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defendant's silence or failure to come forward is far more prejudicial than probative,” and is not limited to the circumstances described in Morrison . Overrules Morrison and its progeny. Failure to object to such argument prior to Reynolds is not per se ineffective assistance, Patterson v. State , 285 Ga. 597, 679 S.E.2d 716 (June 29, 2009). Overton v. State, 295 Ga.App. 223, 671 S.E.2d 507 (November 26, 2008). Not error for prosecutor to comment on defendant’s failure to present alibi evidence in his own defense; “the prosecutor's comments were not directed toward Coleman's failure to testify, but rather toward the defense's failure to rebut the state's evidence.” Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 599, 669 S.E.2d 98 (November 3, 2008). “[T]his Court has held on several occasions that, generally speaking, it is not improper for the prosecutor to comment in closing argument on a non-testifying defendant's appearance and facial expressions. Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 774, 604 S.E.2d 804 (2004); Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439, 449, 469 S.E.2d 129,overruled on other grounds sub nom. Greene v. Georgia, 519 U.S. 145, 117 S.Ct. 578, 136 L.Ed.2d 507 (1996); Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 88-89, 402 S.E.2d 41 (1991); Johnson v. State, 256 Ga. 588, 590, 351 S.E.2d 202 (1987).” Thus, no ineffective assistance for failure to object to such comment. Accord, Hardnett v. State , 285 Ga. 470, 678 S.E.2d 323 (May 18, 2009) (prosecutor properly allowed “to argue in closing that Hardnett made ‘throat-slashing’ gestures to the jury.”); Jeffers v. State , 290 Ga. 311, 721 S.E.2d 86 (January 9, 2012) (prosecutor could point out in closing “that Jeffers had ‘flipped a bird’ at someone in the courtroom during the course of the trial.”). Lampley v. State, 284 Ga. 37, 663 S.E.2d 184 (June 30, 2008). 1. Statement during prosecutor’s closing argument was not an improper comment on defendant’s silence: “ You may not have every question answered, because the only person that can answer all of the questions is the man sitting there at that table, Derrick Lampley; the eyewitness, Montrell Cox; and the deceased victim. Because only those three persons were there and only those three persons know what happened.” “Here, the remarks at issue ‘were but a small part of a summary of the evidence best understood as conceding the ambiguities therein and were unlikely to be interpreted as comments on [Lampley’s] failure to testify,’” quoting Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 86(10) (463 S.E.2d 868) (1995) (“finding no error in prosecutor’s remarks during closing that ‘only two people know what went on in that apartment,’ and ‘there’s only two people who can tell us how long that horror lasted’”). Accord, Odom v. State , 304 Ga.App. 615, 697 S.E.2d 289 (June 25, 2010) (similar comment, citing Lampley ). 2. Argument was improper comment on defendant’s pre-trial silence: “‘ Does he go back to see if [the victim] ... [i]s okay? Does he call the police and say: there has been an incident here. This guy had my car. He wouldn’t give it back to me, and this is what I had to do. I chased him down and I tried to get my car and it got out of hand. No. He doesn’t do any of that.’ This argument does constitute an improper comment on Lampley’s silence or failure to come forward in violation of Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625(5) (409 S.E.2d 839) (1991), overruled on other grounds, see Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6(5) (515 S.E.2d 155) (1999), and thus Lampley’s counsel was deficient in failing to object.” No prejudice shown, however, due to weight of evidence against defendant. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga.App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (March 4, 2008). Prosecutor’s comment that evidence was ‘unrebutted and uncontradicted” was not a comment on defendant’s silence, but a comment “toward the defense’s failure to rebut the state’s evidence.” Sampson v. State, 282 Ga. 82, 646 S.E.2d 60 (June 4, 2007). No improper comment on defendant’s failure to testify: “Sampson cites comments, inter alia, that the case was brought to superior court; that the trial was taking place because Sampson ‘insisted on a jury trial’; that Sampson was entitled to an attorney and the attorney was responsible to put forth any defense or challenge any evidence that he might wish to; and that in defense counsel’s opening statement, the jury never heard, ‘He didn’t do it. ’ Such comments did not, as Sampson urges, clearly imply that Sampson had to testify, that he had the burden of proving his innocence, and that by not testifying, he did not meet that burden.” Cockrell v. State, 281 Ga. 536, 640 S.E.2d 262 (January 22, 2007). DA’s closing argument, commenting on defendant’s failure to testify, was not improper as it “was in direct response to a defense argument.” Defense counsel argued that it had “just occurred” to him that someone else might have committed the murder, and that if he had thought of it earlier, he would have put that person on the stand “and asked him about it.” DA responded that “they could have put the defendant on the stand and subjected him to cross-examination just like every other witness.” “When considered in its proper context, the prosecutor’s statements neither reflected a ‘manifest intention’ to comment on the failure to testify, nor were the comments such that a jury ‘would naturally and necessarily’ find them to be so.” Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (April 27, 2006). Full court opinion. Overruled on this point, see Reynolds (February 23, 2009), above. Glidewell claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel