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with a purity of more than 10 percent.’” Vines v. State, 296 Ga.App. 543, 675 S.E.2d 260 (March 10, 2009). Evidence supported finding that defendant jointly possessed drugs: “In addition to his mere presence in the car, the facts show that Vines rode in the back seat earlier in the trip within arms reach of the backpack. The car had an ‘overwhelming’ odor of marijuana. Vines had a magazine in his pocket that fit [co-defendant] Gibson's 9mm gun. He and [co-defendant] Fabian were incredibly and unusually nervous when the officers approached. The defendants were heavily armed. Vines lived with two of the other defendants. And Gibson's fiancé believed that drug sales were taking place in the home when she lived there approximately one month before the arrests. We hold that taken together these facts provide some evidence of a connection between Vines and the contraband sufficient to show that he knowingly shared the power and intention to exercise dominion or control over it. In a case where a strong odor of contraband is shown, it has been held that even without proving that the appellant was familiar with the odor, the jury may consider the evidence for the conclusion that the appellant should have known that something unusual was in the car. United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1532 (10 th Cir., 1986). The odor allows an inference that, combined with other evidence, could show a connection between the defendant and the contraband. Womble v. State, 290 Ga.App. 768, 770(2), 660 S.E.2d 848 (2008) (that defendant was found in house where methamphetamine was being manufactured and strong odor of that process permeated house, together with associated paraphernalia found on defendant, sufficient to link methamphetamine found in toilet to defendant). [other cits.]” Accord, Maddox v. State , 322 Ga.App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280 (July 11, 2013). In re: D.H., 285 Ga. 51, 673 S.E.2d 191 (January 26, 2009). OCGA § 16-13-2(b) does not unconstitutionally deprive defendants of the presumption of innocence. Defendant argues that literal meaning makes any accused guilty: “any person who is charged with possession of marijuana, which possession is of one ounce or less, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor…” “‘[T]he literal meaning of the statute prevails unless such a construction would produce unreasonable or absurd consequences not contemplated by the legislature. [Cit.]’ Johnson v. State, [267 Ga. 77, 78 (475 S.E.2d 595) (1996)]. The literal construction of OCGA § 16-13-2(b) proposed by D.H. would result in the absurd consequences that any person charged with misdemeanor possession of marijuana would not be presumed innocent and the State would not have any burden of proof. Instead, the accused would automatically be deemed guilty of the offense merely by virtue of the accusation. Such absurd consequences obviously were not contemplated by the legislature, and we will not construe the words of the statute in such an unreasonable way.” Benitez v. State, 295 Ga.App. 658, 673 S.E.2d 46 (January 23, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine reversed; evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant was knowingly in joint possession of drugs carried by his companion. Defendant drove Garduno from Marietta to a hotel in Cartersville, where Garduno attempted to sell drugs to police informant. Defendant was present in room when Garduno showed drugs to informant. Defendant “could see the contents of the [drug] containers from where he was sitting” in the room. Defendant possessed $2485 in cash. “Officer Mayton testified that in his experience, which included more than 100 drug cases in the previous year, no person would be present in a small room with the amount of drugs found here unless they were “intricately involved” in a drug transaction. He also testified that Latinos often carry large amounts of cash because they do not use banks. “[T]he State referred to Garduno as a co-defendant at Benitez's sentencing, but did not show the jury that Garduno was charged as such.” “Even if a rational jury could conclude that Benitez knew that Garduno was carrying methamphetamine, this fact alone ‘would not authorize a finding that [Benitez] aided and abetted him in the offense of trafficking,’” quoting Crenshaw v. State, 183 Ga.App. 527, 528-529 (359 S.E.2d 419) (1987) (“defendant’s traveling on same flight itinerary with person carrying cocaine was insufficient to sustain his conviction for trafficking”). Despite driving to the scene? Jackson v. State, 295 Ga.App. 427, 671 S.E.2d 902 (January 5, 2009). Trial court properly charged jury on joint possession although other occupant of vehicle was not indicted, where defendant didn’t deny actual possession of drugs, only challenging his knowing possession. Compare Turner (November 15, 2005), below (ordinarily improper to charge on joint possession where other occupant not charged). Pincherli v. State, 295 Ga.App. 408, 671 S.E.2d 891 (December 31, 2008). Evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant possessed drugs found hidden in truck’s engine. Defendant was driver but not owner of truck. “[T]he evidence of Pincherli's compensation for the trip, his having made the same trip at least once prior for pay, and his continued nervous behavior throughout the traffic stop, sufficed to create an issue for the jury as to Pincherli's knowing possession of the cocaine.”