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783) (1997).” Three judges dissent, contending that testimony of the experienced officer that “he had never arrested anyone who had a cookie intended for personal use” was sufficient for jury to infer that “the amount of cocaine and its form … was incompatible with personal use” in the opinion of the officer. Ryan v. State, 277 Ga.App. 490, 627 S.E.2d 128 (February 6, 2006). Evidence was sufficient to convict of possession of marijuana and methamphetamine, but not intent to distribute. To prove intent to distribute, “the state must demonstrate the contraband in the defendant’s possession was intended for sale. And the prosecution may show such intent in a number of ways, including the ‘the packaging of the contraband, possession of certain amounts or denominations of currency, a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute, and expert testimony that the amount of contraband possessed was consistent with larger amounts usually held for sale rather than for personal use.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Talbot v. State, 261 Ga.App. 12, 13(1) (581 S.E.2d 669) (2003).” “We find that the state did not prove that Ryan possessed this contraband with the intent to distribute it. The state failed to present any evidence to show that the possession of 2.3 grams of marijuana was an amount suggestive of drug sales, rather than an amount an individual might possess for his own personal use. Similarly, there was no testimony that methamphetamine residue found in a smoking pipe is indicative of drug sales. Certainly, a visual inspection of the amount of marijuana and methamphetamine at issue in this case would not alone compel a jury to conclude that Ryan intended to sell this contraband, rather than use it for himself.” Defendant’s “drug paraphernalia, the pay sheets and Ryan’s prior drug convictions. Although this evidence certainly may be relevant to the issue, it is insufficient to support Ryan’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute without evidence that he actually possessed marijuana or methamphetamine in quantities typical or suggestive of drug sales or evidence that the amounts in his possession could be sold. ” The “pay sheets” were “two sheets of paper, one of which contained a list of individual names with corresponding dollar amounts. Deputy Dyer testified that based upon his experience these sheets appeared to be pay sheets listing people to whom Ryan owed money or who owed him money in connection with drug sales and purchases. A second officer, Dalton Police Officer Scott McAllister, concurred that the sheets were indicative of drug sales, as did a third officer, Wayne Saylors of the Whitfield County Sheriff’s office,” both having been qualified as expert witnesses for this purpose. Accord, Ahmed (June 10, 2013), above. Mayo v. State, 277 Ga.App. 282, 626 S.E.2d 234 (January 19, 2006). “[T]he individual packaging of the 36 bags in this case is sufficient to support an intent to distribute conviction. Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga.App. 666, 668(1) (482 S.E.2d 403) (1997) (nine individual packages of crack cocaine rocks sufficient to support intent to distribute conviction); Williams v. State, 199 Ga.App. 544, 545 (405 S.E.2d 539) (1991) (30 clear plastic packages of cocaine sufficient to support intent to distribute conviction).” Accord, Flemister v. State , 317 Ga.App. 749, 732 S.E.2d 810 (October 2, 2012); Smith (February 22, 2016), above. Marshall v. State, 273 Ga.App. 17, 614 S.E.2d 169 (April 19, 2005). Intent to distribute may be proved by “the possession by the accused of large amounts of currency,” Burse v. State , 232 Ga.App. 729, 503 S.E.2d 638 (1998), or by “[s]cales and plastic baggies on the premises,” Smith v. State , 226 Ga.App. 150, 485 S.E.2d 538 (1997). Rupnik v. State, 273 Ga.App. 34, 614 S.E.2d 153 (April 19, 2005). Possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute may be a lesser included offense of trafficking as a matter of fact, as here. “[T]he jury could have found less than all of the facts necessary to prove trafficking, i.e., that Rupnik possessed less than 28 grams, but that she possessed an amount indicative of intent to distribute and inconsistent with possession for personal use.” Declines to address whether possession with intent to distribute is lesser-included offense of trafficking as a matter of law. Accord, Jackson v. State , 295 Ga.App. 427, 671 S.E.2d 902 (January 5, 2009) (holding that convictions merge as a matter of law). But see Wilson (January 14, 2009), above (possession with intent to distribute cocaine is lesser-included offense of trafficking as a matter of law) . Helton v. State, 271 Ga.App. 272, 609 S.E.2d 200 (January 12, 2005). “To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, OCGA § 16-13-30(b), the state is required to prove more than mere possession. [Cit.] The state may show intent to distribute in many ways, including expert testimony that the amount of contraband possessed was inconsistent with personal use, evidence showing the manner of packaging, and the possession of certain amounts or denominations of currency. [Cit.] Here, the evidence showed that the methamphetamine was divided into four small packages, with a total weight of over 8.7 grams, and that Helton had a large amount of cash in his pocket. Sosebee, an experienced narcotics investigator, testified that 8 to 22 grams was inconsistent with personal use. We reject Helton’s contention that Sosebee’s testimony was insufficient because he was never qualified as an expert. ‘It is well established that expert testimony is not necessary to identify a substance, including drugs. And even if police officers are not formally tendered as expert