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Ga.App. 518, 522(3) (707 S.E.2d 904) (2011). The jury was not required to accept as true Cooper's assertion that he believed the pills were a different Schedule I controlled substance. ‘It is the jury's prerogative to choose what evidence to believe and what to reject.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sullivan v. State, 277 Ga.App. 738, 741 (627 S.E.2d 437) (2006). Because the issue of Cooper's knowledge that he possessed BZP was for the jury, we affirm his conviction. Cf. Serna, supra, 308 Ga.App. at 521–522(3) (rejecting defendant's sufficiency argument based in part upon alleged lack of knowledge of precise chemical compound in bottle of ‘Amsterdam Poppers’). [fn: Our opinion in Mohamed v. State, 314 Ga.App. 181, 723 S.E.2d 694 (February 16, 2012), does not require a different result. In Mohamed, the defendant testified that he believed ‘the chemicals’ would dissipate from a khat plant during the time it took the plant to be shipped from Africa to the United States. Slip Op. at 5–8(1). In this case, however, Cooper admitted that he possessed an illegal drug, and it was for the jury to determine whether he knowingly possessed the chemical compound specified in the indictment. ] ” Jackson v. State, 314 Ga.App. 272, 724 S.E.2d 9 (February 22, 2012). Evidence supported defendant’s drug convictions where it showed that “Jackson knew that [co-defendant] Esters had possession of the marijuana and ecstacy. The evidence also showed that Jackson allowed Esters to place the drugs in the trunk of his vehicle, and that Jackson knowingly transported the drugs in his vehicle.” Mohamed v. State, 314 Ga.App. 181, 723 S.E.2d 694 (February 16, 2012). Conviction for possession of cathinone reversed; evidence failed to show that defendant knowingly possessed that chemical, the active ingredient in the African plant khat . “Given (1) the State's expert witness's testimony that cathinone converts into cathine, another chemical that Mohamed was not charged with possessing, after some period of time and that cathinone is undetectable without the use of scientific testing equipment; (2) evidence that the khat in this case was harvested more than two days before its subsequent arrival in Clayton County; (3) Mohamed's testimony that he believed the chemical ‘[went] out’ of the khat after two days; [fn: The State presented no evidence to contradict Mohamed's assertion, and instead submitted testimony by an expert conceding that cathinone degrades into cathine. ] and (4) the lack of evidence that Mohamed made any attempt to conceal the nature of the package (by, for example, evading police or showing false identification), we conclude that the State failed to establish that Mohamed knowingly possessed the khat with the knowledge that it contained cathinone. [Cits.] Thus, the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.” See also Duvall (July 11, 2011), below. Holiman v. State, 313 Ga.App. 76, 720 S.E.2d 363 (November 30, 2011). Physical precedent only. Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; defendant could be convicted of joint constructive possession with his brother where the brother was charged by the federal government, while defendant was charged by the State. Blackwell criticizes the rule requiring both persons to be charged, originating in Reid v. State, 212 Ga.App. 787, 788 n.1 (442 S.E.2d 852) (1994). “We have found no mention of this principle in any case that preceded Reid, and our opinion in Reid cites no authority for it and does not explain why it must be so. … Given the absence of an explanation for the principle, some reasonable people might question whether it is a sound one, especially considering the settled rule that the failure of the State to prosecute one party to a crime ordinarily offers no defense to other parties to the crime. See OCGA § 16–2–21 (party to a crime can be convicted even if the principal has not been prosecuted); Davis v. State, 163 Ga. 247, 248 (135 S.E. 916) (1926) (‘Failure to prosecute the principal will in no wise relieve the accessory.’); see also Grimes v. State, 245 Ga.App. 277, 278(2) (537 S.E.2d 720) (2000) (‘A party to a crime may be prosecuted and convicted for the commission of the offense regardless of whether anyone else was prosecuted.’).” Henry v. State, 311 Ga.App. 353, 716 S.E.2d 232 (August 3, 2011). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana. Defendant was driving vehicle owned by his girlfriend, who was a passenger. During traffic stop, officers “noticed a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, which the officer believed would have been noticeable to the vehicle's occupants. A green, leafy material later determined to be marijuana was found in the glove compartment.” “In cases involving contraband found in vehicles, the state is generally entitled to an evidentiary presumption that the driver or owner of the vehicle is in constructive possession of the contraband. [Cit.] And … the evidence of the odor of marijuana in the vehicle also supported a finding that Henry and [girlfriend] Smith jointly possessed the marijuana.” Duvall v. State, 289 Ga. 540, 712 S.E.2d 850 (July 11, 2011). Reversing 305 Ga.App. 545, 699 S.E.2d 761 (2010), in VGCSA prosecution, trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to charge on mistake of fact based on defendant’s claim that he didn’t know what the pills he possessed were. Arrested for loitering and obstruction of officers, a search incident to arrest revealed three Ambien tablets in defendant’s pockets. “The entire basis of appellant’s