☢ test - Í

when the indictment only charged that the object was likely to result in serious injury. We find this argument meritless. Here, the trial court did not charge jury on the entire aggravated assault statute, but charged the jury on only that part of the statute relating to the allegations of the indictment. The trial court’s use of the language ‘actually does’ was extraneous, as the trial court also read the accusation to the jury, which excluded any reference to ‘actually does,’ and instructed the jury that the State had the burden of proving every material allegation of the accusation and every essential element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances, ‘[t]he charge, when considered in its entirety, fairly instructed the jurors that they could convict the defendant only of the offense with which he was charged in the indictment.’ Lumpkin v. State, 249 Ga. 834, 836-837(2) (295 S.E.2d 86) (1982).” Ellison v. State, 288 Ga.App. 404, 654 S.E.2d 223 (November 13, 2007). Jury could find that “a shank which had been fashioned from a piece of fence wire six to seven inches long by sharpening a point at one end and winding tape around the other end as a handle,” used “to stab the victim in the area of several vital organs” in a prison fight, was a deadly weapon. Cail v. State, 287 Ga.App. 547, 652 S.E.2d 190 (September 13, 2007). State was not required to submit weapon into evidence to support conviction for aggravated assault. May v. State, 287 Ga.App. 407, 651 S.E.2d 510 (September 4, 2007). “May argues that the indictment against him was fatally defective in that it did not recite that his hands were used as deadly weapons putting the victim in reasonable apprehension of serious injury. We disagree. The essential elements of aggravated assault are ‘(1) an assault on a person as defined in OCGA § 16-5-20 and (2) the use of a deadly weapon or an object which when used offensively against a person is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.’ Jay v. State, 232 Ga.App. 661, 662(2) (503 S.E.2d 563) (1998) (emphasis added), citing OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2). … When this indictment specified that May’s hands and feet ‘were likely to result in serious bodily injury,’ it successfully charged him with aggravated assault. See Jay, supra (when indictment charged that defendant’s fists were likely to result in serious bodily injury, no reference to deadly weapons was required).” See also Scott (October 6, 2006), below. Accord, Ferguson v. State , 322 Ga.App. 565, 745 S.E.2d 784 (July 1, 2013). Johnson v. State, 287 Ga.App. 352, 651 S.E.2d 450 (August 7, 2007). “Johnson claims that the trial court erred in charging the jury that Johnson could be convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon even though no weapon was introduced into evidence. Such claims are without merit and have been rejected previously by this Court. In Lattimer v. State, 231 Ga.App. 594, 595 (499 S.E.2d 671) (1998), we held that: ‘[i]t is not necessary for the State to admit into evidence the deadly weapon used by the defendant in order for the defendant to be found guilty of aggravated assault. The presence of a deadly weapon or the appearance of such may be established by circumstantial evidence, and a conviction for aggravated assault may be sustained even though the weapon was neither seen nor accurately described by the victim. Some physical manifestation is required or some evidence from which the presence of a weapon may be inferred, but OCGA § 16-5-21(a) does not require proof of an actual deadly weapon.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted). Here, two police officers testified that Johnson fired a gun, and such testimony was sufficient to infer the presence of a weapon even though no weapon was introduced into evidence.” Dixon v. State, 285 Ga.App. 694, 647 S.E.2d 370 (June 5, 2007). Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for pointing a gun at his wife. Defendant contends that he held a microcassette recorder, not a gun, manipulating it to make everyone think it was a gun. Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included charge of simple assault. Held, trial court properly refused to charge on simple assault. “ Under the evidence here, the jury could find either that Dixon pointed a gun at his wife, or, if they accepted Dixon’s testimony, that he pointed a micro-tape recorder, which he held in such a way that it appeared to be a gun. In fact, he stated that he intentionally manipulated the device to make it look like a gun and to ensure that the others would not see that it was a tape recorder. Thus, under either version, the jury would necessarily have to find that Denise had a reasonable belief that Dixon had a gun in order to convict him of assault. Such a finding supports a conviction only for aggravated assault. Alternatively, the jury could have found that Denise’s apprehension was unreasonable because, accepting Dixon’s testimony, he only had a tape recorder. Such a finding would have resulted in an acquittal. There was no evidence that Dixon used the tape recorder in any other way to threaten his wife, and therefore no evidence to support a conviction for simple assault. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Dixon’s request to charge on the lesser included offense.” “[T]his Court has upheld convictions for aggravated assault where the crime involved a blank gun, Veal v. State, 191 Ga.App. 445, 446(2) (382 S.E.2d 131) (1989), a b. b. gun, In re: C.A., 249 Ga.App. 280, 282(3) (548 S.E.2d 37) (2001), an inoperable pellet gun , Mitchell v. State, 222 Ga.App. 866, 867(1) (476 S.E.2d 639) (1996), and a toy