☢ test - Í

[267 Ga. 888, 890(3), 485 S.E.2d 720 (1997), overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593(2)(a), fn. 3, 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998)]. Under the evidence, when Goforth fired the gun, he was, in effect, aiming at both of the Slaughters, ‘and his deliberate act ... can be found to have included an intent to injure those at whom he aimed, even if in his anger he totally ignored [Ms. Slaughter's] presence in the line of fire. The attempt was general, not isolated.’ Jordan v. State, 214 Ga.App. 598, 601(2), 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994), overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, supra.” Accord, Watkins v. State , 306 Ga.App. 769, 702 S.E.2d 904 (November 10, 2010). Compare Santiago (February 17, 2012), above (conviction reversed for lack of evidence that victim was aware defendant had a gun, where there was no attempt to cause violent injury). Pace v. State, 239 Ga.App. 506, 521 S.E.2d 444 (August 3, 1999). 1. “Because discharging a firearm near a public street is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, the trial court did not err in refusing to merge the offenses during sentencing. Laster v. State, 178 Ga.App. 825, 826(2), 345 S.E.2d 78 (1986); see also Hawkins v. State, 262 Ga. 193, 194(3)(b), 415 S.E.2d 636 (1992).” 2. Four shots fired in the direction of nine people = nine potential counts of aggravated assault. “Pace's act of firing his weapon into the group made each individual in the group a separate victim. The seven aggravated assault convictions of which Pace was found guilty do not merge because the offenses were committed upon different victims. See Hall v. State, 235 Ga.App. 44, 47(5), 508 S.E.2d 703 (1998); Harshaw v. State, 134 Ga.App. 581, 582(3), 215 S.E.2d 337 (1975).” Accord, Scott v. State , 302 Ga.App. 111, 690 S.E.2d 242 (January 25, 2010). Harwell v. State, 270 Ga. 765, 512 S.E.2d 892 (March 1, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault reversed based on jury charge instructing jury on a method of committing the offense supported by the evidence but not charged in the indictment. Indictment charged the jury with aggravated assault with intent to rob; trial court charged the jury on that method plus aggravated assault with a weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury, a taser (“stun gun”). Supreme Court rejects State’s argument that the taser was not a “weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury.” “ Whether a weapon is deadly or one likely to cause serious bodily injury is a question for the jury, which may consider all the circumstances surrounding the weapon and the manner in which it was used. Williams v. State, 127 Ga.App. 386(1), 193 S.E.2d 633 (1972). See also Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470(3), 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980). Cf. Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54(2), 464 S.E.2d 198 (1995) (where we recognized that there were devices which, though not deadly weapons per se, could be found by the jury to be deadly weapons depending on the circumstances, and suggested that, should the State believe a defendant’s actions constitute aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2), it allege in the indictment the weapon used and that it was a deadly weapon or one likely to cause serious bodily injury). The victim’s acts of cooperation when he recognized that his assailants were armed with a stun gun, the testimony of the victim’s intense reaction to being repeatedly assaulted by the gun’s electronic discharge, and the legal recognition that the stun gun was an ‘offensive weapon’ constituted sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the victim was assaulted with a weapon likely to result in serious bodily injury. Accordingly, [defendant’s] due process rights were violated by the jury charge given by the trial court, and [defendant’s] aggravated assault conviction must be reversed and the sentence vacated. Dukes v. State, [265 Ga. 422, 424, 457 S.E.2d 556 (1995)].” Accord, Bradley v. State , 322 Ga.App. 541, 745 S.E.2d 763 (July 1, 2013) (jury could determine whether scissors were a deadly weapon as used by defendant). Cordis v. State, 236 Ga.App. 629, 513 S.E.2d 45 (February 23, 1999). Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction reversed; trial court erroneously refused to charge jury on simple assault as a lesser-included offense despite defendant’s request. Distinguished, Bradley v. State , 322 Ga.App. 541, 745 S.E.2d 763 (July 1, 2013) (failure to request the charge not ineffective assistance of counsel where no “reasonable probability that an instruction on the lesser included offense would have changed the outcome of the trial.”). 2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER Benn v. State, 309 Ga.App. 373, 710 S.E.2d 587 (April 19, 2011). Convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery, both against a police officer, affirmed. “The state produced evidence that Benn fired the shots at a uniformed police officer. Contrary to Benn's contention, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Benn knew the victim in counts 1 and 3 was a peace officer. Dawsey v. State, 234 Ga.App. 540, 541 (507 S.E.2d 786) (1998).” Fedd v. State, 298 Ga.App. 508, 680 S.E.2d 453 (June 11, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault on a police officer reduced to aggravated assault where trial court failed to instruct jury that knowledge that the victim was a police officer was an essential element of the offense. Failure to give such a charge can be harmless error where the defendant acknowledges that he knew the victim was an officer, see Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 181-182(2) (274 S.E.2d 455) (1981); “ Stevenson v. State, 234 Ga.App. 103, 106(3)(c) (506 S.E.2d 226) (1998) (failure to give the jury