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upon the single comment did not contribute to the verdicts” considering: trial court’s cautionary instruction to counsel; single isolated remark; jury instruction not to consider closing argument as evidence; and strength of evidence against defendant. Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012). Murder convictions affirmed, although death sentences reversed on other grounds; prosecutor’s argument wasn’t objectionable for referring the defendant as “the monster everyone fears” and as “a monster with a hammer.” “We … see no merit in Ellington's contention that the brief characterization of him as a ‘monster everyone fears’ improperly injected the issue of his possible future dangerousness, which was irrelevant in the guilt/innocence phase.” Holsey v. State, 316 Ga.App. 801, 729 S.E.2d 465 (June 21, 2012). Terroristic threats and related convictions affirmed; no reversal required by prosecutor’s improper closing argument. “Holsey … argues that the trial court erred by failing to give curative instructions after he objected when, during closing argument, the prosecutor improperly: (1) argued that the jury should take the case seriously because a member of the jury panel—the person was not selected to be on the jury—had a daughter murdered by her boyfriend; and (2) referred to the ‘domestic violence cycle.’ … Here, the prosecutor's comment regarding the member of the jury pool was arguably an improper violation of the prohibition against future dangerousness arguments. [Cits.] And there was no testimony admitted regarding the domestic violence cycle. Error resulting from a violation of OCGA § 17–8–75, however, ‘is subject to harmless error analysis.’ [Cit.] The trial court specifically instructed the jury in this case that the closing arguments of counsel were not evidence.” Given this instruction, the evidence in the case, and the fact that defendant was found not guilty on some charges, “‘we conclude that it is highly probable that the trial court's error in failing to ... perform its duty under OCGA § 17–8–75 did not contribute to the verdict.’ Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 521, 524(5), 640 S.E.2d 274 (2007).” Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438 (November 9, 2009). At defendant’s capital murder trial, trial court properly sustained defense objection to prosecutor’s closing argument, but denied motion for mistrial: “When, during closing argument, the prosecutor began a hypothetical vignette involving Arrington's killing a female prison guard, defense counsel objected on the ground that there was no evidence that Arrington had ever been a security risk while incarcerated. The trial court properly sustained Arrington's objection and gave a curative instruction to the jury to disregard the vignette. See Henry v. State, 278 Ga. 617, 619-620(1) (604 S.E.2d 826) (2004) (‘[I]t is improper for the State to argue that a defendant will kill in prison simply because he killed while free.’). We discern no abuse of the trial court's discretion in its denial of Arrington's motion for a mistrial. See Flowers v. State, 252 Ga. 476, 479(2) (314 S.E.2d 206) (1984).” Emmanuel v. State, 300 Ga.App. 378, 685 S.E.2d 361 (October 7, 2009). At defendant’s aggravated assault trial, prosecutor’s arguments “that a not guilty verdict would be the same as giving the defendants' guns back to them,” and “asking the jurors if the victim would be the ‘last baby’ killed if a ‘not guilty’ verdict was rendered” were improper “future dangerousness” arguments, but adequately addressed where “the trial judge took corrective action and admonished the prosecutor to confine his arguments to the facts of the case.” Murray v. State, 297 Ga.App. 571, 677 S.E.2d 745 (April 17, 2009). At defendant’s trial for aggravated sexual battery, prosecutor’s remark in opening statement was not improper: “these little girls ... are coming here seeking justice and safety and protection.” “Remarks that the victims are seeking justice ( Carr v. State, 282 Ga.App. 199, 200(2) (638 S.E.2d 348) (2006)), safety ( Hines v. State, 246 Ga.App. 835, 837(3) (541 S.E.2d 410) (2000)), or protection ( Hambrick v. State, 278 Ga.App. 768, 770(3) (629 S.E.2d 442) (2006)) are not improper comments upon the defendant's punishment or future dangerousness.” Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240, 675 S.E.2d 28 (March 9, 2009). Objection to alleged future dangerousness argument was waived by failure to object, notwithstanding “‘OCGA § 17-8-75 which requires a judge to prevent counsel from making improper arguments. The statute, however, only requires the judge to act where counsel makes a timely objection. [Cit.] In this case, [Henderson] did not object.’ Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 495(1) (422 S.E.2d 188) (1992).” Accord, Tidwell v. State , 306 Ga.App. 307, 701 S.E.2d 920 (October 1, 2010); Hutchinson v. State , 318 Ga.App. 627, 733 S.E.2d 517 (October 26, 2012); Hargrove v. State , 291 Ga. 879, 734 S.E.2d 34 (November 5, 2012). Walker v State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (October 9, 2007). At sentencing phase of defendant’s capital murder trial, “Walker argues that the prosecutor argued improperly by suggesting that Walker had left a gun silencer in his apartment for use in a future crime if he succeeded in the murder of the victim in this case. Upon our review of the record, we find