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and his cohort then forced both brothers into the store’s back office. ‘Under those circumstances, the aggravated assault was supported by facts separate from the kidnapping ... and would not, therefore, be included as a matter of fact in’ the kidnapping offense. [Cits.]” Williams v. State, 270 Ga.App. 371, 606 S.E.2d 594 (November 8, 2004). “There was evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Williams committed aggravated assault when he accelerated [his vehicle] towards the police officers, putting them in reasonable apprehension of immediate injury. See OCGA §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and 16-5-20(a)(2); Thomas v. State, 255 Ga.App. 777, 778(1), 567 S.E.2d 72 (2002) (acceleration toward officer sufficient to show intent); Reynolds v. State, 234 Ga.App. 884, 885-886(1)(b), 508 S.E.2d 674 (1998) (whether automobile was used as a deadly weapon is a question for the jury).” Accord, Myers v. State , 311 Ga.App. 668, 716 S.E.2d 772 (September 14, 2011). Thomas v. State, 270 Ga.App. 181, 606 S.E.2d 275 (October 26, 2004). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault reversed – although officer testified that he heard gunshot after defendant jumped over wall, there was no evidence that shot was aimed at officer, and officer acknowledged on stand that “that the weapon could have been accidentally discharged.” Skaggs v. State, 278 Ga. 19, 596 S.E.2d 159 (May 3, 2004). “Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof that the victim was likely to, or actually did, suffer serious bodily injury, not that he died. OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2). There is no dispute that Skaggs intentionally struck and then kicked [victim]. While fists and feet are not deadly weapons per se, they can become such instruments when used to strike another. See Williams v. State, 127 Ga.App. 386, 193 S.E.2d 633 (1972).” Accord, In re: T.W ., 280 Ga.App. 693, 634 S.E.2d 854 (July 26, 2006); Ferrell v. State , 283 Ga.App. 471, 641 S.E.2d 658 (February 6, 2007); In re: Q.S. , 310 Ga.App. 70, 712 S.E.2d 99 (June 16, 2011); Lewis v. State , 317 Ga.App. 218, 735 S.E.2d 1 (June 18, 2012). Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 594 S.E.2d 631 (March 29, 2004). “The indictment charged [defendants] with aggravated assault against one of the victims, Hunter, by shooting at him with a handgun, a deadly weapon. [Defendants] argue the State failed to establish the elements of this crime because neither of them knew that Hunter was in the house at the time of the shooting; Hunter himself slept through the entire shooting; and none of the bullets fired into the house reached the bedroom where Hunter was asleep …. [Defendants’] primary objective was to kill Mills, whom they blamed for the death of Culler’s brother, but it was likely that violent harm would also be inflicted against all persons inside the home. When an unintended victim (such as Hunter) is subjected to harm due to an unlawful act intentionally aimed at someone else (such as Mills), the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own misdirected wrongful conduct and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was intended to the one who suffered harm. [Cit.] Accordingly, it is of no import that [defendants] were unaware that Hunter was in the home. It is obvious that by intentionally firing into the home, [defendants] were likely to seriously injure all the occupants, not just their primary target, Mills. Such harm was likely regardless of whether a particular occupant (such as Hunter), was aware of the shooting as it occurred. It follows that the trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict on the charges of aggravated assault against Hunter.” Accord, Foat v. State , 310 Ga.App. 334, 713 S.E.2d 444 (June 29, 2011) (defendants shot at man on porch, striking someone else in front room of house). Bishop v. State, 266 Ga.App. 129, 596 S.E.2d 674 (March 5, 2004). “Unlike an aggravated assault committed with the intent to murder, rape, or rob, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not require a specific criminal intent; rather, it requires only a general criminal intent as defined in OCGA § 16-2-1, which in the case of simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) is a general intent to injure.” Indictment for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon thus was sufficient although it did not specifically allege intent. By contrast, aggravated assault with intent to murder, rape or rob requires allegation of intent to commit the specific predicate felony. Accord, Adams v. State , 239 Ga.App. 377, 667 S.E.2d 186 (August 22, 2008). Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 592 S.E.2d 656 (February 2, 2004). Court’s jury charge on aggravated assault was reversibly deficient where it failed to inform the jury that “intent to commit a violent injury” (emphasis in court opinion) is an essential element of the offense. Jury even specifically asked whether “injury” included “trying to mentally scare a person?” and whether “injury, as it applies to aggravated assault, [is] limited to a physical event/happening?” “When a given instruction ‘fails to provide the jury with the proper guidelines for determining guilt or innocence[, it is] clearly harmful and erroneous as a matter of law.’ Spear v. State, 230 Ga. 74 (195 S.E.2d 397) (1973). Consequently, the failure to inform the jury of an essential element of the crime charged is reversible error because the jury is left without appropriate guidelines for reaching its verdict. Ancrum v. State, 197 Ga.App. 819 (399 S.E.2d 574) (1990); Powers v.