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In re: S.C.P., 320 Ga.App. 166, 739 S.E.2d 474 (March 7, 2013). Whole court opinion. Delinquency adjudication affirmed; no fatal variance where petition alleged trafficking in methamphetamine and evidence showed trafficking in methamphetamine mixture. Based on Rochefort v. State, 279 Ga. 738 (620 S.E.2d 803) (2005); overruling contrary cases Elrod v. State, 269 Ga.App. 112 (603 S.E.2d 512) (2004) and Daniel v. State, 251 Ga.App. 792, 792–793 (555 S.E.2d 154) (2001). Jones v. State, 319 Ga.App. 678, 738 S.E.2d 130 (February 5, 2013). Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for trafficking in cocaine. “OCGA § 16–13–31(a)(1) provides that a person commits the offense of trafficking in cocaine when he knowingly possesses ‘28 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture with a purity of 10 percent or more of cocaine[.]’ (Emphasis supplied.) Since the evidence showed that the mixture in Jones's possession weighed 37.79 grams and had a purity of 34.6 percent of cocaine, Jones's conviction was authorized. See Godett v. State, 205 Ga.App. 545, 546(2), 423 S.E.2d 34 (1992) (explaining that the cocaine trafficking statute makes it illegal to possess any mixture containing cocaine with a purity greater than 10 percent); see also Quinn v. State, 171 Ga.App. 590, 593(8)(a), 320 S.E.2d 827 (1984).” McGee v. State, 316 Ga.App. 661, 730 S.E.2d 131 (July 6, 2012). Conviction for cocaine trafficking reversed based on erroneous jury charge, though evidence supported verdict. Specifically, evidence was sufficient to show that defendant knowingly “‘possessed a substance and knew that the substance contained some amount of cocaine.’ Harrison [ v. State , 309 Ga.App. 454, 456(2), 711 S.E.2d 35 (April 29, 2011)]. See Barr v. State, 302 Ga.App. 60, 61–62(1), 690 S.E.2d 643 (2010); Cleveland v. State, 218 Ga.App. 661, 663(1), 463 S.E.2d 36 (1995). In contrast, the statute does not require that the State prove that the defendant knew the purity or weight of the substance. See Harrison, 309 Ga.App. at 456(2), 711 S.E.2d 35; Barr, 302 Ga.App. at 61–62(1), 690 S.E.2d 643; Cleveland, 218 Ga.App. at 663(1), 463 S.E.2d 36.” Inconsistent with Scott (March 28, 2014), above. Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. 458, 729 S.E.2d 364 (July 2, 2012). Affirming 312 Ga.App. 166, 170(2), 718 S.E.2d 31 (2011) and defendant’s conviction for marijuana trafficking; jury charge which omitted to tell jury it must find that defendant knew he possessed a trafficking amount of cocaine wasn’t “plain error.” Defendant didn’t object to jury charge, hence plain error analysis applies. Jury instruction here can’t be plain error because it was supported by binding precedent from Court of Appeals holding that “knowledge of the quantity of cocaine is not an essential element of the offense. Barr v. State, 302 Ga.App. 60, 61(1), 690 S.E.2d 693 (2010); Cleveland v. State, 218 Ga.App. 661, 663(1), 463 S.E.2d 36 (1995). … ‘Given that [the Court of Appeals'] case law runs contrary to [A]ppellant's position, it cannot be seriously contended that the trial court committed “clear or obvious' error” as required by the second prong of the plain error analysis.’ State v. Kelly, [290 Ga. 29, 34(2)(b), 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011)].” Strongly hints, however, that the defendant’s underlying argument will prevail when squarely presented: “Affording the statute its plain meaning and considering that we must apply the rule of lenity when interpreting penal statutes, we believe that Appellant's argument that OCGA § 16–13–31(c) requires proof that he knew the amount of the marijuana he possessed may be meritorious.” Hunstein concurs in judgment only; Benham dissents; neither writes separately, however. Foreshadows Scott (March 28, 2014), above. Ahmad v. State, 312 Ga.App. 703, 719 S.E.2d 563 (November 18, 2011). Convictions for numerous drug and driving offenses affirmed; trial court properly declined to merge convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine and ecstasy where “the same 29.01 grams of substance tested positive for” both compounds. “Each crime required proof of a fact which the other did not, [cit.] as there was no evidence that chemical compounds or elements were shared between the drugs. Accordingly, the two counts did not merge and the trial court did not err in sentencing him separately for the two crimes.” Harrison v. State, 309 Ga.App. 454, 711 S.E.2d 35 (April 29, 2011). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; any error in charging jury on knowledge element of offense was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Defendant requested charge that State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he knew that the substance he possessed exceeded the weight and purity requirements of the statute. Trial court charged instead, in part: “Any person who is knowingly in possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture with a purity of 10 percent or more of cocaine commits the offense of trafficking in cocaine.... Knowledge on the part of the defendant that the crime of trafficking cocaine was being committed and the defendant knowingly and intentionally participated in or helped in the commission of such crime must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Casts doubt on “ Barr v. State, 302 Ga.App. 60, 61–62(1) (690 S.E.2d 643) (2010), and Cleveland v. State, 218 Ga.App. 661, 663(1) (463 S.E.2d 36) (1995), [where] we held that OCGA § 16–13–31(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew that he possessed a substance and knew that the