☢ test - Í

Collier v. State, 266 Ga.App. 345, 596 S.E.2d 795 (March 18, 2004). “Pervasive” themes of prosecutor’s closing argument – that jury should convict and punish defendant because his prior sentences on similar offenses were inadequate, and that defendant posed a future danger – “distorted the jury’s role” and “ran afoul of fundamental fairness” and should have resulted in mistrial. Distinguished in Navarro v. State , 279 Ga.App. 311, 630 S.E.2d 893 (May 11, 2006) (theme of prosecutor’s closing – “Navarro’s alleged gang affiliation” – was supported by evidence, and thus not “unfair.”). Williams v. State, 261 Ga.App. 511, 583 S.E.2d 172 (June 5, 2003). Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to object to prosecutor’s closing argument which included as a major theme references to defendant’s future dangerousness and references to the Columbine shootings and bombings of public buildings. (Defendant was on trial for criminal trespass and obstruction.) Mason v. State, 274 Ga. 79, 548 S.E.2d 298 (June 4, 2001). In his closing argument, the ADA asked the jury to consider the credibility of a certain witness, how that witness had been treated on the stand, and what incentive that witness had to lie. He then stated, “Logic. He’s telling you the truth. He’s telling you the honest truth.” The ADA also told the jury that defendant “must be stopped. It’s apparent that he’s not going to do it unless you stop him…Please, please stop him.” Held: The statements as to credibility “are permissible since they are the conclusion the prosecutor wished the jury to draw from the evidence, and not a statement of [his] personal belief as to the veracity of a witness.” Accord, Boyd v. State , 289 Ga.App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (January 16, 2008) (prosecutor urged jury that they could tell minor victim was telling the truth). Nickerson v. State, 248 Ga.App. 829, 545 S.E.2d 587 (February 6, 2001). Prosecutor’s arguments that the Defendant posed a future danger were improper, but harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Stroud v. State, 272 Ga. 76, 526 S.E.2d 344 (February 14, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument, “that an acquittal would give the defendants ‘a license to do it again,’” was improper, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Moore v. State, 242 Ga.App. 249, 529 S.E.2d 381 (February 4, 2000). Armed robbery and firearms convictions affirmed. “Moore contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not object when the prosecutor stated during his closing argument (1) that a witness who testified against Moore might be in danger and (2) that Moore had served only 14 years of a 20-year sentence for his prior armed robbery conviction. We agree with Moore that the prosecutor's closing remarks were highly inappropriate and provided grounds for not only objections from the defense, but also a rebuke from the trial judge. Nevertheless, this case is not in a posture where we are simply reviewing errors by the prosecutor but is before us in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As noted above, such a claim requires a showing of both error and prejudice to the defendant.” Future dangerousness: Contrary to defendant’s argument, however, counsel did object to the future dangerousness argument; trial court denied motion for mistrial but gave curative instruction. Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 519 S.E.2d 221 (July 6, 1999). Murder and related convictions affirmed.“ The issue of a defendant's future dangerousness is relevant in the sentencing phase [of a death penalty case] and the prosecution's reference thereto in this case was proper given evidence of Johnson's attack on a jailer. Pye v. State, 269 Ga. 779(19), 505 S.E.2d 4 (1998).” 17. CONTENT – GENERALLY Peoples v. State, 295 Ga. 44, 757 S.E.2d 646 (April 10, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; reversal not required where prosecutor referred to individual jurors by name during closing argument. “In Atlanta Stove Works, Inc. v. Hollon, 112 Ga.App. 862 (146 S.E.2d 358) (1965), our Court of Appeals noted that ‘[i]t has been held in other jurisdictions that it is improper for counsel to single out a particular juror, address him by name, and personally appeal to him, ... and such practice was disapproved by this court in the case of Hudson v. State, 26 Ga.App. 596, 600 [(107 S.E. 94) (1921)].’ Atlanta Stove Works, 112 Ga.App. at 873 (additional citation omitted). See also Burrell v. State, 225 Ga.App. 264, 268 (483 S.E.2d 679) (1997) (stating, without citation of authority, that a solicitor's reference to a juror by name during closing arguments was ‘improper’). [fn] Although trial lawyers have always made arguments with the backgrounds of specific jurors in mind, we agree that remarks addressed to jurors by name during trial are almost always unnecessary and may put the fairness of the trial at risk; such remarks therefore should be avoided by counsel for all parties—particularly prosecutors in criminal cases—and may be precluded by the trial court in its