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Stevens v. State, 245 Ga.App. 237, 537 S.E.2d 688 (July 19, 2000). Evidence supported two co-defendants’ convictions for cocaine trafficking, but not the third. As to Mr. Stevens, “the evidence shows that his driver's license, an accident report bearing his name, men's clothing, a .45 caliber pistol, a cellular telephone, and scales were found in the bedroom in which the 40 grams of cocaine and $1,408 in cash were discovered.” As to co-defendant Hill, “the evidence shows that marked money the CI used to purchase cocaine was found in Hill's pants. Cocaine found in a lock box on the premises was packaged in plastic baggies, and Hill was caught just after flushing the contents of a baggie down the toilet. Finally, Hill's exclamation denying possession of a sufficient amount of cocaine to sustain a trafficking charge demonstrated his criminal intent.” But “no evidence was found connecting Ms. Stevens to the cocaine.[fn] The room where Ms. Stevens was found asleep contained nothing more than a ‘couple of baby items.’ No drugs were found on her person or in the room. The residence was not leased in her name. Other than her presence, the only evidence suggesting that Ms. Stevens occupied the premises was the fact that the power bill was addressed to her. However, this evidence was rebutted by testimony indicating that Ms. Stevens permitted the account to be opened in her name because her co-defendants had poor credit ratings and were unable to establish their own account. Moreover, the evidence shows that personal items belonging to the co-defendants were found along with the cocaine. Hill's incriminating statement was introduced into evidence. Thus, evidence was presented to show that Ms. Stevens's co-defendants had equal access to the bedrooms where the contraband was found and an equal opportunity to commit the crime.[fn] It follows that the trial court erred in denying Ms. Stevens's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.[fn]” Perkins v. State, 244 Ga.App. 412, 535 S.E.2d 802 (June 12, 2000). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking affirmed; evidence was sufficient to show that defendant knowingly possessed drugs where he accepted delivery, from an undercover narcotics agent, of contraband addressed to a fictitious person. A subsequent search of Defendant’s house revealed that: Defendant was from the place where the package originated; drug paraphernalia and a gun were in Defendant’s house; Defendant had a large amount of cash despite not having worked for over two weeks; and Defendant had the tracking number for the delivery service in his wallet. Distinguishing Luke v. State, 230 Ga.App. 712, 714(3), 497 S.E.2d 376 (1998) (conviction for possession of marijuana reversed; defendant signed for packages delivered to his father’s house, but no evidence showed that he was aware of the contents). Accord Baltazar (March 19, 2002), above (conviction reversed; similar to Luke, no evidence that defendant was aware of contents of package he signed for). Cronan v. State, 236 Ga.App. 374, 511 S.E.2d 899 (February 9, 1999). Dicta: because the definition of marijuana under OCGA § 16-13-21(16) excludes “tetrahydrocannabinol samples which do not contain plant material exhibiting the external morphological features of the plant cannabis,” as described in OCGA § 16-13-25(3)(P), “a prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act for misdemeanor possession of marijuana cannot be instituted on the basis of a blood or urine test which shows ‘positive’ for marijuana, because such positive showings will be based upon the presence of THC ‘without the morphological features’ of the marijuana plant and are thus excluded from the definition of “marijuana” under the Act. Accordingly, it would appear that such prosecutions for possession of marijuana based upon positive blood or urine samples must be brought as felony prosecutions for possession of a Schedule I drug, i.e., THC, pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30(c). See also Osborn v. State, 161 Ga.App. 132, 134-135(2), 291 S.E.2d 22 (1982) (under the Controlled Substances Act, ‘marijuana shall be considered marijuana unless it ... does not exhibit the external morphological features of the plant cannabis’).” Here, however, evidence was sufficient to establish possession of marijuana based on defendant’s admission that he smoked marijuana that morning, corroborated by the positive urine test. Distinguished, Meadows (January 31, 2001), above. 6. POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE Smith v. State, 335 Ga.App. 742, 782 S.E.2d 824 (February 22, 2016). Convictions for possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to distribute, and related offenses, affirmed. Evidence supported finding of intent to distribute. “Here, the defendant possessed two different type of drugs and the cocaine he possessed was in two different forms. A large quantity of marijuana was found in one bag, while smaller and similar quantities of the drug were found in other bags. In addition to the marijuana, Smith also possessed two different forms of cocaine divided into eight individual bags. Deputy Smith testified, without objection, that the quantity and packaging of the drugs was indicative of drug distribution, and this testimony was based on his training and experience. … Moreover, in addition to the officer’s testimony, the evidence also shows that Smith engaged in a high-speed, dangerous chase and then attempted to flee from police on foot and that a nine-millimeter, loaded handgun with a bullet in the chamber was found in the front passenger seat after Smith fled from the car. Causey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 506, 508, 618 S.E.2d 127 (2005) (loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade); see generally State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 652, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) (noting that it ‘not unusual’ for drug dealers to be armed).” 2. “Further, although it is true that Deputy Smith