☢ test - Í

290 Ga.App. 364, 369(1) (659 S.E.2d 768) (2008). Under these circumstances, without the inclusion of the definition of ‘visible bodily harm’ as defined in OCGA § 16-5-23.1(b), and especially in light of the answer given to the jury in response to its question, the jury did not have all the information required for it to determine whether the laceration to Peacock's nose would support a finding of battery or aggravated battery.” Goss v. State, 289 Ga.App. 734, 658 S.E.2d 168 (February 8, 2008). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery. 1. “ Evidence of the victim’s total loss of her wrist, even if temporary, was sufficient to prove both that she was deprived of her wrist and that it was rendered useless. See McClain v. State, 284 Ga.App. 187, 188(1), 643 S.E.2d 273 (2007) (temporary deprivation of a body member may render one ‘deprived’ of that body part under the aggravated battery statute); Daniel v. State, 271 Ga.App. 539, 540(1), 610 S.E.2d 90 (2005) (temporary reduction of the use of a bodily member may be sufficient to render it ‘useless’); Ahmadi v. State, 251 Ga.App. 189, 190, 554 S.E.2d 215 (2001) (temporary loss of the victim’s finger rendered it useless). The evidence was thus sufficient to prove both methods of aggravated battery as alleged in the indictment.” 2. “ Goss also asserts that a wrist is not a ‘member’ of the body as contemplated by OCGA § 16-5-24. Goss cites no authority in support of that proposition, however, and we can find none. Rather, a wrist is a joint in the arm, much like an elbow and a shoulder, injury to which we have previously held can form the basis of a conviction for aggravated battery .” Accord, Serchion v. State , 293 Ga.App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (August 26, 2008) (shoulder is a “member” for purposes of aggravated battery). 3. Defendant’s aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions did not merge. “In order to prove aggravated assault as alleged in Count 2, the state had to prove that Goss assaulted the victim with the intent to murder her by either stabbing her or cutting her throat. [fn] See OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(1). As alleged in Count 4, the aggravated battery charge required the state to prove that Goss maliciously caused harm to the victim by seriously disfiguring her throat or her arms. [fn] See OCGA § 16-5-24(a). Thus, a conviction could be sustained on Counts 2 and 4 based on different conduct: a conviction on Count 2 could be based on the cutting of the victim’s throat, while a conviction on Count 4 could be based on the serious disfigurement of her arms. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by entering judgment on both counts. See, e.g., Waits [ v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 4(2), 644 S.E.2d 127 (2007)].” Jones v. State, 283 Ga.App. 631, 642 S.E.2d 331 (February 20, 2007). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery; a nose is a “bodily member” such that depriving the victim of its use met the definition of the offense. “‘ The accepted definition of bodily “member” is “bodily part or organ,” ’ quoting Mitchell v. State , 238 Ga. 167, 168, 231 S.E.2d 773 (1977). “ ‘“Depriving” the victim of a member of her body may refer to the loss of the use of the member.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rivers [ v. State , 255 Ga. App. 422, 424, 565 S.E.2d 596 (2002).] … [T]he victim’s drainage problem and blood leakage from her nose prior to surgery, as well as her nose was still not ‘all the way’ at the time of trial, could constitute evidence of loss of use, thus depriving her of that bodily member. Finally, Jones’ contention that medical testimony is required to demonstrate loss of use is incorrect. See, e.g., Williams v. State , 262 Ga.App. 698, 699(1), 588 S.E.2d 755 (2003) (in an aggravated battery case, expert testimony is not required to prove the loss of use of an eye).” See also Rivers, supra (aggravated battery conviction affirmed; “the victim was deprived of her tooth”) and Ganas v. State , 245 Ga.App. 645, 537 S.E.2d 758 (2000) (broken little finger, “which had healed ‘for the most part’ at the time of trial, could constitute depriving the victim of that member.”). Ferrell v. State, 283 Ga.App. 471, 641 S.E.2d 658 (February 6, 2007). Evidence was sufficient to prove “serious disfigurement”: “[victim] Wolford testified that her eye socket was broken in three places, causing her eyeball to recede into her head. She also broke her cheekbone and her nose in two places each, broke four ribs, and her adenoids and eardrums burst. Wolford’s injuries required her to undergo multiple surgeries, including having wires placed in her cheekbone and eye socket, her eye pulled back into place, and a plastic implant placed behind her eye. ‘Whether the injuries were seriously disfiguring was a jury question.’ Holloway v. State, 269 Ga.App. 500, 503(2) (604 S.E.2d 844) (2004). The jury was authorized to find that Wolford’s facial injuries constituted serious disfigurement. See id; Parnell v. State, 280 Ga.App. 665, 667- 668(1)(c) (634 S.E.2d 763) (2006) [see below]; Johnson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 413, 415- 416(1) (579 S.E.2d 809) (2003) (broken nose is sufficient to prove disfigurement); Code v. State, 255 Ga.App. 432, 433(1) (565 S.E.2d 477) (2002) (broken jaw is sufficient to support aggravated battery conviction).” Accord, Seymore v. State , 300 Ga.App. 523, 685 S.E.2d 772 (October 19, 2009) (jury could find seious disfigurement from broken nose, scars to face, stitches over eyes, face swollen and covered with blood, eyes swollen shut for four to five days); Feagin v. State , 317 Ga.App. 543, 731 S.E.2d 778 (August 30, 2012) (“The jury was authorized to find that the victim's severely swollen, bruised eye and eye socket fracture constituted serious disfigurement.”). Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (November 6, 2006). “While it is true that one cannot suffer an aggravated battery from wounds inflicted after death, see, e. g., Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730 (561 S.E.2d 788) (2002),