☢ test - Í

Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 544, 604 S.E.2d 503 (October 25, 2004). Prosecutor’s misstatement during closing argument that defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was adequately corrected by prosecutor’s own acknowledgment of the misstatement and trial court’s curative instruction; no mistrial required. Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 598 S.E.2d 488 (June 28, 2004). “[A] videotape in evidence may be shown to the jury during closing arguments. See Berryhill v. State, 249 Ga. 442(11) (291 S.E.2d 685) (1982) (replaying of testimony); Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 354(8) (490 S.E.2d 75) (1997) (replaying portion of videotape during closing argument).” Al-Amin v. State, 278 Ga. 74, 597 S.E.2d 332 (May 24, 2004). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. No reversal based on “cumulative error” in argument. “Georgia does not follow a cumulative error rule of prejudice. Morrison v. State , 276 Ga. 829, 583 S.E.2d 873 (2003).” Compare to Collier (March 18, 2004), below. Accord, Dixon v. State , 268 Ga.App. 215, 601 S.E.2d 748 (June 30, 2004). Rambo v. State, 266 Ga.App. 791, 598 S.E.2d 85 (April 6, 2004). “‘Remarks not likely to prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial do not create reversible error.’ (Citation omitted.) Ortiz v. State, 222 Ga.App. 432, 434, 474 S.E.2d 300 (1996).” Prosecutor’s brief criticism of defense counsel during closing argument, even if objectionable, did not likely “contribute to the verdict.” Collier v. State, 266 Ga.App. 345, 596 S.E.2d 795 (March 18, 2004). “ Pervasive” themes of prosecutor’s closing argument – that jury should convict and punish defendant because his prior sentences on similar offenses were inadequate, and that defendant posed a future danger – “distorted the jury’s role” and “ran afoul of fundamental fairness” and should have resulted in mistrial . Compare to Al-Amin (May 24, 2004), above. Distinguished in Navarro v. State , 279 Ga.App. 311, 630 S.E.2d 893 (May 11, 2006) (theme of prosecutor’s closing – “Navarro’s alleged gang affiliation” – was supported by evidence, and thus not “unfair”). Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; prosecutor’s characterizations of defendant during guilt-innocence phase closing argument “as a ‘misogynistic, woman hating demon of the devil’ and ‘Satan's lap dog’ … were unprofessional and should not have been made,” but did not mandate mistrial. Mann v. State, 240 Ga.App. 809, 524 S.E.2d 763 (November 5, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; prosecutor was properly allowed, in her closing argument, to use similar transaction evidence previously admitted to impeach defendant who had subsequently testified. “It is quite true that, at the time defendant's prior cocaine conviction was tendered, it was admissible only as a similar transaction. But thereafter, Mann elected to testify in his own behalf. Since defendant took the stand, he was subject to impeachment for his prior conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute because that conviction represented both a felony and a crime involving moral turpitude. Lewis v. State, 243 Ga. 443, 446, 254 S.E.2d 830 (1979). Accord Kyler v. State, 270 Ga. 81, 84(10), 508 S.E.2d 152 (1978). The State's attorney was entirely within her rights to comment on that prior conviction for purposes of impeachment in her closing argument.” Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 519 S.E.2d 221 (July 6, 1999). Murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecution’s argument wasn’t improper. “It is not improper for the State to vigorously urge that mercy is not appropriate in the case at hand. Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715(23), 352 S.E.2d 762 (1987). When viewed in context, the State's argument ‘Do not be swayed by pleas for mercy and sympathy and let mercy and sympathy come from a higher Court’ clearly reflects that the ‘higher Court’ referred to by the State is a higher spiritual power and not an appellate court. Therefore, this argument did not violate Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).” Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 515 S.E.2d 610 (May 17, 1999). “The prosecutor did not go outside the boundaries of permissible argument when she told the jury that ‘this is your community,’ nor when she said that defense counsel did ‘an excellent job’ and was ‘a very, very good attorney,’ that rap music ‘refers to women in derogatory terms,’ or that Laney had a ‘smirk’ on his face during the trial. See Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 204, 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996) (counsel are allowed considerable latitude of speech). See also McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 385, 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996) (prosecutor may urge jury to convict for safety of community); Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439, 447, 469 S.E.2d 129 (1996) (not improper to comment on defendant's courtroom demeanor), reversed on other grounds, Greene v. Georgia, 519 U.S. 145, 117 S.Ct. 578, 136 L.Ed.2d 507 (1996).”