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trafficking not also charged). Scott v. State, 297 Ga.App. 649, 678 S.E.2d 124(April 30, 2009). At defendant’s trial for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, trial court properly denied defendant’s request to charge the jury on misdemeanor possession as a lesser included offense. No evidence showed possession of a misdemeanor amount; defendant claimed that he went to the location intending to purchase a misdemeanor amount, but denied that he ever possessed it. Vines v. State, 296 Ga.App. 543, 675 S.E.2d 260 (March 10, 2009). Evidence supported finding that defendant jointly possessed drugs, but not intent to distribute: “Here, there were no scales or drug paraphernalia; cash was only confiscated from [a co-defendant]; none of the witnesses testified that 2.9 pounds of marijuana packaged in three bags constituted a quantity inconsistent with personal use (especially given that four people were found to be in joint constructive possession of it); and no evidence was introduced that Vines had a prior conviction. Thus the State's evidence was insufficient to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the marijuana was intended for personal use.” Distinguished, Jackson (February 22, 2012), above; Accord, Beard v. State , 318 Ga.App. 128, 733 S.E.2d 426 (October 19, 2012) (conviction reversed; no witness testified that possession of “marijuana, packaged in five separate plastic bags weighing one ounce each … was indicative of drug dealing as opposed to personal use.”). Wilson v. State, 295 Ga.App. 545, 672 S.E.2d 516 (January 14, 2009). “‘[P]ossession of cocaine with intent to distribute is a lesser included offense of trafficking.’ Pitts v. State, 260 Ga.App. 553, 563(8)(b), 580 S.E.2d 618 (2003). The trial court, therefore, should have merged Wilson's conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute with his trafficking conviction. Nunery v. State, 229 Ga.App. 246, 247(1), 493 S.E.2d 610 (1997).” But see Rupnik (April 19, 2005), below (possession with intent to distribute is lesser-included offense of trafficking as a matter of fact, not necessarily of law). Hamilton v. State, 293 Ga.App. 297, 666 S.E.2d 630 (August 14, 2008). “Possession with the intent to distribute may be shown by evidence that the amount of drugs found was inconsistent with personal use, Best v. State, 279 Ga.App. 309- 310(1) (630 S.E.2d 900) (2006), that the drugs found were individually packaged for distribution, Id. at 310, and that the defendant was in possession of a large amount of money. Harper v. State, 285 Ga.App. 261, 265-266(1)(b) (645 S.E.2d 741) (2007). The evidence showed testimony from [Officer] Cloninger that the amount of cocaine found was inconsistent with personal use, that the cocaine found in the vehicle was individually packaged, and that $494 was found on Hamilton's person. This evidence authorized a finding that Hamilton was in possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.” Bradley v. State, 292 Ga.App. 737, 665 S.E.2d 428 (July 15, 2008). “[G]iven the large amount and variety of contraband [about 25 grams of cocaine, four ounces of marijuana], its high street value, and that Bradley was taking it inside a heavily guarded prison facility, the jury was authorized to infer that she intended to distribute it to others rather than to use it herself. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 232 Ga.App. 565, 566(1) (502 S.E.2d 502) (1998) (jury authorized to infer that 4.9 grams of cocaine was sale amount not personal use amount); Bacon v. State, 225 Ga.App. 326, 327 (483 S.E.2d 894) (1997) (jury authorized to infer that 9.8 grams of cocaine was distribution amount).” Mike v. State, 290 Ga.App. 214, 659 S.E.2d 664 (March 10, 2008). No conflict between sentencing provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30(d) and OCGA § 42-8-35.2(a). The former applies “except as otherwise provided” to require 10 years to serve on second and subsequent violations; the latter applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law” to require six years special probation “in addition to any term of imprisonment.” Lipsey v State, 287 Ga.App. 835, 652 S.E.2d 870 (October 15, 2007). “Lipsey claims that the State failed to prove intent to distribute, pointing specifically to his own testimony that the seized cocaine could have been used for personal consumption. But the amount of cocaine at issue, as well as Lipsey’s possession of digital scales typically used to weigh drugs for distribution, permitted the jury to discount his testimony and find that he intended to distribute the drugs. See Beck [July 12, 2007, below ]; Copeland [ v. State, 273 Ga.App. 850 (616 S.E.2d 189) (2005)]; see also Davis v. State, 287 Ga.App. 478, 651 S.E.2d 750 (August 15, 2007) (jury authorized to reject testimony of defendant that ‘merely created a question of fact’).” Accord, Jenkins v. State , 291 Ga.App. 215, 661 S.E.2d 617 (April 17, 2008) (officer’s testimony “that the baggies, scale, and razor found in the vehicle Jenkins was driving were consistent with the cutting, packaging, and sale of illegal drugs” was sufficient to infer intent to distribute the cocaine also found); Smith v. State , 291 Ga.App. 353, 662 S.E.2d 176 (May 1, 2008) (Evidence was sufficient to show intent to distribute: officer testified that “the amount of cocaine, broken into several small pieces, the total weight over one gram worth $166, the traffic to and from Smith’s trailer, and the hand to hand exchanges he saw indicated to him that Smith was distributing the cocaine and not holding it