the arresting officer conducted two separate searches of the vehicle and saw the container only on the second search. As the container was not found on the first search, yet was found on the second search when Lehman was the sole occupant of the vehicle, the state argues that Lehman had exclusive opportunity for control of the contraband. However, the arresting officer did not testify that he had conducted multiple searches, nor was he called back to corroborate Nobles’s testimony. While the testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact, in ‘ felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient.’ OCGA 24–14–8 (emphasis supplied). As the testimony of Nobles is the only evidence other than spatial proximity connecting Lehman to the contraband, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction based on constructive possession.” Evans v. State, 330 Ga.App. 241, 766 S.E.2d 821 (December 5, 2014). Convictions for possession of codeine and related offenses affirmed. Trial court properly denied motion for directed verdict, as State wasn’t required to prove the allegation of the indictment that the codeine was “a Schedule V Controlled Substance.” “We have previously held, however, that a description in an indictment to a specified controlled substance by reference to a particular Schedule in the Act is ‘mere surplusage.’ (Citation omitted.) Wright v. State, 232 Ga.App. 104, 105(2) (501 S.E.2d 543) (1998). That is, the Schedule which defines a substance as a controlled substance under the Act is ‘an unnecessary fact’ in the determination of guilt. Id. See also Freeman v. State, 201 Ga.App. 216, 217(2) (410 S.E.2d 749) (1991) (finding Indictment's reference to Schedule II ‘an unnecessary description of an unnecessary fact, which need not be proved’). Under the Act, codeine appears in Schedule II,[fn] Schedule III,[fn] and Schedule V. For purposes of sentencing an offender who is found guilty of violating OCGA § 16–13–30(a), subsections (c), (e), (g), and (l)(1) specify the range of punishments that may be imposed, with the severity of the punishment depending on whether the controlled substance is classified within Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V.” Schedule V includes “[a]ny compound, mixture, or preparation containing limited quantities of any of the following narcotic drugs [including codeine], or salts thereof, which also contains one or more nonnarcotic, active, medicinal ingredients in sufficient proportion to confer upon the compound, mixture, or preparation valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the narcotic drug alone.” OCGA § 16-13-29(1). Contrary to defendant’s argument, allegation that the substance was a “Schedule V controlled substance” didn’t require the State to prove that the codeine was part of a “compound, mixture or preparation” as described therein. “Under the Act, to convict Evans for possession of a controlled substance as alleged in the indictment, the State was required to show that he was in possession of codeine, which is a controlled substance. The State was not required to show that the codeine fell specifically within Schedule V. Pretermitting whether the State failed to adduce evidence showing that the preparation of codeine he possessed met the Schedule V definition, the fact that the State did adduce evidence that the preparation contained codeine defeats Evans's claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of possessing a controlled substance.” Scott v. State, 326 Ga.App. 115, 756 S.E.2d 220 (March 12, 2014). Evidence didn’t support Scott’s convictions for cocaine trafficking and related offenses “because he was merely present at 307 East Jenkins when the search warrant was executed, there was no evidence that he had actual or constructive possession of the drugs, and there was no evidence that he was a party to these crimes.” Police had conducted controlled buys of drugs at the residence, but there was no evidence that Scott was a party to those transactions. When police arrived with a search warrant, Scott was outside the residence. He didn’t own or lease the residence; there was no evidence that he ever entered the residence; the officers found nothing of his inside the residence, no drugs on his person, and nothing “on his person linking him to the house or its contents.” Vega v. State, 321 Ga.App. 682, 742 S.E.2d 499 (April 30, 2013). Conviction for cocaine trafficking was supported by the evidence where defendant was found alone in car with drugs in hidden compartment under floorboard. “Based on the presumption that the driver of a vehicle is in constructive possession of the vehicle, the conflicting stories Vega provided about his travel plans, his lack of luggage for a long trip, the presence of multiple air fresheners, and his extreme nervousness, we find sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury's verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cit.] A jury could infer that Vega was lying and that his lies evidenced guilty knowledge.” Cooper v. State, 315 Ga.App. 773, 728 S.E.2d 289 (May 3, 2012). Evidence supported defendant’s drug conviction; defendant’s testimony that he thought the drug was ecstasy, not N-Benzylpiperazine, didn’t prevent a different finding by the jury . “‘[B]oth knowledge and possession may be proved, like any other fact, by circumstantial evidence. And it has long been the law that knowledge may be proved by facts and circumstances from which a jury could reasonably infer that a defendant knowingly possessed contraband. Thus, OCGA § 16–2–6 provides that a jury may find criminal intention upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.’ (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Serna v. State, 308