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drugs with the intent to distribute them’); Forrester [ v. State, 255 Ga.App. 456, 459(2) (565 S.E.2d 825) (2002)] (evidence of previous drug sales relevant and admissible at trial on charges of trafficking in cocaine, because it established defendant's connection with the house where the cocaine was seized).” Barr v. State, 302 Ga.App. 60, 690 S.E.2d 643 (January 20, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for trafficking cocaine; State is not required to prove that defendant “knew the weight and purity of the cocaine. Interpreting the cocaine trafficking statute, our Court in Cleveland v. State , 218 Ga.App. 661, 662-663(1) (463 S.E.2d 36) (1995), rejected this argument as to the weight of the cocaine, stating: ‘Under the cocaine trafficking statute, the State must show as an element the minimum amount of 28 grams, after which the quantity possessed bears only on punishment. The amount of 28 grams was designated by the legislature as the basis for distinguishing the crime of trafficking from the somewhat less serious crimes. The trafficking statute explicitly requires as the mens rea that defendant know he or she possesses the substance and know it is cocaine. The statute is not, however, reasonably subject to the construction urged, that defendant must know or should know the substance possessed weighs at least 28 grams. ’ (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Similarly, knowledge of the precise purity of the cocaine is not necessary for a conviction either.” Criticized, see Harrison (April 29, 2011), above. Peacock v. State, 301 Ga.App. 873, 689 S.E.2d 853 (January 6, 2010). Defendant and his wife were street-level drug dealers selling methamphetamine fronted by a supplier. Defendant, his wife, and the supplier were all arrested at defendant’s residence. Supplier had in his possession 157 grams of meth; all three were charged with trafficking based on the amount possessed by the supplier. Held, evidence failed to support defendant’s conviction for trafficking. There were no “facts showing that Peacock had control over the trafficking amount of methamphetamine located on the large-scale drug dealer's person; indeed, such would be contrary to the whole ‘buy-sell’ relationship, under which the large-scale drug dealer chose what and how much methamphetamine to advance to Peacock. Compare Riley v. State, 292 Ga.App. 202, 206(2), 663 S.E.2d 835 (2008) (small drug dealer had complete access to entire stash of large- scale drug dealer's cocaine and therefore could be criminally liable for trafficking). Regarding the attribution of the large- scale drug dealer's possession to Peacock as a co-conspirator, Pruitt v. State, 264 Ga.App. 44, 48(2), 589 S.E.2d 864 (2003) rejected this argument under similar circumstances, as a conspiracy to sell methamphetamine does not equate to a conspiracy to sell 28 grams of methamphetamine (and thus the large-scale dealer's possession of 28 grams would not be attributed to the small dealer). Even if the State alleged that pursuant to the conspiracy, more than 28 grams was sold over time (which was not even alleged let alone proven here) and argued that we should aggregate separate transactions together to find a conspiracy to traffic in 28 grams, ‘this argument fails to solve the missing elements of the [ S]tate's case- the lack of an agreement to act together to sell 28 grams or an agreement to act together to deliver 28 grams. An agreement relating to the sale or delivery of amounts of less than 28 grams cannot support a conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, even if the amounts sold over time amount to 28 grams or more. The plain language of the trafficking statute requires a transaction involving 28 grams or more. An agreement to commit this crime would therefore require an agreement to buy, sell, deliver, manufacture, or possess 28 grams of methamphetamine.’ (Emphasis in original.) Id. Thus, here the large-scale drug dealer's possession of 157 grams of methamphetamine was not pursuant to the conspiracy to sell, as co-conspirators are ‘responsible for the acts of the others only so far as such acts are naturally or necessarily done pursuant to or in furtherance of the conspiracy.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Shehee [ v. State, 167 Ga.App. 542, 543(1), 307 S.E.2d 54 (1983)]. Having such a large amount of methamphetamine was not necessary to the conspiracy to sell, where much smaller amounts had always been advanced to the Peacocks in the past.” See Pruitt (November 10, 2003), below. Santibanez v. State, 301 Ga.App. 121, 686 S.E.2d 884 (November 18, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine although the 233 gram sample included an unknown amount of water. “‘There is no requirement that a specific quantity of methamphetamine be present in the mixture to constitute a violation of the statute’ proscribing methamphetamine trafficking. Hill [ v. State, 253 Ga.App. 658, 661 (560 S.E.2d 88) (2002).] [OCGA § 16-13- 31(e)] ‘treats pure methamphetamine and a mixture containing methamphetamine equally.’ Bellamy v. State, 243 Ga.App. 575, 579(2) (530 S.E.2d 243) (2000).” Torres v. State, 298 Ga.App. 158, 679 S.E.2d 757 (June 2, 2009). Jury charge sufficiently defined drug possession offenses, but not possession with intent to distribute or trafficking: “Now, ladies and gentlemen, the crimes contained in Count 1 as to trafficking in methamphetamine, and Count 2 possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and possession of Alprazolam and possession of marijuana are all Violations of the Georgia Controlled Substance Act, which provides that it is unlawful for any person to possess or have under one's control, and he's charged with possession of methamphetamine and Alprazolam, and so that is a Violation of the Controlled Substances Act. And I further give you