☢ test - Í

James v. State, 270 Ga. 675, 513 S.E.2d 207 (March 1, 1999). No error in allowing prosecutor to argue “the deprivations [murder victim’s] family would suffer due to his absence. Argument which evokes sympathy for the family of a victim is not necessarily improper. ‘In fact, we have held that it is not error to remind the jury that family members of the victim do not now have a mother, wife or sister .’ Dupree v. State, 267 Ga. 38(3), 472 S.E.2d 299 (1996).” 18. CONTENT – GOLDEN RULE/VICTIM IMPACT Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; no Golden Rule violation in prosecutor’s argument, “I would turn in my badge if I let you forget [victims].” Spears v. State, 296 Ga. 598, 769 S.E.2d 337 (February 16, 2015). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s sentencing phase argument violated Golden Rule by personalizing the future dangerousness of the defendant if not sentenced to death: “If given the chance, this man in the future will kill again. If he gets a life sentence and is serving time in prison, it could be a prison guard, it could be a fellow inmate. If he ever escaped, it could be you, it could be a family member, another innocent bystander.” No reasonable probability that the argument influenced the sentencing phase verdict, however; “the prosecuting attorney's violation of the ‘Golden Rule,” … was a marginal one whose impropriety was not obvious from our prior case law.” Reeves v. State, 329 Ga.App. 470, 765 S.E.2d 407 (November 4, 2014). Burglary and related convictions affirmed (but theft by receiving charge reversed for lack of evidence); no improper improper golden rule argument: “you heard from all of the victims this morning. And they came in and they testified about how they left their house, and when they came back and they had that horror of finding your home has been broken into. And they described that each of them had the same MO, the modus operandi, the same exact way.” “The record shows that the ‘your’ in the challenged remark referred to the victims and their reactions in finding that their homes had been (allegedly) burglarized, not to the jurors. See generally McKibbins v. State, 293 Ga. 843, 849–850(3)(b) (750 S.E.2d 314) (2013); Smith v. State, 294 Ga.App. 692, 707–708(10)(i)(i) (670 S.E.2d 191) (2008); Johnson v. State, 263 Ga.App. 443, 449–450(3)(c) (587 S.E.2d 775) (2003).” Coghlan v. State, 319 Ga.App. 551, 737 S.E.2d 332 (January 16, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed; State’s closing argument wasn’t improper “golden rule” argument. Prosecutor argued that “[t]he Defendant made a choice and that choice was to get behind the wheel ... putting not only her life in danger, but the life of any other citizen who was on the roads traveling or walking in danger also.” Defendant contended that “these remarks … implied that the jurors (as ‘citizen[s]’) were potential victims in this case.” Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012). Murder convictions affirmed. Not improper “golden rule” arguments: “‘the last thing that [victims] felt was hard cold steel crashing through flesh and bone from someone who vowed to love and cherish and from someone they called daddy.’ [Prosecutor] also said, ‘On behalf of Berna and in memory of Berna, of Cameron, of Christian and on behalf of their family I want to thank you ... for your attention in this case.’” “[A]lthough the first argument treads close to being improper by referring to what the victims ‘felt,’ we conclude that the argument focused the jury's attention on the evidence showing the nature of the acts Ellington committed against the victims rather than directly asking jurors to place themselves in the position of the victims, and therefore it was not impermissible. The second quoted argument was unobjectionable. Compare Braley [ v. State, 276 Ga. 47, 55, 572 S.E.2d 583 (2002)] (holding that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask the jurors to ‘imagine what it was feeling like for [the victim]’).” Hargrove v. State, 291 Ga. 879, 734 S.E.2d 34 (November 5, 2012). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no improper “golden rule” argument. “Here, the record demonstrates that the prosecutor's complained of remarks did not ask the jurors to put themselves in the victim's place with regard to the crime, but rather to consider the feelings of the victim's family. See Sanders v. State, 290 Ga. 637, 640, 723 S.E.2d 436 (2012).” Jones v. State, 318 Ga.App. 342, 733 S.E.2d 400 (October 19, 2012). Convictions for rape, aggravated sodomy, false imprisonment, and escape affirmed; no improper references to victim impact. “After summarizing Jones's defense, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider the implausibility of Jones's defense that the victim fabricated the rape allegations to ‘get back at [him] for stealing a computer.’ In particular, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider whether it sounded reasonable for the victim to fabricate the charges when she would have to ‘act upset’ when the police arrived, submit to an invasive medical examination, and testify at trial where she would be subjected to cross-examination. The prosecutor told the jury that if it could ‘stomach’ Jones's defense and find it reasonable, it should ‘let him go.’ Read in context, the