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agent dressed in a FedEx uniform and took the package and a clipboard with a FedEx sign-in sheet to the door of the trailer found at the address. Defendant opened the door and was asked to sign for the package. Defendant did not understand and began to speak in Spanish. The officer, who doesn’t speak Spanish, pointed to the clipboard to get Defendant to sign for it. Defendant was “basically calm, smiling, as if to say that he didn’t understand.” After the officer pointed to the clipboard two or three times, Defendant printed the name “Kevin Kline” on the signature line while looking at the face of the package. The officer handed the package to Defendant and left. Another officer then came to the door and when Defendant answered, he was arrested. A subsequent sweep of the trailer found the unopened package as well as a Spanish business card with the name “Fortino Cisneros” printed on the front and the name “Kevin Kline” printed on the back. The trailer had been leased to a person with the name Fortino Cisneros, so an officer called the number on the card. Someone answered who only spoke Spanish, so the officer was not able to inquire about Cisneros. The jury found Defendant guilty. Held, conviction must be reversed because the evidence that Defendant knew the package contained cocaine is circumstantial and in considering the evidence in its totality, a rational trier of fact could not conclude that Defendant’s guilt is the only reasonable hypothesis. Mere suspicion will not sustain a conviction. The court found that there was not additional evidence, as in Perkins below, that linked Defendant to the cocaine; however, if the business card had been found in Defendant’s wallet, the case might have had a different result. Meadows v. State, 247 Ga.App. 634, 545 S.E.2d 76 (January 23, 2001). Defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana reversed. Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana found in baggies thrown under porch of his residence, which he shared with his mother. “Although Meadows admitted that he had smoked marijuana and admitted that he, along with others, had thrown bags down which ended up under the porch, there was no evidence directly linking the marijuana which was found under the porch to Meadows. This situation differs from that in Cronan v. State, 236 Ga.App. 374(1)(b), 511 S.E.2d 899 (1999), where the defendant admitted having smoked marijuana on the morning of the date set out in the indictment. In contrast, in this case, Meadows made a general statement that he ‘had smoked’ marijuana. He did not specify a date on which he had smoked the substance. The evidence showed that the house was inhabited by several residents, including Meadows’ mother. The evidence showed that various people, including Meadows, smoked marijuana on the porch and threw the bags under the porch. Nevertheless, there was absolutely no evidence that Meadows had ever controlled or possessed the marijuana which the officers found under the porch. ‘Merely finding contraband on premises occupied by a defendant is not sufficient to support a conviction if it affirmatively appears from the evidence that persons other than the defendant had equal opportunity to commit the crime….’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Mathis v. State, 204 Ga.App. 896, 897-898(1), 420 S.E.2d 788 (1992).” Distinguished, Riggins v. State , 281 Ga.App. 266, 635 S.E.2d 867 (August 24, 2006) (drugs found in defendant’s hat that he discarded as he fled police, sufficient to link defendant to drugs and support his conviction for possession thereof). Sutton v. State, 245 Ga.App. 881, 539 S.E.2d 227 (September 13, 2000). Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; evidence was sufficient to establish possession: “Sutton’s proximity to the drugs was not the only evidence to support a conviction based upon parties to a crime with joint constructive possession . Sutton took the money during one of the drug transactions and told another suspected purchaser they had ‘good dope’ but would not sell it to him. Based on the evidence in the record, the jury was authorized to find that Sutton was in constructive possession of the cocaine and was an active participant in the selling of the cocaine.” Johnson v. State, 245 Ga.App. 583, 538 S.E.2d 481 (August 17, 2000). Evidence didn’t support defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession. “Mere presence at the time and place a crime is committed is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Reese v. State, 157 Ga. 766, 122 S.E. 195 (1924); Sweat v. State, 119 Ga.App. 646(1), 168 S.E.2d 654 (1969). The State must provide evidence of a connection linking the defendant to the contraband other than his mere spatial proximity. Francis v. State, 231 Ga.App. 112, 113(1), 497 S.E.2d 827 (1998). … Here the evidence showed that others were present at the residence, and that at most Johnson was a mere temporary occupant of the premises, with no evidence showing he had any control over the premises or that he had any connection to the rooms where the cocaine was found. See Francis, supra, 231 Ga.App. at 113(1), 497 S.E.2d 827 (no evidence connected defendant to bedroom where marijuana was found). Evidence of occasional or even frequent visits to a residence cannot alone constitute occupying and controlling the residence. Morrison v. State, 220 Ga.App. 151, 153(1), 469 S.E.2d 686 (1996). The presence of the children at the residence and the indications the room was occupied by children further distance Johnson from the bedroom in which the cocaine rocks were found.” “Here evidence showed that Johnson and several other people were outside the apartment the day the drugs were found, and that the drugs were found in a bedroom obviously occupied by the sister's children. No evidence linked Johnson to the three rocks of cocaine,[cit.] to the matchbox,[cit.] or to the bedroom or bathroom in which these were found; thus, the evidence did not exclude the hypotheses that the drugs belonged to the sister, or to the children, or to any of the others present at the apartment.[Cits.]”