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portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument contributed to the guilty verdict. See id. at 865(2)(b); Kirk v. State, 271 Ga.App. 640, 645(2) (610 S.E.2d 604) (2005).” Navarro v. State, 279 Ga.App. 311, 630 S.E.2d 893 (May 11, 2006). “Navarro … objects to the prosecutor telling jurors that ‘[t]his is your opportunity to tell the defendant and the rest of his gang members that this type of behavior is not acceptable, that the citizens of Gwinnett County will not stand for it, that he can’t lie behind the bushes in the shadows and hurt innocent people.’ However, this argument does not implicate Navarro’s future dangerousness. Rather, the prosecutor was referring to Navarro’s past conduct, which is permissible. [Cit.]” Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (April 27, 2006). Full court opinion. Overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). 1. Victim’s boyfriend testified that “I had always thought that [Glidewell] was capable ... of harming [the victim].” Held, this was not objectionable as a comment on future dangerousness; [i]n context of [boyfriend] Kempf’s testimony, Kempf was simply explaining his motives for going to Glidewell’s Hawaii residence.” 2. “Glidewell further contends that his trial counsel were deficient for failing to object to certain of the prosecutor’s references to the testimony of Glidewell’s former wives and girlfriends, which was tantamount to commenting on his future dangerousness. In particular, he highlights the prosecutor’s statement that: ‘ They really wanted to be here. You know why? Every one of them realizes it could have just as easily been one of them .’ In context, the prosecutor was arguing that the witnesses wanted to testify and not that Glidewell was likely to do harm in the future if he was not found guilty. Pretermitting whether the argument was otherwise proper, it was not an argument as to future dangerousness, and Glidewell’s counsel was not deficient for failing to object on that ground.” Hambrick v. State, 278 Ga.App. 768, 629 S.E.2d 442 (March 14, 2006). Argument that domestic violence victim who still desired to live with defendant “needs protection” was not, in context, a future dangerousness argument; “the argument as a whole was not addressed to Hambrick’s ‘probable future behavior.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) [ Fulton v. State , 278 Ga. 58, 65, 597 S.E.2d 396 (June 7, 2004).] Reading the statement in context, it is apparent that the prosecutor was addressing the central contested issue in the trial: the victim’s recantation of her earlier statements implicating Hambrick and her trial testimony that Hambrick did not rape or kidnap her and that she was the aggressor in a fight rather than the victim of an assault. … Although the statement complained of could be construed as a mention of Hambrick’s future dangerousness, the prosecutor’s argument was not addressing that issue but rather seeking to explain the reasons for the victim’s recantation at trial. ‘A court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting for lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hammond v. State, 260 Ga. 591, 597(5) (398 S.E.2d 168) (1990). The prosecutor’s argument, taken as a whole, shows a reasonable explanation for her remark other than an argument of future dangerousness, and we will not conclude that it was intended as such or reverse the trial court’s denial of Hambrick’s motion for a mistrial.” See note on Fulton (June 7, 2004), below . Henry v. State, 278 Ga. 617, 604 S.E.2d 826 (November 8, 2004). Defendant’s death sentence reversed; prosecutor’s closing argument that he posed future danger to prison personnel was not supported by evidence. Three justices dissent, finding that prosecutor could properly argue that the crime at issue showed that defendant would kill to get what he wanted. Distinguished, Hall v. Brannan , 284 Ga. 716, 670 S.E.2d 87 (November 3, 2008) (prosecutor’s argument that defendant presented a risk of future dangerousness in prison was supported by evidence of violent acts while in jail). Fulton v. State, 278 Ga. 58, 597 S.E.2d 396 (June 7, 2004). “‘It is manifestly improper for a prosecutor to argue to the jury during the guilt-innocence phase of any criminal trial that if found not guilty, a defendant poses a threat of future dangerousness.’ Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860(2b), 485 S.E.2d 470 (1997). A defendant’s probable future behavior is not relevant where the jury, as here, decides only the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Mason v. State, below, 274 Ga. 79(2c), 548 S.E.2d 298. A prosecutor argues future dangerousness when the prosecutor asserts there will be more victims if the defendant is not found guilty [cits.] or the community or witnesses will be endangered if the defendant is not found guilty. [Cits.] The prosecuting attorney’s assertion in the case at bar that [defendant] was a ‘menace to our society’ and a ‘cancer in the community’ that needed to be excised ‘to protect the community’ and, ostensibly, the jurors since there were ‘no walls around [defendant’s neighborhood] that would prevent something like this from happening in your communities’ is an argument to the jury that the defendant poses a threat of future dangerousness if not found guilty.” Distinguished in Hambrick (March 14, 2006), above. Accord, Jones v. State , 288 Ga. 431, 704 S.E.2d 776 (January 10, 2011). Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813, 596 S.E.2d 582 (May 3, 2004). Prosecutor made improper argument when she “commented on Pearson’s dangerousness and stated that ‘[i]f he is not stopped, someone else will be next.’”