☢ test - Í

gun , Anderson v. State, 238 Ga.App. 866, 871(1) (519 S.E.2d 463) (1999).” Accord, Davis v. State , 306 Ga.App. 450, 702 S.E.2d 736 (October 13, 2010) (BB gun). Jones v. State, 285 Ga.App. 114, 645 S.E.2d 602 (April 16, 2007). Defendant could be convicted of two separate counts of aggravated assault against same victim. “One aggravated assault count was for aggravated assault with a knife (Count IV of the indictment); the other was for aggravated assault with a gun (Count V). The evidence shows that Jones first grabbed the victim and threatened her with a knife. At this point, the crime of aggravated assault with a knife was complete. Only after he had taken her upstairs to her bedroom did he threaten her with the gun.” Turner v. State, 281 Ga. 487, 640 S.E.2d 25 (January 8, 2007). “Turner argues that the State failed to prove Turner intended to commit aggravated assault, because the evidence does not show he was using the stolen vehicle ‘offensively’ at the time of the collision. However, the State is not required to prove specific intent; the issue is whether defendant possessed a general intent to injure. See Durrance v. State, 250 Ga.App. 185(2) (549 S.E.2d 406) (2001). ‘[A]lthough an automobile is not per se a deadly or offensive weapon, it may become one depending on the manner and means by which the vehicle is used. The question of whether an automobile has been used in such a manner ... is one for the jury to resolve.’ Id. at 187. The jury was authorized to infer from Turner’s conduct that he had an intent to injure Strozier, or anybody who was in his way while he attempted to elude police.” Accord, Guyse v. State , 286 Ga. 574, 690 S.E.2d 406 (March 1, 2010); Johnson v. State , 289 Ga. 650, 715 S.E.2d 99 (September 12, 2011). Dudley v. State, 283 Ga.App. 86, 640 S.E.2d 677 (December 18, 2006). Indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault “by holding a razor blade against the neck of [the victim], said razor blade being an object which when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury.” “In its charge and recharge on aggravated assault, the trial court instructed the jury that ‘[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when that person assaults another person with a deadly weapon, or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury .” (Emphasis added). Held, this did not amount to an improper charge on an additional, uncharged method of commission of the offense. “Here, the trial court instructed the jury that the State was required to prove every material allegation of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. The indictment charged that Dudley committed the crime by holding a razor blade against the victim’s neck. The only weapon shown to be used by Dudley was a razor blade. Accordingly, ‘ the question whether the [razor blade] constituted a deadly weapon or whether it constituted an instrument likely to inflict serious bodily harm had nothing to do with the manner in which the crime was committed. Consequently, the charge cannot reasonably be deemed to have presented the jury with an alternative basis for finding the [defendant] guilty of aggravated assault not charged in the indictment.’ (Citation omitted.) Davis v. State, 184 Ga.App. 230, 232-233(2) (361 S.E.2d 229) (1987). Accord, Miller v. State, 174 Ga.App. 703, 704(3) (331 S.E.2d 616) (1985).” Accord, Opio v. State , 283 Ga.App. 894, 642 S.E.2d 906 (March 7, 2007). Perez v. State, 281 Ga. 175, 637 S.E.2d 30 (October 30, 2006). Evidence was insufficient to prove intent to injure as necessary for aggravated assault where defendant “probed” victim with “knife with a small forked tip,” leaving eight “superficial” wounds to the chest, apparently to see if she was dead after he stabbed her. Conviction reversed. Scott v. State, 281 Ga.App. 813, 637 S.E.2d 751 (October 6, 2006). Indictment was not fatally defective although it did not, in charge of aggravated assault, allege that defendant’s hands were “used as deadly weapons and were likely to cause bodily injury.” “The indictment here charged Scott with aggravated assault by choking Hill around the neck with his hands, and the indictment alleged that Scott’s hands were being used offensively against Hill in such manner as to have been likely to have resulted in serious bodily injury or to have actually resulted in serious bodily injury. Although the aggravated assault count of indictment did not additionally allege that Scott had attempted to commit a violent injury or that his act had placed Hill in reasonable apprehension thereof, another count charging him with kidnapping with bodily injury alleged that he had caused bruising around her throat and hemorrhaging in her eyes. Under the circumstances, even though the aggravated assault count was deficient, it was not so fundamentally flawed as to have charged no crime at all. [Cit.] Consequently, Scott waived the defect in the indictment by proceeding to trial without complaint. [Cit.]” See also May (September 4, 2007), above. Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 490, 629 S.E.2d 816 (May 8, 2006). “The crime of aggravated assault, [under OCGA § 16-5- 20(a)(2), as alleged here], is established by the reasonable apprehension of harm by the victim of an assault by a firearm rather than the assailant’s intent to injure . [Cit.] All that is required is that the assailant intend to commit the act which in fact places another in reasonable apprehension of injury, not a specific intent to cause such apprehension . [Cit.]”