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the instructions that the offense charged in possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute is a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substance Act, which provides that it is a violation of the law to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute.” “[T]he instructions given completely failed to inform the jury about the manner in which the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine or the offense of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute may be committed.” Celestin v. State, 296 Ga.App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (February 18, 2009). At defendant’s trial for trafficking in cocaine, evidence did not support defendant’s request for jury charge on lesser-included offense of possession with intent to distribute. “Celestin argues that weight of the cocaine was in dispute because there was a discrepancy between the amount field-tested by Bracken – 70 grams – and the amount as determined by the forensic chemist – 71.99 grams. As both weights far exceed the amount required for trafficking, there is no evidence of the lesser offense.” Distinguishing Lumpkin v. State , 245 Ga.App. 627 (538 S.E.2d 514) (2000) (failure to charge on possession with intent to distribute was harmful error where “the evidence showed that the defendant possessed exactly 28 grams of cocaine, the minimum amount for a trafficking conviction.”). Jackson v. State, 295 Ga.App. 427, 671 S.E.2d 902 (January 5, 2009). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking. Evidence showed that the amount of cocaine possessed by defendant and car driver was, in the aggregate, 105 grams, “which was in an evidence bag containing a ‘large cookie’ seized from Jackson and two small ‘rocks’ seized from the driver. The testimony at trial showed that the portion seized from Jackson was comparatively a much larger piece, not broken down into smaller portions like the two pieces seized from the driver. An officer testified that the amount found on the driver was small and consistent with personal use and the amount found on Jackson was much larger and consistent with use for distribution or sale. Based on the record before us, including the total weight of 105 grams and the evidence regarding what proportion was found on Jackson, we conclude that the evidence, when viewed in favor of the verdict, authorized a rational trier of fact to find that Jackson possessed 28 grams or more of cocaine.” Eidman v. State, 295 Ga.App. 304, 671 S.E.2d 292 (September 26, 2008). Defendant’s sentence for cocaine trafficking affirmed; contrary to defendant’s assertion, he was not entitled to a reduced sentence due to assistance rendered the State. “OCGA § 16-13-31(g)(2) ‘does not by its terms require the judge to impose a reduced or suspended sentence in the event a defendant has rendered such assistance[,] but instead merely authorizes him to do so.’ (Emphasis added.) Lastohkein v. State, 199 Ga.App. 555(2) (405 S.E.2d 554) (1991). See generally Brugman v. State, 255 Ga. 407, 414(5)(c) (339 S.E.2d 244) (1986). Here, the trial court exercised its discretion and concluded, based on the evidence presented at the sentence hearing, that Eidman's actions did not constitute ‘substantial assistance’ sufficient to justify a reduced sentence below the mandatory minimum. See Lastohkein, supra.” Gillen v. State, 286 Ga.App. 616, 649 S.E.2d 832 (July 16, 2007). “[T]he trial court did not err in finding that pursuant to the specific trafficking statute, OCGA § 16-13-31(g)(1), it was without authority to probate or suspend the sentences. Although OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(1) gives the trial court authority to suspend or probate all or any part of a sentence, the trafficking statute clearly provides that an ‘adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, probated, deferred, or withheld prior to serving the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by this Code section.’ OCGA § 16-13-31(g)(1). [fn] And ‘a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.’ (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366, 368(1) (541 S.E.2d 645) (2001). The trial court was therefore correct in its conclusion that it was without authority to suspend or probate the sentences. Moran v. State, 170 Ga.App. 837, 842(3) (318 S.E.2d 716) (1984).” “The 2006 amendment (adding OCGA § 17-10-6.2 to the exception of OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(1)) does not demonstrate a legislative intent for OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(1) to prevail over the specific trafficking statute.” “The 2004 amendment is equally irrelevant. The General Assembly’s removal of ‘in conformity with any mandatory minimum sentences required by law’ relates to the first sentence in OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(1), requiring the judge to impose ‘a determinate sentence’ for a specific number of months or years. It does not relate to, or have any bearing on, the second sentence of the Code section, the one at issue at here, governing the trial court’s authority to suspend or probate.” Applied as to fines as well as imprisonment, Strickland v. State , 301 Ga.App. 272, 687 S.E.2d 221 (November 20, 2009). Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga.App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573 (July 9, 2007). Evidence of weight of substance was sufficient to support conviction for trafficking in marijuana where bundles of marijuana in plastic wrap, contained in light-weight nylon duffel bags, were estimated to weigh 50 pounds. “ While the amount of contraband confiscated, like any other element of the offense, must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not have to be proven with