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scale or any other evidence that Childs had weighed or measured the cocaine. And the State presented no evidence of prior similar transactions or other evidence that Childs was specifically familiar with trafficking weights of cocaine and would know that the cocaine he possessed on January 5, 2012 weighed at least 28 grams.” “We emphasize that unlike in Freeman [ v. State, 329 Ga.App. 429, 765 S.E.2d 631 (2014)] , the second bag of suspected crack cocaine was never tested for purity and thus cannot be used to show that Childs possessed such a large amount of cocaine with the purity prohibited by statute that his knowledge of the amount could be reasonably inferred.” Freeman v. State, 329 Ga.App. 429, 765 S.E.2d 631 (October 30, 2014). Cocaine trafficking conviction reversed on other grounds, but evidence was sufficient to establish knowledge of possession of a trafficking amount. “[T]he evidence shows that the crack cocaine which Freeman was convicted of possessing had a purity of 82 percent and weighed 50.62 grams – nearly two times the trafficking threshold weight of 28 grams – and was packaged in a plastic bag and hidden in a vent in a bedroom that Freeman was apparently occupying. Furthermore, the jury heard evidence of five similar transactions, including Freeman's three convictions for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. More specifically, in one of those previous cases, Freeman was found to be in possession of nearly 26 grams of cocaine, and in another, he was found to be in possession of 19 grams of the drug. Given these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence showing that Freeman had knowledge of the weight of the cocaine found in the search of the Thoms Drive residence.” Accord, Summerville (June 26, 2015), above. Distinguished, Childs (February 18, 2015), above. Scott v. State, 295 Ga. 39, 757 S.E.2d 106 (March 28, 2014). Reversing unpublished Court of Appeals decision (A12A2293), the plain language of OCGA § 16-13-31(a)(1) (as in effect at time of offenses, in 2009), prohibiting trafficking in cocaine, “required proof that the defendant had knowledge of the weight of the cocaine.” “[A] criminal statute that introduces the elements of a crime with the word ‘knowingly’ is ordinarily construed as applying that word to each element of the offense. Flores-Figueroa v. United States , 556 U.S. 646, 652(II), 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009).” Statute was amended effective July 1, 2013 to delete the word “knowingly”; “such change is consistent with legislative confirmation that proof of a defendant’s knowledge of each element of the trafficking statute, including weight of the drug, was required in former versions of the statute, but that the General Assembly no longer intends that it be so. This is reinforced by the General Assembly’s enactment of OCGA § 16-13-54.1, effective July 1, 2013, which expressly provides that a defendant’s knowledge of the weight or quantity of the controlled substance is not to be an essential element of the offense so that it must be proven in order to obtain a conviction.” Accord, Freeman (October 30, 2014), above (evidence sufficient to establish knowledge of trafficking amount); Summerville v. State , 332 Ga.App. 617, 774 S.E.2d 190 (June 26, 2015) (same holding as to marijuana trafficking, OCGA § 16-13-31(c)); Brown (November 18, 2015), above (physical precedent only; same holding as to methamphetramine trafficking, OCGA § 16-13-31(e)). On remand, see Scott (March 20, 2015), above. Griffin v. State, 294 Ga. 325, 751 S.E.2d 773 (November 25, 2013). Convictions for felony murder and conspiracy to traffic cocaine reversed; evidence didn’t establish that Griffin conspired to traffic cocaine. Griffin accompanied others to stash house; Griffin said they were there to buy marijuana, but evidence indicated no presence of marijuana, but substantial amount of cocaine. Deal apparently went bad, resulting in death of one of sellers. Indictment alleged conspiracy between Griffin and the sellers to traffic cocaine, but “‘[Georgia's] appellate courts have consistently held ... that “the mere agreement of one person to buy contraband which another agrees to sell does not establish that the two acted in concert so as to support a finding of a conspiracy.” [Cit.] This is because in an illegal drug transaction the purchaser and the seller are not acting together to commit the same crime and there is no joint design or purpose.’ Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 700(2), 715 S.E.2d 110 (2011). Thus, a simple buy-sell transaction, without more, does not support a conspiracy conviction under Georgia law. Id.; Pruitt v. State, 264 Ga.App. 44(2), 589 S.E.2d 864 (2003) (reversing drug conspiracy conviction where evidence showed nothing more than that defendant purchased drugs periodically from dealer). Even where there is evidence that the buyer purchased drugs in a quantity that exceeds the amount one would likely want for personal use, such evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy between supplier and buyer, absent evidence that the supplier had some stake in the buyer's resales. Id. Such a stake may be shown where, for example, the supplier ‘fronts’ the drugs to the buyer for the buyer to resell, with the proceeds used to pay for drugs. See, e.g., Aguilera v. State, 320 Ga.App. 707(1), 740 S.E.2d 644 (2013). Here, the record contains no evidence of any agreement between Griffin and the men operating the stash house, beyond a possible buy-sell agreement. In his statement to police, Griffin denied any prior acquaintance with the stash house men, and the State offered no evidence suggesting otherwise. In fact, the lead detective, when questioned on cross-examination, admitted that investigators had no evidence that Griffin even knew there was cocaine at the stash house when he arrived there.” Melton, joined by Hines, dissents.