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chance to show sobriety.’” Court properly sustained objections to these arguments as being burden-shifting , but was not required to grant mistrial; curative instructions to the jury were sufficient. Stone v. State, 257 Ga.App. 306, 570 S.E.2d 715 (September 6, 2002). While prosecutor can’t comment on defendant’s silence, “‘another issue altogether is presented when the defendant gives one version of his [story] to the police and then gives the jury a different version,’” quoting Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). It was not error to allow the prosecutor to draw “permissible deductions based on the discrepancy” between the two stories. Thomas v. State, 254 Ga.App. 129, 561 S.E.2d 468 (March 6, 2002). Prosecutor made statements in closing that the only witnesses to take the stand were State witnesses and that jurors could not “evaluate anybody else’s testimony because nobody else testified.” Held, prosecutor’s statements did not warrant a mistrial as State has right to argue that defendant failed to rebut or contradict evidence demonstrating guilt and the prosecutor’s arguments made in this case do not show a manifest intention on the part of the prosecutor to comment upon defendant’s failure to testify, nor were the remarks of such a character that a jury would necessarily construe them as a comment on defendant’s failure to testify. Salters v. State , 244 Ga.App. 219, 535 S.E.2d 278 (May 26, 2000). Conviction for attempted escape and related offense affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument wasn’t improper. In closing, prosecutor commented that evidence hadn’t developed as promised in defense opening statement. “In context, the statements by prosecuting counsel were not an impermissible reference to Salters's failure to testify but a response to argument made in the defense's opening statement claiming the proof of certain evidence.” Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; prosecutor’s sentencing phase closing argument was not objectionable comment on defendant’s right to remain silent where he noted that none of defendant’s mitigation witnesses had ever heard defendant repent or say he was sorry. Lassiter v. State, 237 Ga.App. 495, 515 S.E.2d 636 (April 5, 1999). “In Ranger v. State, 249 Ga. 315, 319(2), 290 S.E.2d 63 (1982), the Supreme Court concluded that one of the following must be found before reversing based upon a prosecutor's improper comment on the defendant’s failure to testify: (1) that the prosecutor intended to comment upon the defendant's failure to testify, or (2) that the remark was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. We must look at the context in which the prosecutor’s statement was made in order to determine if either of these two factors exist. Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 88(7)(a), 402 S.E.2d 41 (1991).” Neither factor existed here, where prosecutor merely referenced defendant’s statement to police declaring his innocence “and outlined how he anticipated defense counsel would use this statement during closing argument.” Spears v. State, 296 Ga. 598, 769 S.E.2d 337 (February 16, 2015). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; evidence supported prosecutor’s sentencing phase argument that defendant was likely to kill again if death penalty wasn’t imposed. “As outlined within the prosecuting attorney's closing argument, Spears's confession showed that he was willing to and had planned to commit other murders and that he had no concern about the number of murders that he might commit.” Defendant also told officers, ““What difference does it matter what I do now?” and “If you're gonna go to Hell, one sin or ten sins, what difference does it make?” Brown v. State, 325 Ga.App. 237, 750 S.E.2d 453 (November 8, 2013). Terroristic threats and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to prosecutor’s single reference to future dangerousness in closing argument. “The prosecutor's remark was an isolated comment during his explanation of the cycle of violence within Brown's and Miller's relationship. The State's single, off-hand comment does not rise to the level of egregiousness necessary to establish prejudice under Strickland. See Hambrick v. State, 278 Ga.App. 768, 771–772(3) (629 S.E.2d 442) (2006).” Wright v. State, 319 Ga.App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (February 11, 2013). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Prosecutor’s closing argument, suggesting the defendant’s future dangerousness (“the next time he does this, he might shoot somebody”), was improper, but “highly probable that any error in failing to comply with OCGA § 17–8–85 based 16. CONTENT – FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS See also cases under subheading CONTENT – DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, above; Compare cases under subheading CONTENT – SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY, below