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no error.”); Williams v. State , 307 Ga.App. 577, 705 S.E.2d 332 (January 20, 2011) (Physical precedent only) (like Fullwood , no evidence of criminal negligence or reckless conduct); Howard v. State , 288 Ga. 741, 707 S.E.2d 80 (March 7, 2011) (same). Duncan v. State, 290 Ga.App. 32, 658 S.E.2d 780 (March 4, 2008). Trial court erred in sentencing defendant for both aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated assault with intent to rob. “‘Aggravated assault with intent to rob requires [both] the reasonable apprehension of receiving bodily injury and proof of the intent to rob.’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Adcock v. State, 279 Ga.App. 473, 475(5)(b) (631 S.E.2d 494) (2006). The evidence upon which the state relies to support that charge, Duncan's actions in putting the vehicle into park or in directing the victim out of the cab, do not demonstrate a threat of bodily injury. Rather, any reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent or bodily injury relates to the threat posed by the gun, the same weapon used in the aggravated assault.” Disapproved, Thomas v. State , 292 Ga. 429, 738 S.E.2d 571 (February 18, 2013) (no merger of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated assault with intent to rob, same victim). Taul v. State, 290 Ga.App. 288, 659 S.E.2d 646 (February 29, 2008). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault: “The evidence established that while the deputy stood visibly in the roadway, with his arms raised and yelling for Taul to stop his vehicle at the roadblock, Taul drove his vehicle at a speed of 40 miles per hour directly at the deputy. Rather than stopping, slowing down, or swerving to avoid possible contact, Taul continued to drive directly toward the deputy, who had to quickly jump out of the roadway to avoid being struck by Taul’s vehicle. The deputy feared ‘[b]eing struck by [Taul’s] vehicle and receiving serious injuries.’” Ware v. State, 289 Ga.App. 860, 658 S.E.2d 441 (February 29, 2008). Physical precedent only; evidence didn’t support finding that box cutter was used as a deadly weapon. “Considering the evidence concerning the manner in which Ware used the box cutter and the wounds she inflicted with it, the State did not meet its burden of showing that the box cutter was a deadly weapon in this case. At most, the State has shown that Ware hit her husband once with the ‘non- business end’ of a box cutter and inflicted a minor cut to his face and an injury to the inside of his mouth; there is no evidence that the blade or knife of the box cutter was ever exposed or that Ware ever threatened her husband with an exposed blade.” Reliance upon Ware questioned in Reese (April 29, 2010), above (Ware is physical precedent only). Lewis v. State, 283 Ga. 191, 657 S.E.2d 854 (February 25, 2008). Indictment was not defective “for failing to set out the aggravated nature of the assault, either by naming the deadly weapon or alleging intent to murder. “ When the language of an indictment charges the defendant with causing the death of the victim ‘by shooting,’ it raises the possibility of aggravated assault both with a deadly weapon and intent to murder. Accord, Hoehn v. State , 293 Ga. 127, 744 S.E.2d 46 (June 3, 2013) (same challenge, identical indictment). Goss v. State, 289 Ga.App. 734, 658 S.E.2d 168 (February 8, 2008). Defendant’s aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions did not merge. “In order to prove aggravated assault as alleged in Count 2, the state had to prove that Goss assaulted the victim with the intent to murder her by either stabbing her or cutting her throat. [fn] See OCGA § 16-5- 21(a)(1). As alleged in Count 4, the aggravated battery charge required the state to prove that Goss maliciously caused harm to the victim by seriously disfiguring her throat or her arms. [fn] See OCGA § 16-5-24(a). Thus, a conviction could be sustained on Counts 2 and 4 based on different conduct: a conviction on Count 2 could be based on the cutting of the victim’s throat, while a conviction on Count 4 could be based on the serious disfigurement of her arms. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by entering judgment on both counts. See, e.g., Waits [ v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 4(2), 644 S.E.2d 127 (2007)].” Haygood v. State, 289 Ga.App. 187, 656 S.E.2d 541 (January 16, 2008). “Simple assault is necessarily a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Dickerson v. State, 207 Ga.App. 241(1) (427 S.E.2d 591) (1993).” Boyd v. State, 289 Ga.App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (January 16, 2008). No jury instruction on hands as a deadly weapon required when defendant charged with aggravated assault, not with a deadly weapon, but with “instruments which when used offensively against a person [are] likely to or actually [do] result in serious bodily injury.” Jackson v. State, 288 Ga.App. 432, 654 S.E.2d 232 (November 15, 2007). “During its charge the trial court read the indictment, then charged that ‘a person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults another person with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.’ Jackson argues that the trial court erred by including the language ‘actually does’ in the charge,