☢ test - Í

detected the strong odor of marijuana inside the defendant's car or on the defendant's person at the time of the respective traffic stops, which gave rise to a reasonable hypothesis that the drugs had been for the defendants' personal use. … Here, however, there was no evidence that the strong odor of marijuana was immediately detected inside the vehicle or was exuding from Jackson or Esters. Likewise, there was no evidence indicating that Jackson or Esters appeared to be under the influence of marijuana at the time of the stop.” Accord, Evans v. State , 318 Ga.App. 706, 734 S.E.2d 527 (November 20, 2012) (likewise distinguishing Vines ; defendant possessed “60.65 grams of marijuana, as well as multiple small individual baggies found in the packaging recovered at the scene. And there was no evidence that Evans was under the influence of marijuana at the time or that it was for his personal use.”). Jones v. State, 304 Ga.App. 109, 695 S.E.2d 665 (May 17, 2010). Intent to distribute amply shown: in defendant’s pocket, “found a large amount of cash in various denominations and a large amount of each of the drugs (2.7 grams of marijuana and 16 individual tablets of methamphetamine), with the marijuana packaged in four small baggies as if for resale; police also found guns in the limo where Jones had sat with a firing pin at his feet. A friend of Jones testified that Jones had not personally smoked marijuana since his youth some years ago. Finally, a police officer trained and experienced in the illegal drug distribution industry testified that the amount and packaging of the drugs indicated that Jones possessed these drugs with an intent to distribute them.” Boring v. State, 303 Ga.App. 576, 694 S.E.2d 157 (April 7, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and related offenses, affirmed; no error where trial court failed to define “intent to distribute” in jury charge. “‘Even though there was no specific instruction regarding the intent to distribute, this Court has held that the term distribute ... possesses only the ordinary and common dictionary meaning and, as such, does not need to be specifically defined in a jury charge.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Bowman v. State, 222 Ga.App. 893, 897-898(3), 476 S.E.2d 608 (1996). See Watkins v. State, 206 Ga.App. 575, 578(5), 426 S.E.2d 26 (1992). ‘Therefore, this Court finds no error in the failure to specifically charge the jury with a definition of “intent to distribute.”’ Bowman, supra, 222 Ga.App. at 898(3), 476 S.E.2d 608.” Distinguishing Torres (June 2, 2009), below (charge failed to adequately explain difference between intent to distribute, trafficking). Accord, Williams (November 2, 2015), above. Peacock v. State, 301 Ga.App. 873, 689 S.E.2d 853 (January 6, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine where defendant and his wife were selling drugs “fronted” by a supplier “with the expectation that they would pay him the following week after they sold the drugs to other users. ‘[W]here the supplier “fronts” contraband to a recipient with the expectation that the latter will sell it and pay him from the proceeds, it has been held that he retains a sufficient interest in the subsequent sale to establish that he acted in concert with the recipient to distribute the contraband.’ Hernandez v. State, 182 Ga.App. 797, 800(1), 357 S.E.2d 131 (1987). See Osborn v. State, 161 Ga.App. 132, 134(1), 291 S.E.2d 22 (1982).” Accord, Melesa v. State , 314 Ga.App. 306, 724 S.E.2d 30 (February 23, 2012); Aguilera v. State , 320 Ga.App. 707, 740 S.E.2d 644 (March 22, 2013). Haywood v. State, 301 Ga.App. 717, 689 S.E.2d 82 (December 16, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction as a party to possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to distribute. Haywood contended that only his co-defendant, Clayton, intended to distribute the drugs; Haywood admitted that he knew Clayton’s intent, but only held the drugs for Clayton while planning to use some of them himself. “There was evidence that Haywood had actual possession of the drugs, accompanied Clayton to the hotel, knew that Clayton was going to the hotel room to sell drugs to someone there, and had agreed to hold the bag of drugs while Clayton went to the room with the engine of the car still running. [fn] In light of this evidence, the jury could have found that Haywood actively participated in the attempted drug dealing activity by guarding the drug stash and by staying with the still running vehicle to facilitate a quick getaway if necessary.” Torres v. State, 298 Ga.App. 158, 679 S.E.2d 757 (June 2, 2009). Jury charge sufficiently defined drug possession offenses, but not possession with intent to distribute or trafficking: “Now, ladies and gentlemen, the crimes contained in Count 1 as to trafficking in methamphetamine, and Count 2 possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and possession of Alprazolam and possession of marijuana are all Violations of the Georgia Controlled Substance Act, which provides that it is unlawful for any person to possess or have under one's control, and he's charged with possession of methamphetamine and Alprazolam, and so that is a Violation of the Controlled Substances Act. And I further give you the instructions that the offense charged in possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute is a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substance Act, which provides that it is a violation of the law to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute.” “[T]he instructions given completely failed to inform the jury about the manner in which the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine or the offense of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute may be committed.” Distinguished, Boring (April 7, 2010), above (no definition of “intent to distribute” required where