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convicted of joint constructive possession where both defendants were charged); Jackson (January 5, 2009), above (proper to charge on joint possession despite failure to indict other occupant where defendant didn’t deny actual possession, only challenging his knowing possession). Rochefort v. State, 279 Ga. 738, 620 S.E.2d 803 (October 11, 2005). OCGA § 16-13-30.3(b)(1) is not unconstitutionally arbitrary and vague. “‘[C]ombating the illicit drug problem is a legitimate purpose....’ Lavelle v. State, 250 Ga. 224(1), 297 S.E.2d 234 (1982). To that end, ‘the legislature can rationally employ different means to respond to the problems created by different drugs.’ Hardin v. State, 277 Ga. 242, 243(2), 587 S.E.2d 634 (2003). Insofar as the substances listed in OCGA § 16-13-30.3(b)(1) are concerned, the General Assembly has determined that possession of 300 and fewer individual units serves a legitimate health concern, whereas the possession of a greater number does not. See OCGA § 16- 13-30.3(a)(2) (which defines ‘personal use’ as possession ‘for a legitimate medical use’ in a quantity ‘at or below’ 300 tablets). ‘“[I]f the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ (Cits.)” [Cit.] Rather, “(t)his inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinction is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor necessary. (Cits.) Such action by a legislature is presumed to be valid.” [Cits.]’ [Cits.] Hanson v. State, 275 Ga. 470, 472(3), 569 S.E.2d 513 (2002). ‘It is unnecessary for this Court to determine ... whether the legislative classification scheme is the best one available. [Cit.] It is enough to recognize that the legislature can rationally employ different means to respond to the problems created by different drugs.’ Hardin v. State, supra. Accordingly, we find no basis for second guessing the General Assembly’s determination that the line between legal and illegal possession of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and phenylpropanolamine should be drawn at 300 individual units.” Also no constitutional infirmity for including three different substances in same code section, especially in light of testimony that ephedrine and pseudoephedrine “have the same chemical makeup.” Citing to “Akins v. State, 224 Ga. 650, 653, 164 S.E.2d 125 (1968) (upholding, as against a vagueness challenge, the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting possession of ‘any vinous, malt, or spirituous liquors or beverages’ on which taxes or license fees were not paid).” Poston v. State, 274 Ga.App. 117, 617 S.E.2d 150 (June 29, 2005). “Poston reported to his supervising probation officer and, at her request, submitted to a urine drug screen test. Because a preliminary test of the urine was positive for amphetamines, the urine sample was forwarded to the State crime lab. A gas chromatography/mass spectrometry test performed on the sample by the State forensic toxicologist confirmed that methamphetamine was present in Poston’s urine sample. This evidence was sufficient to support Poston’s conviction of possession by ingestion of methamphetamine.” Elrod v. State, 269 Ga.App. 112, 603 S.E.2d 512 (August 12, 2004). Evidence was insufficient to convict of possession of methamphetamine where it showed that the substance tested positive for amphetamine and weighed 58.6 pounds, but “[n]o evidence was introduced concerning the purity or composition of the substance.” Indictment charged defendant with possession of 28 grams of amphetamine, not a “mixture containing amphetamine.” Overruled on this point, In re: S.C.P., 320 Ga.App. 166, 739 S.E.2d 474 (March 7, 2013) (whole court opinion). Jones v. State, 268 Ga.App. 246, 601 S.E.2d 763 (July 1, 2004). “‘[E]ven though ‘the concept of corpus delicti requires that in a drug-possession case there be proof by the state that the defendant possessed ... the illegal drug ..., there is no invariable requirement that in every such case, the drug itself be produced,’” quoting Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 421(1)(A)(c) (349 S.E.2d 717) (1986), cert. denied, Chancey v. Georgia, 481 U.S. 1029 (107 S.Ct. 1954, 95 L.Ed.2d 527) (1987). Accord, In re: P.M.H., 277 Ga.App. 643, 627 S.E.2d 211 (February 17, 2006) (“Compare Phillips v. Williams, 276 Ga. 691, 692 (583 S.E.2d 4) (2003) (State failed to offer any evidence at trial regarding what happened to the alleged cocaine after it had been taken from defendant upon his arrest.)”) Walker v. State, 265 Ga.App. 449, 594 S.E.2d 678 (February 5, 2004). “Walker told the officer that he was aware of the crack pipe being in his car and that he was allowing a friend to keep the pipe in the car. Walker’s protestation that the pipe belonged to someone else was of little import, since OCGA § 16-13-30(a) criminalizes the knowing possession of a controlled substance. ‘[I]t was possession of the cocaine, not ownership, that was at issue.’ Wheat v. State, 205 Ga.App. 388 (422 S.E.2d 559) (1992).” Accord, Pincherli v. State , 295 Ga.App. 408, 671 S.E.2d 891 (December 31, 2008). Baltazar v. State, 254 Ga.App. 773, 564 S.E.2d 202 (March 19, 2002). California law enforcement contacted Georgia authorities about a suspicious package addressed to “Kevin Kline” at a Cobb County address and en route to Georgia via Federal Express. When the package arrived, narcotics agents discovered it contained cocaine. A Cobb County narcotics