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defense at trial was that he knew he possessed the sleeping aids, but that he believed the pills were some form of over-the- counter medication and not Zolpidem Tartrate.” Trial court declined charge on mistake of fact, and Court of Appeals agreed, “construing OCGA §§ 16-13-30(a) and 16-13-75 not to require the defendant to know that the pills he possessed were a controlled substance.” Supreme Court disagrees: “[T]he criminal intent required by OCGA § 16-13-30(a) and 16-13-75 is intent to possess a drug with knowledge of the chemical identity of that drug. … Therefore, possessing Zolpidem Tartrate, which one knows or understands to be Zolpidem Tartrate is a violation of OCGA § 16–13–30(a) because Zolpidem Tartrate is a controlled substance. On the other hand, possessing Zolpidem Tartrate, which one believes or understands to be an over-the-counter medication (such as Doxylamine Succinate, sold as an over-the-counter sleep aid under the brand name Unisom) is not a crime because the requisite mens rea is not present. It is this latter scenario which appellant asserts to be the case. … Appellant’s knowledge of the chemical identity of the substance in his possession is purely a question of fact. As such, it should have been a question for the jury, and the jury should have been instructed to consider the defense of mistake of fact.” Court of Appeals took the facts differently, believing that the defense was that “appellant knew that the three pills in his possession were Zolpidem Tartrate, but that he asserted a defense based on not knowing that Zolpidem Tartrate is a controlled substance under Georgia law. Were that the case,” Supreme Court says, “the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the matter would have been correct.” Accord, Mohamed (February 16, 2012), above. Query: does this open the door for a drug couriers to remain willfully ignorant of what substances they possess? See Maddox v. State , 272 Ga.App. 440, 612 S.E.2d 484 (February 10, 2005) (arson case; approving charge on willful ignorance as supplying the element of knowledge of critical facts), and cases cited therein; Taylor v. State , 293 Ga.App. 551, 667 S.E.2d 405 (September 16, 2008) (forgery case; ‘ mistake of fact constitutes a defense to a criminal charge only if it is not superinduced by the fault or negligence of the [defendant]’). DeLong v. State, 310 Ga.App. 518, 714 S.E.2d 98 (July 6, 2011). Evidence was insufficient to support conviction for VGCSA violation. “[A]lthough the trial court and prosecutor both informed the jury that they would refer to Zolpidem by its trade name, Ambien,[fn] these statements do not cure the defect in the State having failed to present evidence linking Ambien to Zolpidem, and nothing in the record indicates that there was an agreement by the parties to a stipulation of same. [fn] Thus, while the State presented evidence that DeLong admitted to distributing Ambien to both T.C. and J.F. and produced testimony that ‘Ambien’ is a Schedule IV controlled substance, our well-established case law explicitly required the State to identify ‘Ambien’ as a trade name for Zolpidem through admissible evidence. See Elrod [ v. State, 143 Ga.App. 331, 331(2), 238 S.E.2d 291 (1977)] (reversing conviction when testimony referred to drug's trade name without evidence linking that name to the listed controlled substance because ‘[i]n the absence of a specified designation of the drug Demerol, ... the courts cannot “notice” whether a certain substance falls within the prohibitive scope of a broad category of drugs’ (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Tant v. State, 247 Ga. 264, 266 n. 1, 275 S.E.2d 312 (1981) (citing to Elrod for the proposition that ‘the generic equivalent of a trade name is not the proper subject of judicial notice’ and holding that ‘the testimony as to the trade name, Quaaludes, ... was sufficiently connected with the generic equivalent, methaqualone, by the description of the pills, or tablets, by the witnesses and by the crime lab report’); Hulsey v. State, 220 Ga.App. 64, 64–65, 467 S.E.2d 610 (1996) (holding that State sufficiently linked trade name to controlled substance); Crosby v. State, 150 Ga.App. 804, 805(4), 258 S.E.2d 593 (1979) (distinguishing Elrod and holding that State met burden of proof through testimony using controlled substance's name as listed in Act). See generally Kessinger v. State, 298 Ga.App. 479, 480(1), 680 S.E.2d 546 (2009) (holding that State presented sufficient evidence for jury to determine that drugs were oxycodone, a controlled substance, when ‘pills were contained in a prescription bottle labeled oxycodone, and there was testimony from two experienced witnesses qualified as experts in drug identification that ... pills' logo matched that of pharmaceutically prepared oxycodone tablets’).” Gaudlock v. State, 310 Ga.App. 149, 713 S.E.2d 399 (June 1, 2011). Conviction for possession of more than an ounce of marijuana was supported by evidence that defendant possessed 28.8 grams. Defendant erroneously contends that State was required to prove that 28.8 grams is more than an ounce. “When the statute refers to an ‘ounce’ of marijuana, it refers, as a matter of law, to an avoirdupois ounce, which is the equivalent of, when rounded up to the nearest hundredth of a gram, 28.35 grams. [fn] See Paseur v. State, 271 Ga.App. 259, 260 n. 3 (609 S.E.2d 193) (2005), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 177(1) (657 S.E.2d 863) (2008). The number of grams in an ounce is not something that varies from case to case or is open to reasonable dispute.” Bass v. State, 309 Ga.App. 601, 710 S.E.2d 818 (May 17, 2011). Conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute affirmed; evidence was sufficient to establish that substance was marijuana, despite lack of expert testimony. “The trial transcript, however, shows that, at the time of Bass' arrest, the officer who discovered the substance was certified to recognize the odor of marijuana and to identify and test marijuana. According to the officer, the day after Bass' arrest, he weighed the substance, examined it under a microscope, and performed two chemical tests on the substance;