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each time the substance tested positive for marijuana. Further, the officer was subject to cross-examination by defense counsel. Therefore, even though the officer had not been qualified as an expert at trial, his testimony was admissible to prove that the substance was marijuana.” Clyde v. State, 298 Ga.App. 283, 680 S.E.2d 146 (June 10, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for possession of drugs affirmed, but conviction for possession of firearm during commission of felony reversed; drugs were found inside house, which defendant occupied at times, but firearm was found “[i]n the backyard of the house, officers found a .12-gauge sawed-off shotgun wrapped in plastic and buried under some cinder block bricks. These cinder blocks were located 30 feet away from the back of the house and ‘[t]here was nothing around them.’” “The evidence here showed that although others may have been present on the property on various unspecified occasions, Clyde was allowed by the owner to use the house, had been seen at the residence by police on previous occasions, had his vehicle on the premises, and hurriedly walked away from officers when they arrived. The evidence also showed that no other persons were present when officers executed the search warrant.” As to the firearm, however, “Clyde's conviction cannot be sustained unless there was evidence that he had immediate access to the weapon while possessing marijuana and trafficking in cocaine, which in this case was alleged to be the possession of more than 28 grams. See Carswell v. State, 251 Ga.App. 733, 734-736(1)(b) (555 S.E.2d 124) (2001) (evidence insufficient where defendant had cocaine on his person outside of motel but weapon was in suitcase later found in defendant's motel room); compare Gibson v. State, 223 Ga.App. 103(1) (476 S.E.2d 863) (1996) (where drugs were on coffee table and weapon under sofa in small residence, evidence sufficient to establish that defendant passed momentarily within arm's reach of gun). Here, there is no evidence that Clyde had the firearm on his person or within his arm's reach as required by OCGA § 16-11-106(b).” Torres v. State, 298 Ga.App. 158, 679 S.E.2d 757 (June 2, 2009). Jury charge sufficiently defined drug possession offenses, but not possession with intent to distribute or trafficking: “Now, ladies and gentlemen, the crimes contained in Count 1 as to trafficking in methamphetamine, and Count 2 possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and possession of Alprazolam and possession of marijuana are all Violations of the Georgia Controlled Substance Act, which provides that it is unlawful for any person to possess or have under one's control, and he's charged with possession of methamphetamine and Alprazolam, and so that is a Violation of the Controlled Substances Act. And I further give you the instructions that the offense charged in possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute is a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substance Act, which provides that it is a violation of the law to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute.” “[T]he instructions given completely failed to inform the jury about the manner in which the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine or the offense of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute may be committed.” Harbin v. State, 297 Ga.App. 877, 678 S.E.2d 553 (May 14, 2009). 1. Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine by ingestion. “The presence of methamphetamine in Harbin's urine constituted circumstantial evidence that Harbin knowingly possessed methamphetamine within the three days prior to April 11, 2006. West [ v. State, 288 Ga.App. 566, 567(2) (654 S.E.2d 463) (2007)]; Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga.App. 209, 212(1) (515 S.E.2d 397) (1999) (where jury finds presence of drugs in defendant's body, it may infer that the defendant previously possessed the drugs ingested). And this circumstantial evidence was sufficient to authorize a jury to find Harbin guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of methamphetamine. See Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 625-626(1) (398 S.E.2d 360) (1990), ov'd in part, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 902-903(2) (537 S.E.2d 80) (2000).” 2. Evidence supported finding of venue: “the evidence is uncontroverted that Harbin was administered a drug test at the Cherokee County probation office and that the sample tested positive for methamphetamine. We find this evidence sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of methamphetamine possession ‘might have been committed’ in Cherokee County.” Wingfield v. State, 297 Ga.App. 476, 677 S.E.2d 704 (April 13, 2009). Evidence supported inference that defendant was also in possession of cocaine dropped out of vehicle by passenger. “Not only was Wingfield found to have more than $2,000 in his pocket, see Dent v. State, 233 Ga.App. 605, 606(1), 506 S.E.2d 641 (1998), but he was also the owner and driver of the truck from which the drugs were thrown. ‘[A] presumption arises that a person in control of an automobile possesses contraband found therein. In addition, the law recognizes that possession may be actual or constructive, sole or joint.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Navicky v. State, 245 Ga.App. 284, 285-286(3), 537 S.E.2d 740 (2000).” Singleton v. State, 297 Ga.App. 452, 677 S.E.2d 348 (March 23, 2009). Trial court properly “sentenced [defendant] under OCGA § 16-13-31(a)(1)(B), which sets forth the mandatory minimum sentence for possession of 200 or more grams of cocaine, because the indictment only charged that he did ‘knowingly possess more than 28 grams of cocaine, ..., a mixture