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Morey v. State, 312 Ga.App. 678, 719 S.E.2d 504 (November 3, 2011). Evidence supported convictions for aggravated battery and other offenses. Contrary to defendant’s contention, evidence supported “the allegation of the indictment that Joshua's brain had been rendered ‘useless, in violation of OCGA § 16–5–24.’” “Here, evidence was presented to show that after the attack, Joshua was unable to finish high school and he could no longer look after his younger cousin Gerard as he had previously; he had trouble communicating and ‘[s]low reactions’; and [other supporting facts].” Accord, Jackson v. State , 314 Ga.App. 806, 726 S.E.2d 63 (February 17, 2012) (‘severe injury to the brain, resulting in the loss of normal brain functioning,” sufficient to support aggravated battery conviction.). Powell v. State, 289 Ga. 901, 717 S.E.2d 215 (October 17, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed, but evidence didn’t support conviction for aggravated battery based on pouring acid on the victim, apparently after she was already dead. ““In order to constitute aggravated battery, the bodily harm to the victim must occur before death.” Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856(3) (268 S.E.2d 339) (1980). There was no evidence presented at trial from which the jury could conclude that the victim was not dead at the time the muriatic acid was poured on her. Compare Hall v. Terrell, 285 Ga. 448(II)(C) (679 S.E.2d 17) (2009); Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730(1) (571 S.E.2d 788) (2002).” Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga.App. 468, 718 S.E.2d 808 (October 13, 2011). Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for aggravated battery: “the victim testified that her jaw did not function normally after she was injured. Specifically, she could not open or close her mouth without severe pain. Nor could she lie on the left-hand side of her face. She continued to have trouble eating because she could not open her mouth as far as she could before the injury. She incurred extensive medical bills and, at the time of trial, had an appointment to see a specialist.” Reynolds v. State, 311 Ga.App. 119, 714 S.E.2d 621 (June 24, 2011). Aggravated battery and related convictions affirmed; disfigurement of victim’s face was sufficient to meet element of offense that a member of the victim’s body be rendered useless. In re: Q.S., 310 Ga.App. 70, 712 S.E.2d 99 (June 16, 2011). Evidence was insufficient to support delinquency adjudication based on aggravated battery (or disrupting public school, but sufficient as to aggravated assault); although victim suffered short-term memory loss and cognitive impairment after being beaten by Q.S. and her accomplices, no evidence supported a finding that the beating was the proximate cause of these injuries. “For purposes of aggravated battery, one causes another to suffer an injury when her conduct is a ‘proximate cause’ of the injury , or, put another way, a cause that, ‘in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces [the] injury, and without which the [injury] would not have occurred.’ State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 648(2), 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). ‘In a criminal case, proximate cause exists when the accused's act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the victim's injury ... and the injury ... was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.’ Chaney v. State, 281 Ga. 481, 482(1), 640 S.E.2d 37 (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).” After the beating, doctors ordered an MRI of victim’s brain, “and this imaging revealed a preexisting brain tumor.” Victim had surgery to remove the tumor, following which she suffered complications, including memory loss and cognitive impairment. Victim’s neurosurgeon testified “that it was as likely as not that the assault had no effect at all upon the tumor” – not enough to establish probable cause beyond a reasonable doubt. Wells v. State, 309 Ga.App. 661, 710 S.E.2d 860 (May 25, 2011). Evidence supported conviction for aggravated battery “[s]ince the evidence established that Wells had caused [child victim’s] skin to be seriously disfigured, burned, and scarred” by “visible, severe burns and large hypertrophic scars on his skin.” Biggins v. State, 299 Ga.App. 554, 683 S.E.2d 96 (August 5, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery where victim’s ear required stitches and “she ‘could barely hear’ out of it.” “OCGA § 16-5-24(a) provides: ‘A person commits the offense of aggravated battery when he or she maliciously causes bodily harm to another by depriving him or her of a member of his or her body, by rendering a member of his or her body useless, or by seriously disfiguring his or her body or a member thereof.’ This Court has previously held that ears are ‘members’ under the aggravated battery statute. Rivers v. State, 255 Ga.App. 422, 424 (565 S.E.2d 596) (2002). See Drayton v. State, 167 Ga.App. 477(1) (306 S.E.2d 731) (1983). To constitute aggravated battery under the statute, ‘the bodily member need not be rendered permanently useless, and even the temporary reduced use of a bodily member may be sufficient to render it useless.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Ahmadi v. State, 251 Ga.App. 189, 190 (554 S.E.2d 215) (2001). See Ganas v. State, 245 Ga.App. 645, 647(1)(b) (537 S.E.2d 758) (2000).” Accord, Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 711 S.E.2d 660 (June 13, 2011) (fact that victim was temporarily rendered quadriplegic and required extensive therapy to walk again