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for personal use.”). Beck v. State, 286 Ga.App. 553, 650 S.E.2d 728 (July 12, 2007), reversed on other grounds, Beck v. State , 283 Ga. 352, 658 S.E.2d 577 (March 10, 2008). Evidence was sufficient to establish intent to distribute: “officers found a large amount of cash on Beck’s person, including a recorded bill used in the controlled buy, as well as scales, plastic baggies, and scattered bags of drugs, including five individually wrapped pieces of cocaine. In addition, a police officer testified that scales are used by drug dealers to weigh narcotics. … The evidence, though not overwhelming, was sufficient to support the charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. See Copeland v. State, 273 Ga.App. 850, 853-854(2) (616 S.E.2d 189) (2005) (electronic scale, small plastic baggies, $2,600 in cash, and only 1.5 grams of cocaine provided sufficient evidence of possession with intent to distribute cocaine); Jackson v. State, 251 Ga.App. 781, 783(2)(a) (555 S.E.2d 136) (2001) (sufficient evidence to support possession with intent to distribute where defendant admitted he ‘had been a drug dealer for several years’ and officers found a total of 2.1 ounces of marijuana in ten bags, scales, and a box of plastic baggies). Compare Parris v. State, 226 Ga.App. 854, 856 (487 S.E.2d 690) (1997) (‘Where no additional evidence of intent to distribute is offered, such as scales, drug paraphernalia, large amounts of cash, division of drugs into individual packages or a prior conviction of possession with intent to distribute, the expert testimony is critical, and the conviction cannot be sustained without it.’)” Harper v. State, 285 Ga.App. 261, 645 S.E.2d 741 (May 8, 2007). Evidence was sufficient to prove intent to distribute: “No bright line rule exists regarding the amount or type of evidence sufficient to support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute. See James v. State, 214 Ga.App. 763, 764(1) (449 S.E.2d 126) (1994). Intent to distribute may be shown in many ways, including through evidence of the manner in which the drugs are packaged, the amount of drugs, and the amount and denominations of cash. See Helton v. State, 271 Ga.App. 272, 275(b) (609 S.E.2d 200) (2005); Womble v. State, 203 Ga.App. 107 (416 S.E.2d 148) (1992) ([defendant] possessed 16 small bags of crack cocaine); Bowers v. State, 195 Ga.App. 522(1) (394 S.E.2d 141) (1990) ([defendant] possessed four small bags of crack cocaine). Harper had in his pockets a large amount of cash, including twenty-four $20 bills, and 12.12 grams of cocaine divided into 33 individual packages. [Officer] Stanfield, who had been involved in thousands of drug arrests in his eighteen-year career, testified that the small bags of crack cocaine ordinarily sell for $20 each. Construing the evidence to support the verdict, as we must, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Harper possessed the drugs with the intent to distribute them. See Dent v. State, 233 Ga.App. 605, 606(1) (506 S.E.2d 641) (1998).” See also Hamilton (August 14, 2008), above; McCombs v. State , 306 Ga.App. 64, 701 S.E.2d 496 (August 27, 2010) (“the jury could infer the intent to distribute the cocaine from the evidence showing the cocaine was packed in 30 small bags and the large amount of cash in McCombs's possession.”). Gerlock v. State, 283 Ga.App. 229, 641 S.E.2d 240 (January 8, 2007). Evidence of separate, small packages was sufficient to establish intent to distribute: “the marijuana found in Gerlock’s vehicle was packaged in 17 ‘small purple zip lock bags’ that Officer Flanders described as ‘one by one inch jewelry-type bags [,] commonly known as a dime bag on the street, commonly used for the purchase and selling of marijuana.’” Distinguishing Clark v. State , 245 Ga.App. 267, 537 S.E.2d 742 (2000): eight small packages found in possession of four people did not establish intent to distribute; but court recognized “in Clark that the result might be different where one person possessed multiple bags of marijuana – the very situation we have here.” Florence v. State, 282 Ga.App. 31, 637 S.E.2d 779 (October 20, 2006). Evidence that defendant was found with a “cookie” of crack cocaine was insufficient to support conviction for possession with intent to distribute, based on officer’s testimony “that the cocaine in question ‘look[ed] like’ a ‘cookie’ that could have been broken into 30 smaller ‘rocks’ for a total street value of $300. But there was no evidence that the cocaine actually had been divided into rocks, much less that such rocks had been packaged for individual sale. Florence’s possession of a single piece of crack cocaine weighing approximately 2.11 grams and worth about $300, standing alone, cannot support his conviction of possession with intent to distribute. [Cits.]” “This testimony established [officer] Fenninger’s belief that people do not normally keep crack cookies for their personal use. Fenninger did not testify, however, what a personal use quantity is; he said nothing, for example, about a typical crack user’s ingestion or purchasing habits. Rather, his testimony showed only that he assumed that anyone caught with more than five crack rocks intended to distribute them, and that his personal practice was to present such cases to the prosecutor’s office as distribution cases. What Fenninger assumed, however, and what he was in the habit of presenting to the district attorney in preparation for the initiation of criminal charges, are not evidence about typical personal use quantities of crack cocaine. Under the circumstances, the evidence was not sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Florence intended to use the cocaine himself. See Parris v. State, 226 Ga.App. 854, 856 (487 S.E.2d 690) (1997); McNair, supra; Anderson v. State, 225 Ga.App. 727 (484 S.E.2d