☢ test - Í

instruction was deemed harmless when defendant's own testimony established that he knew that his victims were police officers);” but here defendant’s entire defense was that his eyesight was impaired by a previous assault by someone else, and he thought the officer was his prior assailant. Crawford v. State, 294 Ga.App. 711, 670 S.E.2d 185 (November 19, 2008). “Crawford contends that the trial court erred in giving the following instruction to the jury: ‘An essential element of the offense of aggravated assault on a peace officer is that the accused knew that the alleged victim was a peace officer. This may be shown by evidence of circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to know that the alleged victim was a police officer.’ The charge given is the pattern jury instruction and is a correct statement of the law. See Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, Sec. 2.20.25 (4th ed.).” Bolden v. State, 281 Ga.App. 258, 636 S.E.2d 29 (August 4, 2006). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault on a police officer: during a pat-down, officer found defendant’s bag containing drugs. “Upon seeing the officer open the bag, Bolden knocked the officer to the ground and landed on top of him. Bolden then attempted to remove the officer’s firearm from its holster. As the officer struggled to prevent Bolden from getting his firearm, the officer began to request assistance on his shoulder radio. In response, Bolden grabbed the radio and threw it into the street. Realizing that he was in mortal danger, the officer repeatedly told Bolden to ‘just go.’ Bolden initially refused the officer’s requests, telling him that it was ‘too late’ and that he ‘was going to take care of [him].’ Finally, Bolden told the officer that he would not leave because he ‘want[ed his] stuff back.’ When the officer indicated that he no longer had Bolden’s drugs, Bolden got up, grabbed the drugs off the ground, and ran away.” Adams v. State, 280 Ga.App. 779, 634 S.E.2d 868 (July 27, 2006). “‘It is well established that a speeding driver who uses a car offensively against a police officer during a high-speed chase can be guilty of aggravated assault on a police officer.’ (Citations omitted.) Dyer v. State, 222 Ga.App. 289, 290(1) (585 S.E.2d 81) (2003).” Accord, Branton v. State , 292 Ga.App. 104, 663 S.E.2d 414 (June 19, 2008). Easley v. State, 266 Ga.App. 902, 598 S.E.2d 554 (April 9, 2004). “‘“Intent to injure is not an element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.... It is the reasonable apprehension of harm by the victim of an assault by a firearm that establishes the crime of aggravated assault, not the assailant’s intent to injure.”’ Tanner v. State, 259 Ga.App. 94, 95(1)(a) (576 S.E.2d 71) (2003) (footnote omitted). ‘[O]nly an intent to commit the act which in fact places another in reasonable apprehension of injury is required, not a specific intent to cause such apprehension.’ Maynor v. State, 257 Ga.App. 151, 154 (570 S.E.2d 428) (2002). At trial, Easley admitted that he had intended to fire the gunshots out the window and that he had known police officers were in the vicinity. The police officers’ testimony fully authorized the jury to find that they were placed in reasonable apprehension of injury. The evidence was clearly sufficient to have authorized a rational trier of fact to find Easley guilty of the two counts of aggravated assault upon a police officer beyond a reasonable doubt.” Accord, Williams v. State , 299 Ga.App. 345, 682 S.E.2d 586 (June 25, 2009). Elrod v. State, 265 Ga.App. 335, 593 S.E.2d 879 (January 29, 2004). Conviction for aggravated assault on a police officer, by ramming the officer’s patrol car with defendant’s pickup truck, reversed; defendant requested and was entitled to a charge on felony obstruction as a lesser included offense. “‘A written request to charge a lesser included offense must always be given if there is any evidence that the defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense.’(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 132 (442 S.E.2d 444) (1994).” Also, trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that “‘knowledge is an essential element to the offense of the aggravated assault of a peace officer ... [and] the jury must be charged that knowledge is an essential element to the crime.’ [Cit.] ... The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to this element, even absent request, was error.” 3. AGGRAVATED BATTERY Jackson v. State, 316 Ga.App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (July 3, 2012). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; evidence was sufficient to support “serious disfigurement” element of aggravated battery. “[T]he evidence showed that Jackson's former girlfriend bore scars as a result of her stab wounds. Whether the scars rose to the level of serious disfigurement was a factual issue for the jury to resolve. See Grace v. State, 210 Ga.App. 718, 719(2) (437 S.E.2d 485) (1993); Barfield v. State, 170 Ga.App. 796, 797(2) (318 S.E.2d 219) (1984). Nor was the State required to present expert testimony from a physician to prove serious disfigurement. See Holloway v. State, 269 Ga.App. 500, 503(2) (604 S.E.2d 844) (2004). The jury, which heard from the girlfriend and saw her scars, was authorized to find from the evidence that the girlfriend was seriously disfigured as a result of the knife attack. See id.”