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these ones, don't you think they would've wanted the same thing, to prove to [the investigating officer] that they did not do this?” Contrary to defendant’s argument, “the prosecutor's remark was not intended to comment on Kirkland's decision not to testify and was unlikely to be interpreted by the jury as a comment on his silence at trial; the remarks were instead intended to address, albeit inartfully, Kirkland's untruthful statements about his alibis.” Harrelson v. State, 312 Ga.App. 710, 719 S.E.2d 569 (November 18, 2011). Convictions for motor vehicle hijacking and related offenses affirmed; prosecutor’s comments in closing argument on defendant’s pre-arrest silence were not improper, where defense counsel raised the issue. “Here, the evidence shows that defense counsel repeatedly brought out at trial the fact that no statement from Harrelson existed because Harrelson had a constitutional right to not talk with the police and he exercised that right. The first time was during cross-examination of a detective, and the second time was upon recross-examination of the same detective. And at three different times during closing argument, defense counsel brought out the fact that no statement from Harrelson existed and that Harrelson chose to not talk with the police; one time counsel commented that Harrelson was smart to exercise his right to not talk with the police. The prosecutor, in closing argument, then stated that Harrelson had a right to not talk to the police, and she asked whether talking to the police was the first thing an innocent person does when they see the police. ‘Typically, questioning about and commenting upon a defendant's silence or failure to come forward is more prejudicial than probative.’ Fullwood v. State, 304 Ga.App. 341, 343(3) (696 S.E.2d 367) (2010) (citing Mallory v. State, 261 Ga 625, 630(5) (409 S.E.2d 839 (1991)). However, ‘because [Harrelson] raised the issue regarding his failure to come forward, the prosecutor was legitimately authorized to address it in [ ] closing argument.’ Id.; see Gaston v. State, 257 Ga.App. 480, 484(3) (571 S.E.2d 477) (2002) (rejecting claim of improper comment on silence where defense opened the door). See also Mitchell v. State, 242 Ga.App. 177, 181(4)(a) (529 S.E.2d 169) (2000) (no ineffectiveness where defendant opened the door to prosecutor's cross-examination concerning his silence and counsel failed to object to the cross examination).” Accord, Doyle v. State , 291 Ga. 729, 733 S.E.2d 290 (October 15, 2012). Schenk v. State, 307 Ga.App. 890, 706 S.E.2d 218 (February 16, 2011). DUI conviction; counsel’s reference in closing argument to defendant’s “testimony,” meaning his demeanor on the traffic stop video, expressly acknowledging defendant’s right not to testify in court, was not improper. “‘The State wanted to impress upon the jury the probative value of Schenck's demeanor captured on the videotape, despite the fact that he had not “testified” in court[,]’ and that was why the prosecutor had used ‘air quotes’ to indicate he was making a distinction between any reference to Schenck's in court testimony and his ‘testimony’ on the videotape.” Lacey v. State, 288 Ga. 341, 703 S.E.2d 617 (November 8, 2010). Murder, armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no improper comment on defendant’s silence when prosecutor argued in closing that defendant “cannot justify his excessive force when he never, ever, … said or implied that he was in fear for his life.” “Viewed in context, the prosecutor made the challenged comments while seeking to persuade the jury that Lacey’s statements and behavior shortly after the crimes were inconsistent with Lacey’s theory of self-defense, and we cannot conclude that his remarks were intended to comment on Lacey’s failure to testify or would have been received as such by the jury.” Cannon v. State, 288 Ga. 225, 702 S.E.2d 845 (September 20, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for malice murder and related offenses affirmed, no improper comment on defendant’s silence: “the State's manifest intention was not to comment on Cannon's silence to the police or failure to testify at trial, but to comment on his failure to assert his innocence in response to a request by an acquaintance to turn himself into the police. Thus, ‘[t]aken in context, the prosecutor's closing argument did not directly or naturally implicate the defendant's decision not to testify.... Rather, the prosecutor was simply making a reasonable inference based on [the previous testimony of Coons].’ Smith v. State, [279 Ga. 48, 50(2) (610 S.E.2d 26) (2005)].” Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). Reversing Court of Appeals at 290 Ga.App. 44, 658 S.E.2d 815 (2008), holds that prosecutor’s comment in closing argument, on defendant’s pre-arrest silence, was improper. “[D]uring closing argument [at defendant’s trial for aggravated battery], the prosecutor stated, ‘I want you to consider that Mr. Reynolds had the opportunity to stay ... that night and call the police or wait for police to respond to give his version of the facts.’” Court of Appeals held, based on Morrison v. State , 251 Ga.App. 161, 164(3) (554 S.E.2d 190) (2001), that this was not improper comment because “the rule prohibiting comments regarding prearrest silence is properly limited to a defendant's silence in the face of questions by an agent of the State or his failure to come forward when he knew that he was the target of a criminal investigation .” Supreme Court rejects this holding of Morrison , finding it to be inconsistent with Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 630(5) (409 S.E.2d 839) (1991) (overruled on other grounds, Chapel v. State, 270 Ga. 151, 154-156(4) (510 S.E.2d 802) (1998)). Mallory held that “a comment upon a