☢ test - Í

and kicked the victim, took the victim's ring and wallet, and stole the victim's 1994 Nissan Altima; as a result of the assault, the victim suffered three broken ribs, a punctured lung, and severe lacerations to the head.” Tucker v. State, 245 Ga.App. 551, 538 S.E.2d 458 (August 15, 2000). Convictions for aggravated assault on a peace officer and related offenses affirmed. Evidence supported aggravated assault conviction: “the state alleged in the indictment that Tucker committed the offense of aggravated assault upon a peace officer by assaulting the officer with a deadly weapon. Such general language sufficiently charges an assault by way of either manner contained in the assault statute. See Jordan v. State, 214 Ga.App. 598, 601(2), 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994), overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593(2)(a), 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998). Thus, the state could have proved the charged crime with evidence either that Tucker used the gun in an attempt to violently injure the officer or that Tucker used the gun to place the officer in fear of being violently injured. … [T]he evidence shows that Tucker used a gun in an attempt to commit a violent injury upon the officer. Because apprehension is not an essential element of an assault in which it is alleged that the defendant attempted to commit a violent injury upon the victim, there was evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find Tucker guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing aggravated assault upon a peace officer. See Love v. State, 268 Ga. 484, 485(1), 490 S.E.2d 88 (1997).” Self v. State, 245 Ga.App. 270, 537 S.E.2d 723 (July 21, 2000). Evidence supported defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault. “Self contends the evidence is insufficient to support the aggravated assault convictions because the victims realized his gun was not loaded.[fn] The victims testified that there were shells in the gun and that Self only had to pump the gun to load a shell into the chamber. Additionally, they also testified that they thought they were going to get shot and that they were afraid. Under these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the victims had a reasonable apprehension of receiving immediate, violent injury. See State v. Bolman, 222 Ga.App. 534, 535, 474 S.E.2d 721 (1996) (presence of deadly weapon ‘would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently’).” Stobbart v. State, 272 Ga. 608, 533 S.E.2d 379 (July 10, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions reversed on other grounds, but no error in denying request to charge on pointing a firearm as lesser offense to aggravated assault. “Although Stobbart argues that testimony showed the weapon was unloaded when he pointed it at Marchitelli, and that he therefore had a lower level of criminal culpability than that required for aggravated assault, OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2) ‘looks to the victim's state of mind, rather than the accused's, to establish the elements of an assault. There is an intent of the accused that must be shown, but it is only the criminal intent to commit the acts which caused the victim to be reasonably apprehensive of receiving a violent injury, not any underlying intent of the accused in assaulting the victim. [Cit.]’ Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593(2)(b), 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998). The only testimony was that the weapon was pointed as a threat and perceived as such, and therefore an assault. ‘ Although pointing a firearm at another is an offense included in aggravated assault, it is not error to refuse a charge on it when the evidence does not reasonably raise the issue that [the] defendant may be guilty only of the lesser crime. [Cit.]’ Head v. State, 233 Ga.App. 655, 659(4), 504 S.E.2d 499 (1998).” Scott v. State , 243 Ga.App. 383, 532 S.E.2d 141 (March 22, 2000). Aggravated assault convictions affirmed. “ Whether Scott's fists and hands constituted objects likely to result in serious injury was a question of fact for the jury. Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 473(3), 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980). The evidence that Scott beat the victim about the head and face with his hands is sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict that he is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of aggravated assault as alleged in Count 5 of the indictment. Maloy v. State, 237 Ga.App. 873, 874(2), 516 S.E.2d 370 (1999).” Huguley v. State, 242 Ga.App. 645, 529 S.E.2d 915 (February 22, 2000). Aggravated assault convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge on reckless conduct as a lesser-included offense where defendant contended he fired his gun, not “to injure the victims, but only to ‘warn’ them.” “[T]he only dispute is whether Huguley directed these ‘warning shots’ at them, as the [victims] Valcarcels contend, or into the air, as Huguley contends. However, this is a nonissue, because, either way, Huguley's intent was to put the Valcarcels in fear of an immediate bodily injury. [Cit.] Thus, a charge on reckless conduct was not warranted.” Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700, 523 S.E.2d 868 (November 15, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault of his former girlfriend, and malice murder of her ex-husband, affirmed. “Goforth contends that, as a matter of law, the jury cannot find him guilty of aggravated assault upon Ms. Slaughter, because she did not become aware of the shot until after it struck her ex-husband. ‘ Where the “assault” at issue consists of an attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of another, awareness on the part of the victim is not an essential element of the crime. [Cits.]’ Tiller v. State,