☢ test - Í

that the argument was not improper, because there was evidence presented at trial about the silencer’s having been discovered in Walker’s apartment and because a silencer is something likely to be used in criminal activity. See Braley v. State, [276 Ga. 47, 54 (572 S.E.2d 583) (2002)] (‘[R]eliable evidence of bad character ... is admissible in the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial.’); Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868(4) (268 S.E.2d 316) (1980) (‘Any lawful evidence which tends to show [the defendant’s] predisposition to commit other crimes is admissible in aggravation.’). Compare Henry v. State, 278 Ga. 617(1) (604 S.E.2d 826) (2004) (reversing where there was no evidence to support the argument that the defendant would present a future danger in prison).” Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (June 25, 2007). In sentencing phase of death-penalty trial, argument on future dangerousness was not objectionable where supported by the evidence – here, defendant’s own testimony. “The prosecutor argued before the jury a scenario presenting Rivera’s future dangerousness to a young female prison nurse. ‘ Arguments addressing [future dangerousness] are not improper if based on evidence adduced at trial. ’ Ross v. State, 254 Ga. 22, 34(7) (326 S.E.2d 194) (1985), overruled on other grounds, O'Kelley v. State, 278 Ga. 564 (604 S.E.2d 509) (2004).” At sentencing phase, defendant himself testified and asked for the death penalty “because I couldn’t stop before and I still can’t stop. I just still fantasize about, about hurting people.” “Furthermore, there was testimony in the record that Rivera had been involved in several physical fights while in jail, showing that the structure of incarceration had not suppressed his propensity for violence. Therefore, the State’s argument that he would prove a danger to a female employee of the prison system was narrowly tailored to and logically based on the evidence before the jury. Compare Henry v. State, 278 Ga. 617, 619-620(1) (604 S.E.2d 826) (2004) (improper for the State to argue that a defendant will kill in prison simply because he killed while free).” Carpenter v. State, 285 Ga.App. 296, 645 S.E.2d 709 (May 8, 2007). Closing argument was not an improper argument as to future dangerousness: “Carpenter argues that the prosecutor’s argument was improper because it asked the jurors to imagine themselves in the victim’s place and implied that Carpenter posed a threat of danger to others if the jury failed to convict her. We disagree. During his closing argument, the prosecutor said, ‘ You know, at the most in this case, the victim, Chris Rhodes, looked at that defendant [with a] mean [expression], in his own home . I’ll tell you, if that’s all it takes to shoot somebody, all of us married people are going to be a little bit worried. There’s going to be blood in the streets. That’s not what the law of self-defense is about. You don’t go to somebody’s house in the middle of the night and show up and bust in their house and be justified in shooting them . … Contrary to Carpenter’s claim, the prosecutor’s argument did not ask the jury to put themselves in the victim’s place. Neither did the argument imply that the defendant represented a future danger to society. Instead, the argument demonstrated that it would be nonsensical to find that a mean look could justify a shooting. Given that Carpenter’s defense relied on the jury finding that she was justified in shooting Mr. Rhodes, this argument was not improper.” Clark v. State, 285 Ga.App. 182, 645 S.E.2d 671 (April 27, 2007). In defendant’s prosecution for selling cocaine, trial court did not abuse discretion by allowing prosecutor to argue “on the connection between illegal drugs and crime in the community.” Jones v. State, 285 Ga.App. 121, 645 S.E.2d 602 (April 16, 2007). “[Co-defendant] McCoy contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor, during his closing argument to the jury, described the crimes [of armed robbery] as early morning terror and random acts of violence and then asked the jurors, ‘Who’s next? Is it one of you?’ Rather than granting a mistrial, the trial judge admonished the prosecutor and instructed the jurors that the prosecutor’s comments were inappropriate, were not proper for their consideration and should be disregarded. ‘Whether to grant a mistrial for improper argument is a matter largely within the trial court’s discretion. The trial court has other options, including the rebuke of counsel and providing curative instructions.’ (Citations omitted.) Lloyd v. State, 280 Ga. 187, 192(2)(d)(ii), 625 S.E.2d 771 (2006). In the instant case, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to rebuke counsel and give curative instructions, rather than grant a mistrial, due to counsel's improper argument.” Mikell v. State, 281 Ga.App. 739, 637 S.E.2d 142 (October 4, 2006). “Mikell … contends that the prosecutor argued future dangerousness when he made statements such as ‘What’s scarier is what’s going to happen if you let him go’ and ‘If you release this man you are releasing a sexual predator.’ … [W]e agree. ‘It is manifestly improper for a prosecutor to argue to the jury during the guilt-innocence phase of any criminal trial that if found not guilty, a defendant poses a threat of future dangerousness.’ [ Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860, 864(2)(b) (485 S.E.2d 470) (1997).] Here, the State prosecutor’s statements clearly raised the issue of future dangerousness and were improper. However, we determine that these statements did not constitute reversible error. Given the overwhelming evidence of Mikell’s guilt, which included the victim’s testimony and the testimony of her younger sister who witnessed the incident, it is highly unlikely that this single