☢ test - Í

Accord, Kirkland v. State , 282 Ga.App. 331, 638 S.E.2d 784 (November 8, 2006); Ganaway v. State , 282 Ga. 297, 647 S.E.2d 590 (July 13, 2007); Little v. State , 298 Ga.App. 298, 680 S.E.2d 154 (June 11, 2009) (deputy reasonably apprehended injury when defendant hit him with car, “sending him into oncoming traffic,” regardless of defendant’s intent to injure); Lee v. State , 320 Ga.App. 573, 740 S.E.2d 307 (March 20, 2013) (victim reasonably apprehended receiving serious bodily injury when defendant used his car to intentionally run victim’s car off road at high speed). Stancil v. State, 278 Ga.App. 843, 630 S.E.2d 130 (April 13, 2006). “Regardless of whether the rifle that Stancil pointed at the officer was loaded and capable of firing, a jury could have found Stancil guilty of aggravated assault based on evidence that he pointed a gun at the officer and that the gun reasonably appeared to be a deadly weapon. See OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2); Mitchell v. State, 222 Ga.App. 866, 867(1) (476 S.E.2d 639) (1996).” Massey v. State, 278 Ga.App. 303, 628 S.E.2d 706 (March 17, 2006). Indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault against victim “with a ‘certain broom ... in a manner ... likely to result in serious bodily injury,’ and with assaulting the victim ‘with his hands and feet ... in a manner ... likely to result in serious bodily injury.’ The trial court first defined assault as ‘an attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of another or an act which places another person in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.’ It continued that ‘a person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.’ See OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2). ‘ Contrary to [Massey’s] contention, the trial court did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault.... Furthermore, the charge tracked the suggested pattern charge on aggravated assault, which includes the statutory definitions of simple assault. The record demonstrates no error.’ (Footnotes omitted.) Heard v. State, 257 Ga.App. 315, 317(2) (573 S.E.2d 82) (2002). Massey also complains that it was error for the trial court to specifically name ‘feet, fists, and broom handle’ as possible deadly weapons in its charge. However, ‘the trial court’s charge tracked the indictment, informing the jurors that if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] committed the offense in the manner alleged in the indictment, they were authorized to convict [defendant] of aggravated assault. A complaint about a portion of the charge which follows the language of the indictment is without merit.’ (Emphasis in original.) Williams v. State, 184 Ga.App. 480(1) (361 S.E.2d 713) (1987).” In re: T.K.L, 277 Ga.App. 461, 627 S.E.2d 98 (February 2, 2006). “Aggravated assault with intent to rob is complete where there is an assault coupled with an intent to rob. [Cit.] Taking a substantial step toward a robbery would convert the crime to attempted robbery.” Giddens v. State, 276 Ga.App. 353, 623 S.E.2d 204 (November 14, 2005). Defendant was not entitled to new trial where trial court failed to define “assault” as part of its charge on aggravated assault. “Giddens does not dispute that he shot McGaha with a firearm, but claims that he acted in self defense. Thus any error in the charge would not have affected the outcome of the case.” Leaves open the question of whether the failure to define “assault” was error. But see Brown (August 12, 2005), below. Anthony v. State, 276 Ga.App. 107, 622 S.E.2d 450 (October 25, 2005). “‘Intentionally firing a gun at another, absent justification, is sufficient in and of itself to support a conviction of aggravated assault.’ (Punctuation omitted.)” quoting Love v. State , 268 Ga. 484, 485(1), 490 S.E.2d 88 (1997). “Indeed, the presence of a gun ‘would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State , 251 Ga.App. 578, 579(1), 554 S.E.2d 768 (2001).” Accord, Dukes v. State , 285 Ga.App. 172, 645 S.E.2d 664 (April 26, 2007); Howard v. State , 288 Ga. 741, 707 S.E.2d 80 (March 7, 2011); In re: O.L. , 326 Ga.App. 640, 757 S.E.2d 236 (March 27, 2014) (Physical precedent only). Walker v. State, 275 Ga.App. 862, 622 S.E.2d 64 (October 14, 2005). “‘The crimes of aggravated assault and kidnapping do not necessarily merge as a matter of law, although they may do so as a matter of fact when they are based on the same conduct.’ (Punctuation and citation omitted.) Owens v. State, 271 Ga.App. 365, 367(2) (609 S.E.2d 670) (2005). Although our appellate Courts have found that kidnapping with bodily injury and aggravated assault merge as a matter of law, [cits.] and although the indictment in this case was arguably sufficient to charge Walker with that crime in that it alleged that the victim received bruises and knife wounds during the kidnapping, Walker was tried, convicted and sentenced for the crime of kidnapping, not kidnapping with bodily injury.” “[T]he crimes here were established by separate and distinct facts, and the evidence to establish the aggravated assault charges was not ‘used up’ to establish the kidnapping charge. [Cit.]”