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established that his legs were rendered useless). Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga.App. 821, 681 S.E.2d 248 (July 9, 2009). Trial court should have merged defendant’s two convictions for aggravated battery against same victim based on same act of pushing victim out of moving car; one count was for injuring her “lower back and buttocks,” the other for injuries to her legs. “‘[T]his question requires a determination of the [statute]'s “unit of prosecution,” or the precise act or conduct that is being criminalized under the statute.’ [ State v. Marlowe , 277 Ga. 383, 384(1) (589 S.E.2d 69) (2003)]. In its essence, the aggravated battery statute criminalizes ‘maliciously caus[ing] bodily harm to another.’ OCGA § 16-5-24(a). That the aggravated battery statute provides more than one method for committing the offense does not create separate offenses based on a single act toward a single victim. See McKee v. State, 275 Ga.App. 646, 650(5) (621 S.E.2d 611) (2005) (‘[w]ithout evidence of a legislative intent to allow multiple punishments for the same course of conduct ... acts that constitute a [single] criminal course of conduct are not punishable separately’). Compare Rouse v. State, 295 Ga.App. 61, 64(1) (670 S.E.2d 869) (2008) (one aggravated battery charge was established through evidence that the defendant broke the victim's nose, wrist and shoulder, and knocked out two of his teeth; the second aggravated battery count was established by showing that the defendant disfigured the victim's hand by burning him and causing the victim to be bitten repeatedly by fire ants). This punishes twice the same conduct against the same victim and is akin to charging a defendant with redundant crimes based on a single attack. As we stated in Mitchell v. State, 187 Ga.App. 40 (369 S.E.2d 487) (1988), when we addressed two aggravated assault charges based on different theories [fn]: ‘[b]oth charges referred to [the defendant's] assault on [the same victim], and the evidence actually showed only one attack upon [the same victim].’ Mitchell, 187 Ga.App. at 44(4). See also Adcock v. State, 279 Ga.App. 473, 475(5)(b) (631 S.E.2d 494) (2006) (holding that separate sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob were barred). Mitchell and Adcock are pre- Drinkard, but because the analysis in this case does not turn on an application of Drinkard's ‘required evidence’ test, we find their holdings persuasive here. Therefore, the offenses merged.” Adcock disapproved, Thomas v. State , 292 Ga. 429, 738 S.E.2d 571 (February 18, 2013). Yearwood v. State, 297 Ga.App. 633, 678 S.E.2d 114 (April 29, 2009). Evidence of disfigurement was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery. “Aggravated battery predicated upon serious disfigurement, whether temporary or permanent, requires proof that ‘the injury inflicted was more than a superficial wound, that is, a scrape, bruise, discoloration, or swelling. [Cits.]’ Williams v. State, 248 Ga.App. 316, 319(1) (546 S.E.2d 74) (2001). Inasmuch as the circumstances inevitably vary in each case of aggravated battery, ‘whether disfigurement is serious is best resolved by the factfinder on a case-by-case basis ... [and] is almost always a question for the jury.’ (Citation omitted.) Id. at 318(1).” Evidence of disfigurement here: “a fracture to the child's skull which necessitated a long period of hospitalization.” Accord, Pierce v. State , 301 Ga.App. 167, 687 S.E.2d 185 (November 19, 2009) (injury to victim’s thigh caused by beating with belt “was not a normal bruise, caused knots under her skin, was ‘very deep,’ and was still dark blue at the time of trial a year later;” disfigurement adequately shown); Jones v. State , 329 Ga.App. 439, 765 S.E.2d 639 (October 30, 2014) (victim “temporarily lost consciousness and could not see clearly for several days” due to severely swollen eyes”). Blanch v. State, 293 Ga.App. 750, 667 S.E.2d 925 (September 30, 2008). “ A trial court is not required to define the term ‘maliciously’ in the course of instructing a jury on the elements of aggravated battery. The term ‘has such obvious significance and common understanding that there is no need to define it in the jury charge.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Webb v. State, 228 Ga.App. 624, 624-625(1), 492 S.E.2d 312 (1997).” Carroll v. State, 293 Ga.App. 721, 667 S.E.2d 708 (September 26, 2008). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery reversed; trial court “omitted a portion of the statutory definition of battery” defining the concept of “visible bodily harm” to mean “bodily harm capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim and may include, but is not limited to, substantially blackened eyes, substantially swollen lips or other facial or body parts, or substantial bruises to body parts.” “As evidence of the jury's confusion, Carroll points to its request during deliberations: ‘We would like a definition of what is considered “seriously disfiguring” and does this definition depend on length of injury[?]’” “Carroll asserts that by omitting this portion of the statutory definition, the trial court failed to give the jury the proper framework for evaluating whether the laceration to Peacock's nose was severe enough to merit a finding of aggravated battery. We agree. We have held that ‘although “seriously disfiguring” is not defined in OCGA § 16-5-24, it must require an injury more severe than the visible wounds used to illustrate the “visible bodily harm” required to support a battery conviction.’ Williams v. State, 248 Ga.App. 316, 318-319(1) (546 S.E.2d 74) (2001). And ‘[f]undamental to any criminal case tried to a jury is the jury's understanding of the essential elements of the crimes charged in order to determine whether the [ S]tate has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Coney v. State,