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Appling v. State, 281 Ga. 590, 642 S.E.2d 37 (February 5, 2007). “[Defendants] maintain that the trial court erred by allowing the State to characterize the defense as a ‘fraud; during closing argument [fn]. The prosecutor argued that the defense cross-examination of State witnesses was a fraud because when [defendants] ultimately testified, they both admitted certain facts in issue, e.g., their presence at the scene. The wide leeway given to argue all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence during closing argument, see Smith v. State , 279 Ga. 48 (2), 610 S.E.2d 26 (2005), encompasses pointing out inconsistencies in a defendant’s testimony and urging that, on that basis, the defendant lied. Nichols v. State , 281 Ga. 483, 640 S.E.2d 40 (January 8, 2007).” Collins v. State, 283 Ga.App. 188, 641 S.E.2d 208 (January 5, 2007). “‘[A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting for lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hambrick v. State, 278 Ga.App. 768, 772(3) (629 S.E.2d 442) (2006).” Carswell-Danso v. State, 281 Ga.App. 576, 636 S.E.2d 735 (September 15, 2006). Prosecutor’s brief reference to “prison” in closing argument did not require mistrial. “During closing argument, the prosecutor commented that ‘[Carswell-Danso] doesn't want to be found guilty, [and] she doesn’t want to go to prison.’ Even assuming without deciding that this statement was improper, the court’s prompt curative instruction – requesting the jury to disregard any reference to prison and not to be concerned with punishment – was sufficient to prevent any possible prejudicial effect. See McPherson v. State, 274 Ga. 444, 451(11) (553 S.E.2d 569) (2001).” Ellis v. State, 279 Ga.App. 902, 633 S.E.2d 64 (June 20, 2006). “Ellis asserts that the trial court erred when it ruled his counsel could not point out in her closing argument that the State failed to submit photographs of the victim’s injuries. The record shows that the trial court granted Ellis’s motion to exclude photographs showing the victim’s injuries based upon the State’s failure to produce them to Ellis ten days before trial. During Ellis’s closing argument, the trial court agreed with the State’s contention that the defense could not successfully move to exclude the evidence and then argue a negative inference from the State’s failure to present the same evidence. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling. ‘It would be manifestly unfair to prevent the prosecution from presenting evidence and at the same time comment upon the prosecution’s failure to do so.’ Piast v. State, 230 Ga.App. 222, 223(1) (495 S.E.2d 875) (1998).” Steverson v. State, 276 Ga.App. 876, 625 S.E.2d 476 (December 14, 2005). Prosecutor’s commentary on the type of person defendant spends time with, as part of closing argument, was not improper when relevant and supported by the evidence. “Steverson … argues that trial counsel should have objected and moved for a mistrial when, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated that she wished she could bring in church-going witnesses to ‘tell you that they witnessed a horrible act of child molestation in this county. But I can’t do it because people that are hanging around with Donnie Steverson are not Sunday School teachers. Becky Bryant, she’s all we have.’ Steverson argues that the comment about the type of people with whom he associates improperly placed his character in issue. We disagree. ‘Attorneys are allowed considerable latitude in making closing arguments, and they may draw any inference from the evidence so long as that inference is both reasonable and legitimate.’ [Cits.] Here, the prosecutor’s comment was a fair inference drawn from the evidence. Steverson testified that he and Bryant lived together for periods of time; that Bryant was a thief and a drug user; and that she had a violent temper. Other defense witnesses testified to Bryant’s bad character. Trial counsel testified that he did not object to the prosecutor’s closing argument because Steverson had ‘already admitted that he hangs around with a whore, a prostitute, and a drug ... user.’ Because the prosecutor’s comment was a reasonable, legitimate comment on the evidence, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to it.” Level v. State, 273 Ga.App. 601, 615 S.E.2d 640 (June 9, 2005). “‘Counsel enjoys very wide latitude in closing arguments, and may make use of well-known historical facts and illustrations, so long as he does not make extrinsic or prejudicial statements that have no basis in the evidence.... Counsel’s illustrations during closing argument may be as various as are the resources of his genius; his argumentation as full and profound as his learning can make it; and he may, if he will, give play to his wit, or wing to his imagination. (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Head v. State, 276 Ga. 131, 135(6), 575 S.E.2d 883 (2003).’ James v. State, 265 Ga.App. 689, 690(1)(a), 595 S.E.2d 364 (2004).” Here, counsel gave an example of circumstantial evidence: a chocolate cake with a hole in it, and a young boy nearby with chocoloate on his face and hands. Accord, Harris v. State , 279 Ga. 522, 615 S.E.2d 532 (June 30, 2005) (“a prosecutor’s flights of oratory and figurative speech in opening statements and closing arguments are not reversible error;” here, prosecutor called defendant “totally evil” in opening statement.); Peterson v. State , 282 Ga. 286, 647 S.E.2d 592 (July 13, 2007) (“During closing argument, the State referred to Peterson as ‘evil’ and untruthful.”).