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discretion. See generally 75A AmJur2d Trial § 471 (collecting cases on the issue of addressing jurors individually or by name); Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 335–336 (745 S.E.2d 630) (2013) (recognizing the trial court's discretion to control the manner in which counsel address the jury). The mere mention of jurors by name does not, however, mandate reversal. Where, as occurred here, references to individual jurors are made incidentally in the course of illustrating points of law, rather than in an effort to draw the attention of the named jurors or the entire jury to facts not in evidence or to other improper considerations, it is within the trial court's discretion, after sustaining an objection to such comments, to deny a motion for mistrial. See Atlanta Stove Works, 112 Ga.App. at 873 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion for mistrial based on counsel's reference to a juror by name, where ‘the remarks were based on matters already legitimately appearing in the case and the naming of the juror was necessary in order to point out the alleged prejudicial fact of the common employment’ of the juror with the other party's expert witness); United States v. Kyle, 257 F.2d 559, 564 (2 nd Cir., 1958) (‘The reference to two of the jurors by name by the prosecutor in the course of an argumentative illustration was innocuous.... It added nothing to the case and might have been better omitted but it was certainly not “injurious to the accused.”’ (citation omitted)).” Thompson v. State, 320 Ga.App. 150, 739 S.E.2d 434 (March 7, 2013). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing prosecutor to make part of his closing argument while seated on the witness stand. Rainly v. State, 307 Ga.App. 467, 705 S.E.2d 246 (November 30, 2010). In defendants’ prosecution for armed robbery and related offenses, no improper argument by prosecutor: “Earlier [i.e., in defense closing] you heard a lot of misdirection. What you need to focus on is the evidence and on the truth.” “When viewed in the context in which it was made, the prosecutor's argument referencing magic and misdirection and request that the jury focus on the evidence did not exceed the wide latitude permitted in closing argument.” Defendant complained that the argument “improperly disparaged trial counsel.” Ham v. State, 303 Ga.App. 232, 692 S.E.2d 828 (March 29, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument was not improper: “As I listen to the defense attorneys here, I was wondering during the trial when they were going to stop prosecuting [victim] and start representing their clients, defending their clients.” Smith v. State, 294 Ga.App. 692, 670 S.E.2d 191 (November 19, 2008). Prosecutor’s comments describing rape defendant “as a ‘sharp predator looking for somebody walking up and down the street’ … fell within the very wide latitude enjoyed by counsel as a permissible inference drawn from the state's evidence.” Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 599, 669 S.E.2d 98 (November 3, 2008). “The prosecution's statement that defense counsel would ‘do anything or say anything’ to obtain acquittals is troubling. Defense counsel would certainly have been within their rights to object, and the trial court would not have abused its discretion had it sustained the objection.” No showing of ineffective assistance in failing to object, however, as “there are often sound tactical reasons for not objecting to every improper statement made by the prosecution during closing argument.” Stroud v. State, 284 Ga.App. 604, 644 S.E.2d 467 (March 28, 2007). Prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, but not harmful: referring to the child molestation victims, prosecutor remarked, “‘If you find [Stroud] not guilty, you are saying they made [the allegations] up for nothing.... That doesn’t make sense. It just does not make any kind of sense that they put themselves through this for nothing. But that’s what [Stroud] wants you to believe. That's what the defense wants you to believe, and that's what your legal system does, our wonderful legal system, of which, I guess, I am a part. I will humiliate the victims but protect the abusers, and then sit around and judge every little detail about the victims’ lives. I am not proud to be an attorney right now, but it’s what I do.’” “[C]losing argument in the nature of negative characterizations of the criminal justice system ‘is not any reasonable and permissible inference to be drawn from the evidence adduced at trial and [is] disproved.... We find it unnecessary and undesirable for prosecutors to resort to such characterizations. … We strongly condemn the remarks cited in this case.” Banks v. State, 281 Ga. 678, 642 S.E.2d 679 (March 19, 2007). Prosecutor’s argument was within counsel’s “wide latitude”: “But that defense is used so much we have a name for it. We call it the whore defense. And basically what it is, is you try to run down the victim so bad, you call them a whore to where either people don’t care or think they deserved it. That’s what that is. It’s designed to play on prejudices they’re hoping you have. In other words, it’s designed on the low opinion of you. That is what that defense is.”