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State, 150 Ga.App. 25 (256 S.E.2d 637) (1979).” Also, “[i]t is not necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect. [Cits.]” Allegation that the aggravated assault was committed with a gun was sufficient. See also Coney (March 19, 2008), above. Gordon v. State, 252 Ga.App. 133, 555 S.E.2d 793 (October 23, 2001). Fact that intended victim was actually male, and thus couldn’t be raped, was not a defense to the charge of aggravated assault with intent to rape where defendant thought victim was female at time of assault. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga.App. 109, 539 S.E.2d 605 (September 22, 2000). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault where Defendant soaked victim in fuel then menaced him with a lit cigarette. “It is common knowledge that gasoline is flammable and that the lit end of a cigarette is extremely hot, and it stands to reason that one who is set aflame is likely to suffer serious burns, if not death. Accordingly, the jury was authorized to find that the cigarette, in conjunction with the gasoline, constituted an offensive weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury.” Merneigh v. State, 242 Ga.App. 735, 531 S.E.2d 152 (March 13, 2000). Shoplifting and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; 1. indictment sufficiently charged aggravated assault. “Count 2 of Merneigh's indictment reads: ‘for that the said accused ... did unlawfully make an assault upon the person of Michael Jason Frank, with a knife, the same being an object which when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury ....’ Count 3 uses the same language but names a different victim. Merneigh's right to reasonable notice of the charges against him was satisfied by this language in the indictment. See Jay v. State, 232 Ga.App. 661, 662(1), 503 S.E.2d 563 (1998) (indictment accused Jay of an assault inflicted on his wife ‘“with his fists, objects which when used offensively against said person, were likely to result in serious bodily injury contrary to the laws of (this) State”’); State v. Bolman, 222 Ga.App. 534, 534, 474 S.E.2d 721 (1996) (indictment accused Bolman of the offense of aggravated assault in that he ‘“did unlawfully make an assault upon the person of another, to wit: Henry Wade Alexander, with a deadly weapon, to wit: a certain knife”’). We have previously held that such language in an indictment sufficiently ‘charges an assault by way of either manner contained in the simple assault statute.’ Jordan v. State, 214 Ga.App. 598, 601(2), 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994), overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593(2)(a), 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998). Here, either manner of simple assault could have occurred , and the trial court charged the jury as to both manners contained in the simple assault statute. The trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the aggravated assault counts of the indictment.” 2. T rial court properly declined to charge on reckless conduct as a lesser offense of aggravated assault:“there is no evidence that Merneigh was simply negligently handling the knife when he swung it at the food manager and store manager, using profane language and telling both victims they had ‘messed up’ while lunging at them with the knife.” Robertson v. State, 245 Ga.App 649, 538 S.E.2d 755 (August 23, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. 1. “When a defendant intentionally shoots several times into a group of people intending to harm only one of them, a jury would be authorized to find him guilty of aggravated assault against each person in the group.” Here, Robertson got into an argument with his wife. His wife was trying to flee the scene in a truck with their two children and Robertson’s mother. Robertson put his hand into the truck and fired three shots, only hitting his wife. The court held that, even though Robertson did not intend to harm all the persons in the truck, a conviction for aggravated assault on all persons in the truck was appropriate. 2. Fact that victim “had a reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury” was shown by evidence that she was “‘out of breath,’ ‘erratic,’ and ‘very upset’ upon her arrival at the police station,” despite her testimony that she was not afraid. “Similarly, Harper's testimony that the children were crying when appellant fired into the truck in which they were sitting was sufficient for the jury to conclude that they, too, had a reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury. Accord, Odle v. State , 331 Ga.App. 146, 770 S.E.2d 256 (March 12, 2015) (“Proof that a victim was placed in apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury need not be by the victim's testimony, as it may be inferred from the conduct of the victim,[fn] and the state of mind of the victim of assault may be established by circumstantial evidence,” as here, one victim’s testimony as to actions of a second victim.). Braswell v. State, 245 Ga.App. 602, 538 S.E.2d 492 (August 18, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; evidence supported finding “that Braswell's hands and feet were used against the victim as ‘deadly weapons’ as charged in the indictment. This is a jury question, resolved adversely to Braswell. Dixon v. State, 268 Ga. 81, 82(1), 485 S.E.2d 480 (1997). (‘Although hands and feet are not considered per se deadly weapons within the meaning of OCGA § 16–5–21(a)(2), the jury may find them to be so depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the extent of the victim's injuries. [Cit.]’). The injuries sustained by the victim supports the jury's decision that Braswell used his hands and feet as ‘deadly weapons’ in his assault of the victim.” Here, “Braswell and his brother beat