☢ test - Í

Anthony v. State, 275 Ga.App. 274, 620 S.E.2d 491 (August 30, 2005). “‘The injuries sustained in an aggravated assault are relevant to that assault and therefore admissible.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 258 Ga.App. 78, 81(3) (573 S.E.2d 110) (2002).” Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (August 12, 2005). “ A charge on simple assault is not necessary to make a charge on aggravated assault complete. Weaver v. State, 256 Ga.App. 573, 574(2) (568 S.E.2d 836) (2002). See State v. Tate, 262 Ga.App. 311, 312(1)(b) (585 S.E.2d 224) (2003) (offense of aggravated assault may be completed without the commission of a simple assault).” Accord, Dasher v. State , 281 Ga.App. 326, 636 S.E.2d 83 (August 29, 2006). Cornelius v. State, 273 Ga.App. 806, 616 S.E.2d 148 (June 21, 2005). Defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to commit aggravated assault against the occupants of the vehicle other than the one who owed him money for drugs, but “in light of the testimony at trial concerning the number of rounds Cornelius fired into the confined space of Hunt’s single cab pickup truck, the jury was authorized to conclude that Cornelius was shooting indiscriminately at the occupants of the truck.” Barber v. State, 273 Ga.App. 129, 614 S.E.2d 105 (April 7, 2005). “When viewed in favor of the verdict, … the evidence showed that Barber willingly participated in a gunfight in a crowded parking lot and that an innocent bystander was fatally wounded during the exchange of gunfire. This evidence was sufficient to sustain Barber’s conviction for aggravated assault,” although the evidence did not show that defendant shot victim. Lemming v. State, 272 Ga.App. 122, 612 S.E.2d 495 (March 11, 2005) (disapproved on other grounds, Miller v. State , 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009)). “Apprehension,” as used in the definition of assault and aggravated assault, requires “not that the victim have a reasonable fear of immediately receiving a violent injury but rather that the victim have a reasonable perception that he is about to receive a violent injury,” (emphasis in original). Court of Appeals finds by 4-3 majority that circumstantial evidence supported finding that victim had such apprehension. “[P]ositive evidence of an adamant denial of apprehension by the victim does not preclude conviction when there is some circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer a perception of danger…. Moreover, evidence of the state of mind of one victim can be relevant to the state of mind of other victims,” so one victim’s express apprehension of danger can be circumstantial evidence that other victim likewise apprehended it. Here, Waffle House cook grabbed a broom and came after defendant, who was holding a “filed-down pocket paring knife” and threatening the waitress with it. As cook came at defendant with the broom, defendant jabbed his tiny knife at the cook, inflicting a superficial cut on his finger. Held, both waitress and cook could have apprehended violent injury, although cook testified that he was concerned for the safety of the waitress, not himself. Defendant’s convictions for two counts of aggravated assault affirmed. Accord, Anthony v. State , 276 Ga.App. 107, 622 S.E.2d 450 (October 25, 2005) (apprehension may be proved by circumstantial evidence); Moore v. State , 286 Ga.App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337 (July 5, 2007) (pointing a gun at victim was sufficient to authorize jury to find reasonable apprehension of violent injury, without proof of actual fear by victim); Williams (June 25, 2009), above (fact that victim stood up and fought with defendant when he saw defendant approaching with knife sufficient to show reasonable apprehension of injury); Davis v. State , 306 Ga.App. 450, 702 S.E.2d 736 (October 13, 2010) (reasonable apprehension of injury is a question of fact). Cadle v. State, 271 Ga.App. 595, 610 S.E.2d 574 (February 11, 2005). Defendant was charged with aggravated assault against police officers under OCGA §§ 16-5-21(a)(1) and (2), and jury was charged on the definitions of criminal intent and criminal negligence. “‘[A]n aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) cannot be committed by criminal negligence[.]’ Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 591- 592(2) (502 S.E.2d 726) (1998). Although the charge is simply inapt as to an aggravated assault predicated on OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2), Dunagan at 593- 594(2), in this case it is impossible to tell from the verdict which form of aggravated assault served as the basis for the conviction. ‘Thus, we cannot conclusively state that the verdict rested exclusively on the (a)(2) ground or that, if it rested on the (a)(1) ground, that the jury did not incorrectly substitute criminal negligence for criminal intent in rendering its verdict on the (a)(1) ground.’ [ Dunagan at 594-95].” Owens v. State, 271 Ga.App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (January 21, 2005). “‘The crimes of aggravated assault and kidnapping do not necessarily merge as a matter of law, although they may do so as a matter of fact’ when they are based on the same conduct. [Cit.] Here the aggravated assault occurred when Owens pointed the gun at the second store-owner brother to hold him at bay during the robbery of the first brother. The kidnapping of that same second brother occurred when Owens